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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to establish the significance of 
the Augustan period in the history of law-making and of various 
important areas of Roman Law. Clearly, the demise of the Roman 
Republic and the emergence of a princeps could not fail to be 
reflected in a system which had evolved, along with the Republic 
itself, over five centuries, and which was, therefore, closely 
linked with Republican institutions and processes. The varied 
Republican channels of law-making continued to be employed under 
Augustus, but never before had one man enjoyed sufficient power 
and auctoritas to enable him to oversee a large law-making 
programme as Augustus did. 
In chapter 1, i survey briefly the many enactments which are 
attributed in the evidence to the Augustan period after about 19 
B. C., particularly those which can confidently be categorised as 
statutes, senatusconsulta or edicts, in order to see what happened 
to the Republican sources of law under Augustus and to look at the 
sorts of issues which were regulated by law during the Augustan 
period. The remaining chapters are devoted to the most important 
and best documented Augustan statutes, the lex Iulia de maritandis 
ordinibus and the lex Papia Poppaea (chapters 2 and 3), the lex 
Iulia de adulteriis coercendis (chapter 4) and the lex Aelia 
Sentia and the lex Fufia Caninia (chapter 5). The purpose of 
these chapters is to examine the individual statutes in detail and 
to see what policies and aims may be detected in them in order to 
assess their importance in the history of these areas of Roman Law 
and as reflections of the aims and achievements of Augustus in 
general. The most important observations made in all five 
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LAW-MAKING IN THE AUGUSTAN PERIOD 
No one would deny that the Augustan period was a crucial one in 
the history of Rome, marking as it did the 'transition from the 
Republic to the Empire. This transition had major implications for 
law-making, for the advent of an Emperor raised many questions 
regarding the continuing relevance of the various Republican law- 
makng channels and regarding the competence of the Emperor to 
influence the formulation of the law. In this chapter I hope to 
survey briefly the many enactments attributed to the Augustan period, 
to examine Augustus's attitude to and relationship with those bodies 
and individuals involved in law-making during the Republic and to 
assess the responsibility of Augustus for the emergence of the -later 
situation whereby the pronouncements of the Emperor in various 
different capacities came to be acknowledged by the classical jurists 
as possessing the force of law. 
There is no room here to discuss the far-reaching question of 
sources of law under the Republic about which much has been written 
(1). Any such discussion would have to take into account concepts 
such as natura, consuetudo, moo, aeguitas etc.. The aim of this 
chapter is primarily to see what happened under Augustus to the 
Republican sources of "declared" law, although the question of the 
role of the jurists is too important to leave aside. 
The most important Republican sources of "declared" law were 
statutes (leges and plebiscita) proposed by magistrates to the 
popular assemblies. Most of those enacted in the Republic regulated 
public law issues, but there were a few relating to private law, 
notably the famous lex Aquilia of 287 B. C. Also important were 
senatusconsulta. The evidence for Republican senatusconsulta shows 
that the Senate did not confine its resolutions to its particular 
spheres of competence, finance and foreign policy. The Senate was 
clearly expected to act at times of crisis, for the convening of a 
popular assembly was a slow and a cumbersome procedure. 
Nevertheless, there is little or no evidence of the Senate passing 
decrees relating to private law issues (2). 
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A question which has caused some controversy among scholars is 
whether or not senatusconsulta enjoyed strictly law-making status 
during the Republic (3). By the time of Gaius they were regarded as 
law-making (4) although Gaius adds that the Senate's right to make 
law had been questioned. Watson believes that the Senate did not act 
as if it had law-making powers in the Republic on the ground that its 
resolutions were addressed to magistrates rather than to all citizens 
and that senatusconsulta were only enforceable by being incorporated 
into edicta or leger. Crifo, on the other hand, takes the view that 
if in practice magistrates applied the principles laid down by 
senatusconsulta, then the latter were law-making. Since the Romans 
had no theory of "sources of law" under the Republic, Crifö must 
surely be right to argue that what happened in practice is the 
important issue. Watson's arguments are, in any case, rather shaky s 
it cannot be demonstrated that every single senatusconsultum for 
which there is evidence was incorporated into a lex or edictum, and 
even if it could, this-does not necessarily point to a lack of 
efficacy on the part of senatusconsulta. Those who believe that 
senatusconsulta gained law-making status under the. Empire cannot 
designate a certain point at which this occurred, and there is little 
doubt that senatusconsulta enjoyed as much efficacy in practice 
during the Republic as they did under the Empire. 
Magisterial edicts, and especially the praetorian edict, were 
another important source of law in the Republic, although, as Stein 
argues (5), they were not regarded by Cicero as "written" law because 
they were only valid during the magistrate's term of office, and a 
magistrate might not write down all the principles on which he would 
base his actions. Nevertheless, much was written down and carried on 
from year to year (and thus Gaius in the second century A. D. 
classified edicts as written law (6)) and the praetor's edict came to 
be a very influential factor in the development of private law by the 
end of the Republic (7). By this time, a substantial body of rules 
had grown up through the activity of the praetor alongside the ius 
civile, rules'which were designed, according to Pomponius, 'adiuvandi 
vel supplendi vel corrigendi iuris civili gratia'(8). 
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Closely related to the activity of the praetor was-that of the 
jurists who had an important advisory role to play in the formulation 
of magisterial edicts as well as in the courts. Clearly, in a system 
where magistrates and judges were men possessing no particular legal 
expertise, advice from experts wam indispensable. Frier (9), 
however, believes that it was not until the last years of the 
Republic that juristic science began to assume a r8le of real 
importance in the development and application of Roman law. Previous 
to this, he argues, jurists tended to be men of senatorial rank who 
were politically motivated and gave advice in return for support at 
elections. Juristic science, however, became less attractive as a 
political tool in the last century of the Republic for various 
reasons, not least the overshadowing of jurisprudence by oratory, and 
men of equestrian status began to replace senators in this sphere 
(10). Prier believes that the absence of political motivation among 
the new equestrian jurists of the Ist century B. C. resulted in a 
greater interest in the law for its own sake on their part. Be 
further claims that three external factors -contributed to the 
increasing importance of the r81e of the jurists,. namely the spread 
of the citizenship (which resulted in a multiplication of the number 
of cases to be judged), increase in commerce and in personal wealth 
(which also gave rise to more law-suits) and political instability 
(which created a desire for a clearer distinction between public and 
private law). All of this, he believes, contributed to an increase 
in the weight accorded to the pronouncements of the jurists. Prier's 
theory is not without flaws : it lacks supportive evidence and surely 
underrates the contribution made by the "senatorial" jurists who, 
even if politically motivated, still had an important part to play in 
the system. Nevertheless, his thesis is attractive and well argued, 
and there is no reason to doubt that the part played by the jurists 
in the formulation and application of the law was indeed assuming 
greater importance by the end of the Republic. 
-3- 
AUGUSTAN ENACTMENTS 
Evidence for enactments of the Augustan period exists in both 
the juristic and non-juristic sources. While the juristic sources 
almost invariably label the various enactments as statutes, 
senatusconsulta, etc., the non-juristic sources do not, and since 
Dio, Suetonius, Tacitus and others sometimes use loose and non- 
technical terminology, it is at times difficult to determine from 
their accounts how a particular measure was enacted and what legal 
form, if any, it possessed (11). Some scholars, notably Biondi, have 
nevertheless classified some of these doubtful measures as leges, a 
classification which, in the absence of more specific evidence, does 
not seem to me to be justified. Given the title of this chapter, my 
concern is primarily with those measures which can confidently be 
labelled as statutes, senatusconsulta and edicts. I intend also to 
limit my survey of Augustan enactments to the period after about 19 
B. C., thus omitting the enactments of the earlier period, many of 
which were introduced in order to offer various titles and privileges 
to him and which are not relevant to the arguments of-this thesis. 
STATUTES 
Several scholars have produced lists of Augustan statutes, 
notably Rotondi (12), Gualandi (13)land Biondi and Arangio-Ruiz (14). 
A useful survey is provided elsewhere by Arangio-Ruiz (15). 
Lex Iulia de colleaiis 
According to Suetonius, both Julius Caesar and Augustus 
introduced rules concerning collegia (16). s he says that they both 
banned all collegia (which were clearly thought to be politically 
subversive and had been the objects of a spate of legislation in the 
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last century of the Republic) except for ancient ones. A few 
scholars have doubted that there was an Augustan lex de collegiis 
(17), but the evidence of an inscription (18) seems to confirm that 
there was. The inscription relates to a colleaium symphoniacorum: 
quibus senatus c(oire) c(onnocari) c(ogi) permisit e lege iulia ex 
auctoritate Aug(usti) ludorum causa. 
The most plausible interpretation of the evidence is that a law was 
passed by Caesar and subsequently revived by Augustus. It is easy to 
see the political motivation behind such a law on the part of both 
Caesar and Augustus. 
As for the date of the law, Rotondi places it in 21 B. C., while 
Mitteis (19) favours 7 B. C. on the basis of an inscription of this 
date (20) which records the granting of authorisation to a collegium 
fabrorum tianariorum. This, however, by no means proves that the law 
was passed in this year, and the little evidence that exists for the 
law does not justify any firm dating (21). 
There was a spate of legislation during the years 18-17 B. C. 
and this has led Arangio-Ruiz to argue that all of the leaes Iuliae 
should be attributed to this two-year period. In order to sustain his 
argument, however, Arangio-Ruiz has to assume that any law of 
uncertain date belongs to this period and he is guilty of fitting the 
evidence around his theory. Nevertheless, the period 18-17 B. C. was 
clearly characterised by intense activity in statute-making and a 
number of laws can be confidently assigned to the period, the lex 
Iulia de maritandis ordinibus, the lex lulia de adulteriis 
coercendis, the lex Iulia de ambitu, the leaes Iuliae de- iudiciis 
publicis et privatis, the lex sumptuaria, the lex de annona and the 
leges Iuliae de vi publica et privata. 
Lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus : 
Lex Iulia de'adulteriis coercendis 
see relevant chapter 
see relevant chapter 
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Lex Iulia de ambitu (or ambitus) 
Like the lex Julia de collegiis, this law was clearly 
politically motivated and in the Republican tradition. (There is 
evidence for four Republican laws de ambitu between 67 and 52 B. C. ). 
Dio places in IS B. C. a law which debarred from office for five years 
anyone who had used bribery to gain office, and Suetonius includes a 
lex de ambitu in his list of Augustan laws (22). As for the juristic 
evidence, a title of Justinian's Diges 'de lege Iulia ambitus'(23) 
contains an excerpt from the jurist Modestinus, and the Sententiae of 
Paul contain a section entitled 'ad legem Iuliam ambitus'(24). The 
Modestinus passage shows that a pecuniary penalty in addition to that 
of infamia was fixed by a senatusconsultum for those who contravened 
the terms of the lex in a municipium. If the purpose of the sc was 
to extend to the municipia the rules of the lex, and if Dio's passage 
indeed refers to the lex de ambitu, then more than one penalty must 
have been introduced. Alternatively, the sc may have been 
responsible for the introduction of the pecuniary penalty. Yet 
another penalty is mentioned in the passage from Paul's Sententiae, 
where the jurist says that if a candidate incites a mob in the course 
of electioneering he is guilty of vis and is to be deported to an 
island (25). 
Lewes Iuliae iudiciorum publicorum et privatorum (26) 
There seem to have been two separate laws, the lex lulia 
iudiciorum publicorum and the lex Iulia iudiciorum privatorum, 
although they are referred to in various different ways 'in the 
sources (27). Some scholars have regarded them as one law, while 
others have argued for the existence of three laws, the third 
relating to municipal jurisdiction, on the basis of Gaius, Inets. 
4.30 (28). Mommsen believed that these laws and the leaes Iuliae de 
vi were one (29). The evidence for the laws is poor, but they were 
clearly far-reaching and highly significant : they are generally 
regarded as having been crucial in the history of both civil and 
.n 
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criminal jurisdiction. The laws overlapped to some extent and were 
designed to introduce greater uniformity and better organisation to 
the civil and criminal courts. They dealt with such issues as the 
qualifications of judges, composition of juries, witnesses and length 
of trials. 
It is difficult to date the laws with certainty, but Dio, in 
his account of the events of 17 B. C., refers to measures which are 
very likely to have belonged to them (30), while one of the 
provisions attributed to them by the juristic sources suggests that 
they were passed after the lex ambitus (31). 
The provisions mentioned by Dio are that orators must not 
charge for acting as advocates and that people should not enter the 
houses of others while serving on juries. Suetonius also describes a 
number of provisions which are generally attributed to these laws 
(32). He says that when people have been waiting a long time for 
trial and the charges are not pressed, Augustus ruled that the case 
should be abandoned. Augustus also lengthened the period for the 
hearing of cases (actus rerum) by thirty days to ensure that certain 
misdeeds ('maleficium negotiumve') should not be unpunished nor such 
cases delayed. To the existing three divisions of jurors (that is, 
senators, equites and tribuni aerarii) he added another group, the 
ducenarii, to deal with minor pecuniary claims. He changed the 
minimum age of jurors from 35 to 30, and, because of reluctance to 
serve on juries, he gave to'each group one year's vacation in four 
and had no judging of cases in November and December. A passage from 
Macrobius (33) shows that cases were also not judged during the 
Saturnalia. A text of Gellius (34) indicates that the lex Iulia 
contained provisions regarding adjournments and resumptions of 
trials, while from Asconius (35) we learn that the law limited the 
number of patroni who might act for a defendant. 
Such is the information provided by the literary sources, As 
for the juristic sources, Gaius (36) mentions the abolition of the 
ancient system of legis actiones in favour of the formulary system 
except in two cases, that of damni infecti and in trials by the 
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centumviral court.. The formulary system had been provided as a 
possible alternative to the rigid legis actio system by the lex 
Aebutia of the late second century B; C., and with its flexibility had 
clearly more or less supplanted the ancient system. Augustus's 
reform in this area was therefore not as crucial as it at first 
appears and his aim seems to have been to rid the system of 
unnecessary archaisms rather than to introduce any fundamental 
reform. A more important development (and while there is no clear 
evidence which associates this with the leaes iudiciariae they may 
well have been responsible for it) was the emergence of the cognitio 
extraordinaria exercised within the new criminal courts established 
by Augustus, that of the Senate presided over by the consuls and that 
of the Emperor with his consilium (37). By the cognitio 
extraordinaria a magistrate might conduct an entire trial himself, 
thus doing away with the traditional division of a trial into two 
parts. This system was more efficient and more in keeping with the 
political circumstances of the Augustan period. 
A passage of Ulpian preserved in the Fragmenta Vaticana (38) 
confirms the close relationship between the two leaes"iudiciariae by 
attributing certain rulings to chapter 26 of the lex iudiciorum 
publicorum and to chapter 27 of the lex"iudiciorum privatorum. The 
provision being discussed in the text is exemption from iudicandi 
munus through- the possession of three children and the jurist is 
questioning whether children lost in war and nepotes may be counted. 
Other provisions relating to iudicia privata ruled that a person 
might not act as an arbiter when on the list of judges (39), that an 
under 20 should not be compelled to act as a judge (40), that the 
iudicium might be agreed upon between the parties (41) and that if a 
iudicium legitimum was not judged within is months it should be 
dropped (42). 
Changes were likewise made in the iudicia public a. Here 
Augustus seems to have aimed to provide more uniformity among the 
various very diverse Quaestiones by laying down rules for all 
criminal trials. A text of Paul (43) shows that rules were laid down 
concerning the drawing up. of libelli, while another excerpt from 
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Justinian's Digest stipulates that a person may not make two 
accusations concurrently unless he is the injured party in both (44). 
According to Macer (45), a case may--be re-tried if the accuser in a 
former trial in which the defendant was absolved was guilty of 
praevaricatio. Papinian attributes to the lex publicorum a provision 
regarding the capital accusation of a slave (46) and Paul says (47) 
that by the terms of this law people must not be compelled to give 
evidence against adfines and cocnati. A passage from Modestinus' 
second book de poenis (48) attributes to the law a provision which 
forbade the defendant and prosecutor to enter the house of the judge 
on pain of transgressing the lex lulia ambitus. 
Further light is cast on the leges iudiciorum by epigraphical 
evidence. A passage from Augustus' edictum de a uaeductu Venafrano 
(49) shows that they contained provisions concerning the rejection of 
recuperatores, while the Augustan edicts to Cyrene contained measures 
(such as stipulations concerning the age and qualifications of 
judges) regulating the judiciary system there, measures perhaps based 
on the reforms effected at Rome by the leeres iudiciorum. 
There is evidence for other Augustan measures which are 
regarded by some scholars as separate. enactments but by others as 
part of the judiciary laws. A passage of Gaius (50) mentions a lex 
lulia in connection with cessio bonorum by a debtor, which according 
to evidence elsewhere (51), was no longer to involve loss of liberty 
nor infamia. There are two differing views on this, one that there 
was an Augustan lex Iulia de cessione bonorum which revived a 
Caesarian law, the other that the lex lulia mentioned here by Gaius 
is the lex iudiciorum privatorum (52). It is difficult to see how a 
provision of this nature would have fitted in with what we' know of 
the provisions of the judiciary laws, and in spite of the paucity of 
evidence, it is likely that there was indeed such a lex. 
Some scholars also argue for the existence of a lex lulia de 
suffragiis iudicum on the basis of a passage of Dio (53). Here, after 
r 
desclibing the conspiracy of Caepio and Murena in 22 B. C., he says that 
some of the jury voted to acquit them and that Augustus therefore 
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ruled ((voro8E th6q that the vote should not be taken in secret in 
trials at which the defendant was absent and that all of the jurors 
must vote to convict him. That such"a ruling was made by Augustus is 
quite impossible : Dio cannot be believed here. According to Momunsen 
(54) what should be understood here is that because Augustus insisted 
on a show of hands in such trials, everyone in practice did vote for 
condemnation : this is a plausible suggestion. Dios use of 
P 00 EVONo9ET16t does not necessarily imply that a formal law was passed 
and there is no other evidence for a law of this kind. Given the 
nature of the ruling (that the vote should not be taken in secret) it 
is likely that, even if it was enacted in 22 B. C, it was later 
incorporated into the judiciary laws. 
Leges Iuliae de vi publica et privata 
As in the case of the judiciary laws, some of the evidence 
implies that there were two laws while some implies that there was 
only one, and scholars are therefore divided (55). If. there were two, 
they were very closely related and scholars have found it impossible, 
especially given the later development of the concept of vis, to 
make clear distinctions between public and private vis. As has 
already been mentioned, Mommsen identified the legislation concerning 
vis with the judiciary laws. While vis clearly did feature in the 
judiciary laws, this merely illustrates the close connections between 
many of the laws-of Augustus (56). 
4 
This legislation was clearly very extensive, for in one passage 
Ulpian mentions the provisions of the 88th chapter (57). There is no 
mention- of it in the literary evidence, but there are titles in 
Justinian's Digest 'ad legem Iuliam de vi publica'(58) and 'ad legem 
Iuliam de vi privata'(59) and sections of Paul's Sententiae and of 
the Collatio are devoted to it. 
Söge provisions can easily be categorised as relating to public 
vis, such as that which forbade possessors of Imperium to kill, beat 
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or torture a Roman citizen adversus provocationem (61). Thus the 
Republican right of provocatio was reinforced. Another provision 
stipulated that a defendant must not be prevented from reaching Rome 
within the requisite period in order to make his appeal (62). There 
are various other offences mentioned in the excerpts' collected in 
Justinian's Digest 48.6 ('ad legem Iuliam de vi publica'). The law 
forbade the collection of arms and weapons except for hunting, 
travelling or sailing (63) and penalised those who had slaves or free 
men armed with the intention of stirring up sedition (64). There 
were provisions designed to prevent disruption of the course of 
justice s thus, for example, it was forbidden to have a weapon with 
malicious intent in a place where justice was dispensed (65). 
Another excerpt from this chapter of the Digest (66) shows that 
stuprum (presumably rape) was forbidden by this law as well as by the 
adultery law. A passage from Paul's Sententiae (67) adds to this the 
rule already mentioned under the lex de ambitu, that a person who 
stirs up a mob in the course of electioneering should be relegated to 
an island as guilty of vis publica. Elsewhere, however, the penalty 
for vis publics is designated as aquae et ignis interdictio (68). 
An important provision is specifically assigned in Paul's 
Sententiae to the lex lulia de vi privates. The law penalised those 
who used force to drive a person from his property or to shut him in 
(69). Nicolet (70) argues that this sort of measure was designed to 
end "private justice", and adds that vis of this nature was ancient 
rural custom for evicting a debtor or a person whose ownership of 
property was disputed. The same text of Paul's Sententiae shows that 
the law also penalised those who did not allow a person to be buried 
or who threw out a body and those who caused sedition or arson. 
Given the similarity between these rules and those of the lex 
de vi. publica, it is not surprising that scholars have had difficulty 
in distinguishing between public and private vis. Again, there are 
juristic excerpts ascribed to both, laws by the compilers of 
Justinian"s Diciest concerning a prohibition against stealing by force 
(71) and concerning a provision which forbade flogging and beating 
(72). Another-Digest excerpt assigned to the lex de vi publics (73) 
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describes a provision which prohibited the use of force to place a 
person under an 'obligation : this is similar to the provision 
assigned by Paul (74) to the lex de vi privata which penalised a 
creditor who forcefully gained a pledge from a debtor. Reminiscent 
of the rulings of the lex de vi publica is a, provision assigned by 
Paul to the lex de vi privata (75) which incriminated a person who 
tried to prevent. someone by force from being brought to justice. 
A passage from Julian (76) ascribes to the lex Plautia et Iulia 
a ruling that ownership may not be acquired by usucapio of anything 
possessed by force, and this is confirmed by Gaius (77). The 
reference here must be to the lex Iulia de vi which presumably either 
confirmed this ruling of the Republican lex Plautia or enlarged upon 
it. 
Biondi (78) separates from the other evidence three texts 
which, he believes, assign provisions wrongly (on the ground of their 
content) to the lex Iulia de vi. One text (79) assigns to the lex a 
provision which allowed those who enjoyed exercitio to delegate it, 
and another (80) describes a provision which allowed a new accuser to 
start afresh a prosecution if the original accuser was unable to 
continue. The third text (81) is more significant because it 
purports to provide a verbatim quotation from the 87th and 88th 
chapters of the law concerning those who were not allowed to give 
evidence under this law. This category included those under puberty, 
those convicted in a iudicium publicum, gladiators and such like and 
close relatives if they were not willing. There seems to me to be no 
good reason to doubt Ulpian's claim to be quoting from the lex Iulia 
de vi, especially since the text is confirmed by an excerpt from 
Callistratus preserved in Justinian's Digest (82). 
Although the offences of vis publics and vis privata were 
sufficiently similar to make it difficult for scholars to disentangle 
them from each other, the penalty for vis privata was less severe 
than that for vis publica. Those convicted had one third of their 
property confiscated and they were debarred from being senators, 
decurions or judges. It is difficult to separate the Augustan 
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rulings de vi from later rulings, but there is no doubt that the 
leges Iuliae were significant statutes in the history of the law of 
vis. The various means of redress against violence which existed 
under the Republic such as the praetor's interdicts unde vi and de vi 
armata were clearly not very effective (83). Brunt believes that 
Augustus's lex was aimed "not at common criminals, but at offenders 
who had the money and power to organise armed bands and terrorize 
their neighbours, precisely as Cicero says Clodius terrorised 
Etruria-(84). Such a political motivation on the part of Augustus is 
very plausible. He seems generally to have wished to consolidate 
Republican rulings on the issue of vis and to provide more effective 
redress by making it a crime punishable under the terms of a 
comprehensive statute. 
Lex Iulia sumptuaria 
A lex sumptuaria is attested by Suetonius (85) and by Aulus 
Gellius (86). According to Gellius, limits were placed on the 
duration of and expense involved in banquets and weddings. Dio also 
mentions, under the events of 22 B. C., that Augustus placed limits on 
public banquets. He does not, however, portray this as a law, but 
rather as an example of Augustus taking on the role of censor, and it 
may well have been incorporated into a formal law at a later date. 
Elsewhere (87) Dio says, in connection with Augustus' measures on 
marriage and adultery that he admonished women about their dress, and 
some scholars have attributed thisito the lex sumptuaria (88). The 
passage does not , however, justify assigning such a measure to any 
particular law. The fact that Suetonius seems to group this law with 
the law de adulteriis et de pudicitia has led to the theory that the 
lex sumptuaria' was part of the adultery law (89): however the 
evidence for the adultery law provides no support for this. 
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Lex lulia de annona 
The existence of a lex lulia de annona is well attested in the 
juristic sources (90), although Mom®sen attributed it to Caesar (91). 
According to a passage of Ulpian (92), the, law penalised anyone 
responsible for the formation of a societas which increased the price 
of corn and anyone who hindered its transportation. Various dates 
have been suggested, notably 7 B. C. (93). Whatever the exact date, a 
law which checked speculation by limiting freedom of contracts and 
which perhaps reinforced the Emperor's responsibility for overseeing 
the corn supply would have been in the Augustan mould. 
Lex Quinctia de aquaeductibus 
The evidence for this law is found in Prontinus, De aquis urbis 
Romae, 129, where a full text of the law is preserved. The law 
belongs to 9 B. C. and owes its name to its proposer, the consul 
T. guinctius Crispinus. It penalised anyone who caused damage to or 
obstructed the water supply of Rome and empowered curators and 
praetors to deal with offenders. 
Lex Fufia Caninia s see relevant chapter 
Lex Aelia Sentia see relevant chapter 
Lex (Iulia) de vicesima hereditatum 
It is clear that Augustus instituted a 5% inheritance tax in 
order to finance the aerarium militare (94). Dio ascribes the 
measure to A. D. 6 and says that Augustus exempted close relatives and 
very poor people, claiming that he had taken over the idea from 
1 
Caesar's writings. The tax was ratified in 13-B-C- . Whether or not 
this measure is to be identified with the lex de vicesima hereditatum 
mentioned in the juristic sources has been the subject of scholarly 
debate (95). A passage of Gaius (96), for example, mentions a 
provision of the lex de vicesima hereditatium, that the securities 
required by this law should be exempt from the stipulation of the lex 
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Cornelia which limited the amount of money for which one person might 
be surety in relation to the same creditor and debtor. A section of 
Paul's Sententiae entitled de vicesima (97) also mentions a lex 
(par. 3) and outlines various rules concerning how and when the will 
is to be opened. The jurist, Macer, seems to have written two books 
of commentary 'ad legem de vicesima hereditatium' (98). The fact 
i that Dio uses the word Koc're6'T1f 6n(TO in the passage mentioned provides 
no proof that Augustus did not actually enact a law on this issue, 
given that Dio often uses loose, non-technical language, and while 
the jurists do not ascribe the law to Augustus, there is no evidence 
to associate it with anyone else. The institution of the vicesima 
hereditatum was not atall popular, as Dios account suggests, since 
Italy had been more or less free from taxation in the late Republic. 
Nicolet (99) believes that since inheritances left to close 
relatives were exempt from the tax (as, evidently, were smaller 
inheritances) the effect of the law was to discourage the common 
practice of leaving money to friends and freedmen in favour of 
handing money down within families and thus "discouraging the 
breaking up and too rapid decay of private estates". 
Lex Papia Poppaea see relevant chapter 
It is worth while mentioning a few laws which are sometimes 
ascribed to Augustus, although of doubtful authorship : 
Lex iulia maiestatis 
i 
Many scholars believe that Augustus enacted a lex lulia 
maiestatis (100) designed to penalise any act which threatened the 
security of the state (101). Others believe that there was no 
Augustan lex Julia maiestatis and that all of the juristic evidence 
for such a law refers to a Caesarian lex (102). The existence of a 
Caesarian lex iulia maiestatis is clearly attested by Cicero (103). 
There is, however, no firm evidence for an Augustan lex and the 
arguments of those who believe that there was one are by no means 
conclusive. " One of the main arguments, for example, is based on a 
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text of Marcian (104) in which the jurist, describing a provision of 
the law, uses the phrase 'iniussu principis', a phrase which, it is 
argued, cannot be Caesarian. Nor, however, can the phrase be 
Augustan : it is obvious that Marcian is not quoting the law verbatim 
in this text, but is representing the law as it was applied in his 
day. Another argument is based on the fact that, although the 
Caesarian law replaced the death penalty with that of aquae et ignis 
interdictio, Augustus was still able to put Caepio and Murena to 
death on charges of maiestas in 23 B. C., the assumption being that 
the Augustan law introduced the death penalty (105). But this 
argument is not conclusive either s as Allison and Cloud point out, 
there is plenty of evidence to show that Augustus, like subsequent 
Emperors, appropriated for himself a privileged position in relation 
to the law. In any case, the date most favoured for an Augustan lex 
Iulia maiestatis is 8 B. C., long after the conspiracy. 
Lex Zulia de tutela 
There are some references in the sources to a lex lulia and a 
lex Titia (or a lex lulia et Titia) which extended to the provinces 
the provision by the lex Atilia of a tutor to a person who did not 
have one (106). However, there is no evidence which associates this 
with the Augustan period, and it is more likely to have been 
Caesarian (107). 
Lex Iulia peculatus, lex lulia de residuis 
These two laws were closely related, as the title of 
Justinian's Digest, 48.13, shows : 'ad legem luliam peculatus et de 
sacrilegiis et de residuis'. Some scholars believe that they were 
not, in fact, separate laws (108). This legislation was concerned 
with the embezzlement of public funds. Once again, however, there 
is no evidence to justify the assumption that it was Augustan. 
Some scholars (109) believe in the existence of a lex de senatu 
(habendo) on the basis of passages from Dio which describe rulings 
made by Augustus regarding the Senate and a few references elsewhere 
- 16 - 
to a lex de senatu (110). The Dio passages descibe how Augustus 
enacted (SVO 019e T16e that the magistrates in office should nominate 
certain equites to fill up the tribunate (111) and how he made a 
distinction between a senatusconsultum and a senatorial auctoritas 
(112). There is, however, no juristic evidence for a lex de senatu 
and the authors mentioned may be using the term 'lex' loosely. Dio's 
account certainly gives no indication that a formal law was passed to 
incorporate these various measures, and there is little 
justification for believing in the existence of an Augustan lex de 
senatu. Rotondi also lists a lex lulia de maaistratibus on the basis 
of a passage of Dio (113) where he says that Augustus allowed all to 
stand for office who possessed property worth 400,000 HS s but this 
supposed law also lacks firm evidence. 
Rotondi (114) places in A. D. 4a lex Iulia theatralis on the 
basis of two passages of Suetonius (115) which show that Augustus 
designated certain seats at the theatre to certain categories of 
spectator. Suetonius does. not call the disposition a law, but a lex 
Iulia theatralis is mentioned by Pliny (116) and by Quintilian (117). 
There is, however, no juristic evidence for a lex tulia theatralis 
and this measure cannot with certainty be designated a law. 
These examples illustrate the difficulty often encountered in 
determining from the literary evidence the exact status of Augustan 
enactments. The juristic evidence, while more precise, often poses 
problems regarding dating (as well as the usual problems of 
corruption and interpolation). Dio, for example, uses a variety of 
terms whether describing provisions which we know from elsewhere to 
have belonged to statutes or not. He employs the terms EILE XEU6E 
(118 ), bccVOtAoBET i. (119 ), SLevo to6ETr16E (120), 7cPoC TagE (121), 
&XF_(nrzV 
(122 ), «7Cr1Yof eure (123) and1cP rETl16OM7 (124). Nevertheless, 
there is a sufficient number of well-attested Augustan statutes to 
warrant the conclusion that Augustus, far from abolishing the law- 
making function of the popular assemblies, made extensive use of it 
in order to enact measures encroaching on a large number of areas, 
some formerly free from intervention by statute. Statutes thus seem 
to have become more important than the praetorian edict in the 
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development of private law, a reversal of the Republican situation. 
Dio implies that Augustus showed deference to the popular assemblies 
by bringing many of his proposed laws to them in advance for 
discussion and possible alterations (125), although there can be 
little doubt that in general the approval by, a popular assembly of 
legislation was merely a formality. 
What exactly was the basis of Augustus's right to propose 
statutes? There is no need to enter into a discussion concerning the 
"constitutional position" of Augustus. in order to answer this 
question. Dio says that he accepted an offer from the Senate of 
permission to enact any laws he wished, to be known as leges Auaustae 
(VöjUO(, Y066TO (126) . Since there is, however, no evidence of a 
single such lex Augusta, this was clearly not the basis on which he 
enacted laws. As he claims in Res Gestae (127), the basis of his 
right to propose laws at this time was his possession of tribunicia 
potestas, hence the large number of plebiscita known as leges'Iuliae 
from the earlier part of the period. Later on, statutes tended to be 
proposed by the consuls rather than by Augustus, as their names show, 
but comparison of the content of these with that of the earlier 
statutes (for example, comparison of the content of the lex Iulia de 
maritandis ordinibus with that of the lex Papia Poppaea) suggests 
strongly that he was the author of both. Clearly, his auctoritas was 
such that the compliance of the consuls in proposing laws initiated 
by him was assured. 
The thesis proposed by Arangio-Ruiz that all of the Augustan. 
leges Iuliae belong to the period`18 - 17' B. C. has already been 
mentioned, together with its shortcomings. What does emerge clearly 
from the evidence is the observation just made, that the leges Iuliae 
which were plebiscita, proposed by Augustus, belong to the earlier 
part of the Augustan period, while the lecies which were proposed by 
the consuls belong to the latter part of the period. There are 
various theories which might be proposed in order to explain this 
apparent change of policy : that Augustus, for example, did not wish 
to appear- to be monopolising the right to propose statutes, that 
insecurity in the earlier period led him to emphasise his possession 
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of tribunicia potestas, or that it was not until the later period 
that he felt sufficiently confident of the acquiescence of the 
consuls to entrust legislation to them. Such theories are purely 
speculative, and it may be that the answer lies in the simple fact 
reported by Dio (admittedly in the context of elections) that 
Augustus gave up attending popular assemblies when he was older 
(128). 
SENATUSCONSULTA 
A fair number of senatusconsulta are attested for the Augustan 
period (129), some relevant to particular situations, others designed 
to have a longer lasting application. Belonging to the former 
category are many which voted honours to Augustus and to his 
relatives and friends (130). which there is no need to ennumerate. In 
the latter category are those enacted in order to supplement statutes 
and to clarify their application : here too there is little point in 
ennumerating all of those associated with Augustan statutes since 
most of these were probably post Augustan (131). As in the case of 
statutes, my concern is with sca belonging to the period after 19 
B. C. which are well attested. 
The best known of the Augustan sca with a specific application 
is the sc de ludis saecularibus of 17 B. C. known from an inscription 
(132) which permitted those debarredtby the lex lulia de maritandis 
ordinibus from watching games to do so on the occasion of the ludi 
saeculares. Another inscription (133) mentions an sc which'gave to 
Augustus- the right to conduct repairs on a bridge (134). Two 
inscriptions (135) attest sca authorising the building of arches 
(136) and a third (137) is thought to refer to an sc concerning the 
boundaries of the Tiber (138). 
Frontinus (139) describes a series of six sca passed in 11 B. C. 
relating to aquaeducts. These sca gave to the Emperor a formal right 
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to ensure the water supply of Rome (a task previously undertaken by 
Agrippa) and outlined, in case of disputes, the competence and 
jurisdiction of the curatores which would formerly. have been 
determined by the praetor. It is likely that these sca were passed 
in order to deal with the immediate necessity and that the lex 
Quinctia was passed to provide fuller legislation on the subject. 
The Augustan edicts to Cyrene have already been mentioned in 
connection with the leaes iudiciariae. To the fifth edict was 
appended an sc Calvisianum de pecuniis repetundis of 4 B. C. which 
provided a quicker procedure for extortion charges before the Roman 
Senate : the penalty in case of a successful prosecution was merely 
the restoration of the amount extorted. Apart from introducing this 
important procedural reform, the sc does not seem to have made any 
innovation in the law of extortion (140). Another well-known 
Augustan sc was the sc Silanianum of A. D. 10 which made provision for 
the torture and trial of slaves whose master had been killed, 
presumably by one of them (141). All of the slaves in proximity to 
the master when he was murdered were to be tortured, and if one of 
the slaves denounced the killer, he was to be free without an act of 
manumission s this, as Arangio-Ruiz. shows (142), was an important 
innovation, introducing as it did the concept of manumission without 
an act of the master. Buckland (143), argues that the aim of the sc 
was to ensure that the murder be avenged (previously the task of the 
relatives) and hence the will was not to be opened before a guaestio 
had been held. This meant that no slave could receive testamentary 
manumission and hence be spared torture before the murderer had been 
found. Relating to this sc was an sc Aemilianum of A. D. 11 (144), 
which stipulated a period of time for the cognitio resulting from the 
sc Silanianum. 
Suetonius mentions an Augustan sc which forbade equites to take 
part in plays or gladiatorial shows (145) and another (called a 
decretum patrum ) which assigned certain seats at the theatre to 
senators (146). A passage of Dio (147) describes how Augustus made a 
proposal to the Senate (yVWM1y eS TjV BOUA JV C6I veyre) that 
money should be set aside for the payment of soldiers. This led to 
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the setting up of the aerarium militare. Elsewhere (148) Dio 
describes a senatorial decree (boy/o E yE VETo) passed in Augustus's 
absence which aimed to enlarge the diminished, senatorial body by 
laying down that the vigintiviri be chosen from the eduites. , Dio's 
use of different terms to describe what seem to have been sca is 
indicative of the difficulty involved in determining which Augustan 
enactments were strictly sca. This difficulty is further illustrated 
by some passages of the Res Gestae in which Augustus describes 
measures proposed by the Senate or by the people and the Senate (149) 
without clarifying the status of such proposals. This, together with 
the problems involved in dating the various sca attached to Augustan 
laws which are mentioned in the juristic sources, makes any attempt 
at a list of Augustan sca rather unsatisfactory. 
There is no room here to discuss fully the relationship between 
Augustus and the Senate. As Nicolet shows (150) Augustus made 
official (although not compulsory) the hereditary tendency in the 
senatorial order, and made the division between this and the 
equestrian order more clear cut. The Senate still had a large part to 
play-in the Augustan system, and not merely in order that Republican 
sentiment be satisfied. The senatorial order was important and useful 
both socially and politically to Augustus, and in his membership of 
the Senate there was mutual benefit. One of the continuing functions 
of the Senate lay in-law-making, and since Augustus tended to enhance 
rather than to diminish the prestige and self-consciousness of 
senators, the Senate's decrees would not have lost any of their 
efficacy. A variety of issues was regulated by sca, most of those for 
which there is evidence relating to honours voted to Augustus and 
others, celebrations of victories, public works and the amendment and 
application of statutes s these are the sorts of issues also 
regulated by sca under the Republic. The sc which stands out is the 
sc Silanianum which dealt with an issue of private law, an issue 
which under the Republic would have been dealt with, if not by the 
familia, then by the praetor. It. is thus difficult to see why it was 
regulated by 'sc and this suggests an extension of the law-making 
competence of the Senate into areas not formerly regulated by it. The 
Senate's influence over criminal law was also extended by its 
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institution as a court in which interpretatio had to be exercised 
(151). 
While the Senate under Augustus was. accorded deference and a 
continuing role in law-making, the real influence exercised by 
individual senators over the content of sca was greatly undermined by 
the power and auctoritas of its most prominent member. Augustus was 
entitled to sit between the consuls at meetings of the Senate and to 
speak first at any meeting, but he seems to have exercised control 
over senatorial proceedings mainly through his consilium. Dio (152) 
says that Augustus took the consuls, one of each of the other kinds 
of officials and fifteen men chosen by lot from the Senate as 
advisers for periods of six months s he adds that this came to be the 
way that legislation proposed by the Emperors was communicated to the 
remaining senators. Elsewhere (153) Dio says that late in life when 
Augustus was unable to attend meetings of the Senate he asked for 20 
annual counsellors, and that any measure decided upon by him with 
Tiberius, his counsellors, the consuls of the year, the consuls 
designate, his grandchildren and others called upon, was regarded as 
valid, as if it had been agreed upon by the whole Senate. Dio adds 
that he had, in any case, enjoyed these rights in practice. It was 
not until much later that the issuing of sca to follow orationes by 
the Emperor in the Senate sometimes became superfluous, but the 
nature of many of the sca for which there is evidence shows that the 
Senate and its law-making activities provided another useful channel 
through which Augustus might exercise his will. 
EDICTS 
As proconsul of a large province, Augustus was entitled to 
issue edicts relating to the affairs of these territories. He did 
not, however, limit his edicts to apply to the inhabitants of his own 
provinces, but issued some which were directed to the inhabitants of 
"senatorial" provinces (154) and others concerning private law issues 
which were clearly designed to apply to all Roman citizens. 
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Several Augustan edicts have been found on inscriptions, the 
most famous being the Cyrenian edicts, the first four dating from 7/6 
B. C., the fifth from 4 B. C. (155). The nature of these illustrates 
the fact that edicts were used as channels to inform provincials of 
the state of the law on certain issues and to enforce the existing 
law more often than to introduce new rules (156). That the sc 
Calvisianum was appended to the fifth edict has already been 
mentioned. The edicts also informed the inhabitants of Cyrene of 
various rules regarding the administration of justice in the 
province, some of which were probably introduced at Rome by the 
judiciary laws. Some of the provisions of the edicts are addressed 
to the provincial governor, others to the provincials themselves. 
There were rules concerning the governor's consilium with whose aid 
he judged cases, and concerning juries of capital cases which were to 
be taken from lists published by the governor at the beginning of the 
year and to be made up equally of Greeks and Romans unless the 
defendant wished otherwise. This last provision was aimed at an 
abuse whereby rich provincials were sometimes brought before 
governors on trumped-up charges, tried before an all-Roman jury and 
condemned (the accuser presumably- hoping for a share of the 
confiscated property). such rules were clearly designed to protect 
provincials from abuses, while another edict which regulated the 
privileges of Roman citizens in the provinces forbade those who had 
obtained the citizenship to claim exemption from liturgies. A letter 
of Pliny to Trajan (157) shows that analogous edicts were issued 
relating to Asia and to Bithynia, and a text from Justinian's Digest 
(158) attests an edict relating to the affairs of Egypt. Other 
edicts were issued concerning the affairs of the Jews, such as that 
attested by Josephus (159) which granted permission to the, Jews to 
follow their own customs : Augustus claims here the approval of the 
Roman people. 
There is also evidence for edicts concerning the affairs of the 
army, an issue closely related to the provinces (160) and concerning 
' public works (161). Suetonius and Dio describe as edicts some 
proclamations made to all Roman citizens which look more like 
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propaganda than legislative acts. Thus Suetonius (162) claims that 
Augustus proclaimed in an edict his desire to be the author of the 
best possible constitution, and Dio'(163) that Augustus set forth in 
an edict the aspect of the stars and the time of his own birth. much 
more important are a few Augustan edicts which regulated issues of 
private law. Ulpian (164) claims that by the terms of edicts of 
Augustus and, subsequently, of Claudius, women were forbidden to 
intercede for their husbands. A fragment (165) prescribes a penalty 
for a person who 'contra edictum Augusti rem litigiosam a non 
possidente comparavit'. Another Digest text (166) mentions an edict 
of Augustus which forbade a father to disinherit a son serving as a 
soldier. Two further texts describe Augustan edicts which were 
designed to apply other measures : D. 29.5.3.18 shows that the sc 
Silanianum was enforced by edict, and D. 48.18.8prr. mentions an 
Augustan edict proposed to the consuls concerning Quaestiones, 
probably an application of the judiciary laws. 
Arangio-Ruiz (167) believes that Augustus only issued edicts 
relating to the provinces, and that none of these enactments 
mentioned which concerned issues of private law for general 
application were genuinely edicts. He claim for example, that 
D. 16.1.2, r. is corrupt and that, since any prohibition- against 
intercessio would have had to be incorporated into the praetor's 
edict, the 'eorum' of the text should be replaced by 'praetorum', 
making for better style and sens . He also argues that, since the 
prohibition attested in frag. ure de fisci 8 carried with it the 
penalty of payment to the fiscus, it was probably incorporated into 
instructions to the officials in charge of the imperial finances. 
This theory of Arangio-Ruiz is an attractive one, especially 
because-it is so difficult to discern the basis of any right enjoyed 
by Augustus to issue edicts relating to private law for general 
application. ' As has already been mentioned, he possessed the right, 
as proconsul, to issue edicts relating to the affairs of his own 
province, and it is not surprising that he extended this to provinces 
which did not belong to him, probably on the ground of possessing 
maius imperium. But he did not claim to possess the imperium of a 
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praetor and was therefore not entitled to issue edicts relating to -< 
private law for general application as part of the praetorian edict. 
(This may well explain why the praetorian edict became less important 
in the development of private law under Augustus than it had been in 
the Republic). His issuing of edicts is unlikely to be linked to 
imperium consulare, for if he did possess this, he did not use it as 
a basis for influencing the law in other ways permissible to a 
consul, such as proposing statutes to the comitia. However, while 
the theory proposed by Arangio-Ruiz would get over this problem, 
there are other edicts mentioned in the sources which he does not 
account for, and his rejection of all of the juristic references to 
edicts regulating private law issues is not convincing. This is not 
to deny that many Augustan edicts were indeed issued for the 
provinces, often to apply rules already incorporated into other 
enactments, but there were others for more general application which 
are portrayed as innovatory. Those which related to private law 
issues seem to have been based on a right simply appropriated by 
Augustus to issue such enactments as a quick and direct means of 
supplementing statutes and sca. The edict mentioned in D. 48.18.8gr. 
is addressed not to a provincial governor nor to provincials, but to 
the consuls. He was indeed a possessor of imperium, but the extent 
of his competence in the realm of edicts must also have depended on 
his auctoritas. It is significant that there is a notable lack of 
evidence for any innovatory edicts issued by any other magistrates. 
OTHER AUGUSTAN 
While my concern is mainly with those enactments which may 
confidently be described as statutes, sca and edicts, it is 
worthwhile briefly mentioning various enactments of uncertain status 
which are attested in the juristic sources and listed by Gualandi 
(168). A few -measures are preceded by the words 'Augustus 
constituit',, notably the surprising innovation whereby a 
filiusfamilias miles was permitted to make a will with his peculium 
castrense (169) while another lays down that a slave may be freed 
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before the prefect of Egypt 'ex constitutione 'divi Augusti'. No 
doubt the jurists (or the compilers) had in mind here the system 
which developed later whereby the pronouncements of the Emperor 
either in reply to requests for rulings or in'his capacity' as a 
judge, known collectively as constitutiones, came to overshadow all 
other law-making channels and were acknowledged by the jurists as 
being law-making. Two well known passages of Justinian's Institutes 
describe how Augustus repeatedly urged the consuls to use their 
authority to ensure that trusts be legally enforced (170) and how he 
gathered together the jurists and asked them to ratify the legal 
validity of codicils (171). Honors (172) sees Augustus here taking on 
the reforming role of a Republican praetor. What in fact seems to 
emerge most forcibly from these passages is the variety of 
traditional channels used by Augustus in order to enforce his will 
and the enormous auctoritas enjoyed by him which enabled him to gain 
the cooperation of consuls and jurists. 
In a passage concerning certain invalid marriages we find a 
ruling preceded by the words 'Augustus interpretatus est'. This 
suggests the beginnings of the system of decreta s the auctoritas of 
the Emperor made his decisions more influential than those of any 
other judge, and they came to be acknowledged by the classical 
jurists as being legally binding. Gualandi also lists a ruling 
concerning the discipline of soldiers preceded by the words in 
disciplina Augusti ita cavetur'(173), and another regarding the 
bodies, of those condemned to death with the words 'divas Augustus 
libro decimo de vita sua scribit' (174). A grant of the ius Italicum 
to the colony of Berytensis is described by Ulpian as 'Augusti 
beneficiis' (175). 
THE R8LE OF THE JURISTS 
The text cited above (176) which portrays Augustus persuading 
the jurists to ratify the legal validity of codicils confirms that 
the jurists' had a part to play in the formulation of law under 
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Augustus. The exact role of the jurists under Augustus is a much 
debated issue. Clearly there was still a 
. 
need for advice to be 
submitted by those who were experts to magistrates and to judges 
(including the Emperor) who, as under the Republic, were men with no 
particular legal expertise. The controversy, centres on a statement 
made by the second century jurist, Pomponius, preserved in 
Justinian's Digest (177) in which he attributes to Augustus a measure 
which gave to certain favoured jurists the right to give opinions by 
his authority'. This seems to be confirmed by Gaius (178) who says 
that the answers of the jurisprudents are the decisions and opinions 
of those who have been authorised to lay down the law. Scholars are 
divided over the exact status which this gave to the opinions of 
jurists in the Augustan period who enjoyed or who did not enjoy this 
privilege. Gaius, writing in the second century, adds that an 
opinion held by all of the 'privileged' jurists by this time actually 
had the force of law. Kunkel (179) believes that the responsa of the 
'favoured' jurists were legally binding only when written and 
delivered under seal, while de Visscher (180) argues that legal force 
was given to the rulings of jurists on certain important issues but 
not to all of the responsa of any particular jurist. " Guarino (181) 
believes that the ius respondendi merely made the responsa of the 
favoured jurists more persuasive and that they were not made legally 
binding until the time of Tiberius (182). However, it seems 
arbitrary to try to pinpoint a date at which the 'authorised' 
responsa gained the force of law in the absence of firm evidence. 
Prier (183), pursuing his argument that jurisprudence grew in 
importance as an influence on the law towards the end of the Republic 
regards the introduction of the ius; respondendi as the climax of this 
growth. 
I do not believe that Augustus gave law-making status to the 
responsa of the favoured jurists, but the 'authorisation' of the 
emperor must, nevertheless, have greatly increased their authority 
and influence, gradually leading to the situation described by Gaius, 
while the opinions of other jurists must have become, if not 
valueless, then of very limited worth. The important point about the 
attitude of 'Augustus to the jurists is that, while he recognised 
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their value, he wished to make those who were able to influence the 
law to some extent dependent on him and on his patronage. More 
importantly, perhaps, he wished that the most eminent jurists should 
be identified with him, in other words, that juristic activity should 
be associated with his rule. The trend of the late Republic towards 
equestrian jurists was reversed under Augustus and jurists of 
senatorial rank were patronised. This, no doubt, enhanced the 
prestige of juristic science (as well as fitting in with Augustus's 
general policy towards the Senate) and probably contributed to the 
growing 'authority' of the jurists. 
The best known jurists in the Augustan period were Trebatius, 
Capito and Labeo (who was supposed to have been an outspoken opponent 
of the r6gime). According to Pomponius (184), it was from Labeo and 
Capito that the two schools of jurists, the Proculians and Sabinians, 
derived, even though they were named after later jurists : this, 
however, has been questioned. If it is true, it suggests that 
Augustus gave to them a free hand in exercising interpretatio. 
CONCLUSION 
In the light of this survey, how was the transition from 
Republic to Empire reflected in law-making under Augustus, and to 
what extent did Augustus preserve the old system or lay the 
foundations for a new system? It has been shown that all of the 
Republican channels of "declared" law were preserved. Thus the 
popular assemblies continued to pass leges and plebiscita proposed by 
magistrates, several of these regulating issues of private law 
previously untouched by statutes, sca were enacted on an even wider 
range of issues, magistrates still issued edicts and jurists 
continued to submit responsa. ' However, given the power and 
auctoritas enjoyed by Augustus, these channels could not possibly 
remain exactly as they had been in the Republic. Thus the right to 
propose plebiscita to the concilium plebis was monopolised by 
Augustus to' an extent that would not have been possible for any 
tribune of the plebs in the Republic, sca were now promulgated from a 
changed Senate dominated by one figure to a degree unprecedented in 
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Republican times, there is little evidence of any magistrate other 
than Augustus innovating by means of edicts so that the praetorian 
edict ceased to play the part it had played-during the Republic in 
the development of private law, and the influence of jurists on the 
law, while apparently enhanced, was dependent on their being 
'authorised' by Augustus. It is unlikely that Augustus preserved the 
various traditional channels only in order to satisfy Republican 
sentiment. It was useful for him to preserve a system which 
possessed many checks and balances and which provided a variety of 
different channels through which he might exert his influence over 
the formulation of law. 
Augustus influenced the formulation of law not only by means of 
the various powers which he enjoyed (proconsulship, tribunicia 
Potestas etc. ) but also by means, of his auctoritas. Clearly this 
auctoritas played an important part in the willingness of the Senate 
and people to vote to him the various powers, but it also enabled him 
to influence the jurists (. 185) and to persuade the consuls both to 
use their authority at his bidding (186) and to propose laws for 
which he was undoubtedly responsible (such as the lex-Papia Poppaea). 
This auctoritas must also have given to the decisions of Augustus in 
his capacity as a judge a higher status-than that of the decisions of 
anyone else and thus the foundations were laid for the system of 
Imperial decisions, known as decreta, which were acknowledged by the 
clasical jurists as being law-making (187). The foundation was also 
laid for the system of Imperial rescripts, already mentioned, whereby 
the Emperor's replies to requests from rulings from magistrates and 
from individuals were also regarded by the classical jurists as 
having the force of law. 
The pronouncements of the Emperor, whether as a judge or in 
reply to petitions (which, by the second century, seem to have 
poured in to him from all over the Empire and which often required a 
simple statement of the law as it stood), gradually came to 
overshadow all of the more traditional channels of law-making. Thus 
the passing of statutes through the popular assemblies died out by 
the end of the first century A. D., Imperial orationes in the Senate 
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often made sca superfluous, the lack of innovation by praetors 
resulted in the consolidation of the edict in the reign of Hadrian, 
and jurists came to be employed to a. great extent, within the Imperial 
rescript system instead of giving independent advice to magistrates. 
Of course, none of these developments occurred in the reign of 
Augustus, but they were nevertheless the logical outcome of the 
undermining effect on the traditional law- making channels of a 
figure possessing the power and auctoritas of Augustus. 
0 
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Oxford, 1974, P. Stein, "The sources of law. in Cicero", Estratto di 
atti del III colloquium Tullianum, Rome, 1976, pp. 19 ff.. 
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(187) The basis of Augustus' right to judge cases is, in fact, a 
debatable issue. As proconsul of a large province, he possessed 
the right (which he mostly delegated to legates) to try cases 
arising there. This meant that Roman citizens dissatisfied with 
the judgments passed by his representatives could appeal to him 
just as they might appeal to an assembly of the Roman people 
during the Republic. The privilege of appeal seems also to have 
extended to citizens in "Senatorial" provinces, perhaps on account 
of Augustus's maius imperium. It is more difficult to explain the 
basis of his right to judge cases in Rome and Italy. Some 
scholars explain this in terms of his possession of consular 
Imperium, others in terms of tribunicia potestas. But neither the 
rights associated with a consul nor a tribune explain his 
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rights associated with a consul nor a tribune explain his 
competence to judge criminal cases which should have come before 
inappellable uuaestiones. For instance, we hear of Augustus 
presiding over cases of forgery and of treason (Suet. DA 33.2, 
Tac. Annales 1.72.4). it is equally difficult to explain his 
competence to investigate civil suits. The only feasible 
conclusion is that he merely appropriated for himself and for his 
consilium the right to judge such cases, just as he gave to the 
Senate the right to judge certain cases. 
I 
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CHAPTER 2 
TKE 'LEX IULIA ET PAPIA' (1) 
The lex Iulia et Papia is a collective term employed in the 
juristic sources for two distinct Augustan marriage laws of similar 
content, the lex lulia de maritandis ordinibus and the lex Papis 
Poppaea. 
The full title of the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus is 
attested by the jurists Ulpian and Paul (1). Suetonius also mentions 
a law 'de maritandis ordinibus' (2). Dio's account of events 
suggests that a law of this nature was passed around 18 B. C. (3): 
this date is supported by the evidence for the sc de ludis 
saecularibus which confirms that the law was in force by 23rd May, 17 
B. C., when the sc was passed (4). A dispensation was granted on the 
occasion of the ludi saeculares to the unmarried who would, by the 
terms of the lex Iulia, have been debarred from the privilege of 
watching public games (5). There is no evidence to suggest an 
alternative date, and scholars have. generally accepted that of 18 
B. C.. The lex Papia Poppaea was a much later law. It was certainly 
passed in A. D. 9, when the consuls to whom it owes its name were M. 
Papius Mutilus and Q. Poppaeus Secundus. The date is confirmed by 
Dio (6). The full title is mentioned by Ulpian and by Tacitus and 
Dio (7). It is frequently found in its abbreviated form, lex Papia 
M. 
None of the non-juristic sources is very specific about the 
chronology of events surrounding the passing of the two laws. 
Suetonius includes the lex de maritandis ordinibus in a list of laws 
passed by Augustus without specifying a date. He mentions various 
emendations made later by Augustus, but does not actually acknowledge 
a second law. Gellius also only mentions the lex Iulia (9). Tacitus 
mentions the Papia Poppaea twice, adding that Augustus had it passed 
in his old age, and that it followed the 'Iuliae rogationes' (10). 
Dio summarises some of the provisions of the lex Iulia under the 
events of 18 B. C., without actually naming it, but he does name the 
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lex Papia after mentioning various modifications which were made to 
the first law in response to a demonstration by the knights against 
its severity (11). Scholars generally asssociate these measures with 
the lex Papia Poppaea. 
There is evidence in Justinian's Digest of books of commentary 
ad legem Iuliam et Papiam by the jurists Ulpian (20 books), Gaius (16 
books), Paul (10 books) (12), Iunius Mauricianus (6 books) and 
Marcellus (5 books). Hence the term 'lex Iulia et Papia' is a 
popular one among modern scholars, and the two laws are often treated 
as one. No doubt there was some tralatician material carried over 
from the lex lulia to the lex Papia Poppaea, and there are areas in 
which the provisions of the individual laws cannot, from the 
evidence, be separated from one another. Nevertheless, the term 'lex 
Iulia et Papia' (or a similar one) rarely appears in the juristic 
äources (13) apart from its regular application to the juristic 
commentaries, while there is a considerable number of references to 
the lex iulia and to the lex Papia Poppaea individually (14), 
sometimes in the context of the jurist making a comparison between 
the provisions of the two laws. It is clear from the jurists' 
comments that the second law was designed to revise and to 
complement, not to completely supersede, the first law. There 
are of course, enormous difficulties involved in trying, from the 
juristic evidence, to separate the provisions of the two laws. For 
example, we do not know enough about the transmission of the texts of 
laws, and there are the problems*of suspected interpolation and 
corruption of the juristic texts. However, precision must have been a 
primary consideration to jurists involved in the process of 
transmission of the texts of laws. Since they discuss some 
provisions in their commentaries without mentioning either law in 
particular, and in a few cases assign provisions to a collective lex 
lulia et Pavia (presumably when the provisions, of the two laws in a 
certain area cannot be separated) this suggests that they had good 
reason for sometimes associating a provision with one or other of the 
laws. If they had mentioned the individual laws completely at 
random, one would expect frequent contradictions among them, and this 
is not the case. 
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A few scholars have attempted to disentangle the provisions of 
the two laws, and to reconstruct them individually, notably 
Gothofredus, Heineccius and Joers (15). Gothofredus attempted to 
reconstruct the exact wording of the law in its final form in A. D. 9 s 
he divided it into two sections, The 'lex de maritandis ordinibus' 
(28 chapters) and the 'lex caducaria' (9 chapters). Heineccius 
suggested that there were forty-four chapters in the 'lex de 
maritandis ordinibus' and fifteen in the Ilex caducaria'. 
Generally, scholars have been content with the distinction that the 
lex Iulia was concerned with marriage and the lex Papia Poppaea with 
the procreation of children. Such a distinction is, however, 
inadequate in relation to such complex statutes, and there is 
generally a lack of historical comment accompanying the proposed 
reconstructions and divisions. An examination of the relationship 
between the two laws appears in Chapter 3. 
A study of the excerpts from the jurists' commentaries ad leerem 
luliam et Pa iam provides assistance in any attempt to reconstruct 
the provisions of the two laws. There are of course, certain 
problems here: as already mentioned, many excerpts are suspected of 
interpolation or corruption; the jurists clearly discuss later 
developments as well as the original provisions of the laws; it is 
difficult to assign some of the excerpts to any particular issue; 
there are some books of commentary from which we have no excerpts; 
and there is certainly not complete uniformity among the jurists in 
their order of commentary. Nevertheless, there is enough consistency 
to make certain conclusions possible. An obvious example is that 
most of the excerpts relating to permitted and forbidden marriages 
appear in the early books of the jurists' commentaries, suggesting 
that provisions on this topic appeared at the beginning of the law 
(16). 
It is therefore useful to classify the individual Digest 
excerpts which are taken from the jurists' commentaries ad legem 
Iuliam et Papiam under the author and book of commentary to which 
they are attributed. Thus an attempt may be made to determine the 
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various topics discussed by the jurists and to gain some idea of the 
order in which they were discussed. (Only a very brief suannary of 
the content of the excerpts is necessary for this purpose. Many of 
the excerpts listed are suspected of interpolation, but for present 
purposes it is unnecessary to detail these) (17). 
GAIUS 'ad legem Iuliam et Papiam' 
Liber 1 
23.1.17t Just causes for extensions of betrothals. 
48.19.29: Condemnation 'ultimo supplicio'. 
Liber 2 
23.2.30: Inefficacy of simulated marriages. 
Liber 3 
28.6.5: Röte of substitutes in cases of incapacity of heirs. 
Liber 4 
22.5.5: Definition of 'gener' and 'socer', who are not compelled 
to act as witnesses (18). 
Liber 5 
33.1.8: Legacies of usufruct. 
34.5.23: Decision that in case of a woman dying in shipwreck with 
son below puberty, he is deemed to have died first (19). 
Liber 61 
50.15.7: Categorisation of Troas, Berytus and Dyrrachium as 'iuris 
Italici'. 
Liber 7 no excerpt. 
Liber 8 
23.2.46: Debate among jurists as to rights of a patron married to 
freedwoman if he shares possession of her. 
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37.1.4: Bonorum possessio. 
50.16.148: Explanation of term 'habet liberos'. 
Liber 9 
50.16.150: Giving of pledge for anther's debts. 
Liber 10 
38.16.13: Effect of capitis diminutio on a woman's possession of 
sui heredes. 
50.16.149: Definition of 'herbere liberos'. 
50.16.152: Definition of 'homo'. 
Liber 11 
29.3.11: Relation of 'codicilli' to 'testamentum' and of 'secundae 
tabulae' to 'principales tabulae'. 
49.14.14: Safety of liberties and legacies when inheritance. is 
appropriated by the fiscus (20). 
Liber 12 
31.55: Repudiation of legacy; institution of heir who is partly 
or wholly incapax. 
40.1.18: Rights of venditor and promissor to manumit. 
Liter 13 
35.1.69: Conditional legacies. 
38.16.14: Aditio not required for sui heredes. 
40.7.31: Conditional legacy made to a slave. 
28.5.74: Substitution to an heir instituted conditionally. 
Liber 14 
29.3.53: Institution of heir conditionally. 
31.56: Legacy made to Emperor (ruling by Antonius Pius). 
31.581 Acceptance of legacy. 
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Liber 15 
34.9.10: Use of'tacita fideiconmissa to evade provisions of laws 
concerning inheritance. - 
ULPIAN 'ad legem Iuliam et Papiam' 
Liber 1 
1.5.25: Validity of senatorial ruling to give free status to a 
freedman, since 'res iudicata pro veritate accipitur'. 
Cf. 50.17.207: 'Res iudicata pro veritate accipitur'. 
1.9.5: Inclusion of adopted sons in category of 'son of a 
senator'. 
1.9.7: Definition of 'son of a senator': effect of emancipation, 
removal of father from senatorial rank etc. 
23.3.43: Definition of prostitute and of 'lens'. Ruling of. Senate 
against marriages between senators and women condemned in 
a public court. 
35.2.62: Application of lex Falcidia (21). 
40.10.6: Elevation to free status by ius anulorum (rescript of 
Hadrian). 
50.16.128: Definition of 'spado' (22). 
Liber 2 
25.7.1: Right of patron over freedwoman who is his concubine; 
those who may lawfully be held as concubines; 
condemnation of concubine for adultery; woman who passes 
from concubinage of patron to that of his son or 
grandson; minimum age of concubines. 
29.2.79: Acquisition of inheritance by a paterfamilias through 
another party. 
50.16.130: Clarification of 'lege obvenire hereditates'. 
Liber 31 
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23.1.16: Oration of Antoninus and Commodus concerning senatorial 
marriages (23). 
23.2.27: Licence of man who has lost his senatorial rank to have a 
freedwoman as wife. 
23.2.29: Manumission of a slave woman by a 
. 
patron with a view to 
marriage. 
23.2.45: Definition of 'patronus' who enjoys rights over 
freedwoman; absence of right over fiancee; explanation of 
'invito patrono'; position of a freedwoman whose patron 
is captured in war. 
24.2.11: Prohibition against initiation of divorce by freedwoman 
married to her patron as long as he wishes to have her as 
his wife; her lack of an 'actio de dote' and of conubium 
with any other man. 
40.10.4: Obtaining of 'ius anulorum aureorum' by women. 
50.16.131: Definitions of 'fraus', 'multa' and 'poena'. 
Liber 4 
1.6.10: Passing of judgment on possession or otherwise of a son. 
1.7.46: Status of a son acquired during servitude of father and 
restored to his potestas by an act of the Emperor. 
36.2.23: Conditional legacy. 
49.15.9: Status of a son born in captivity if restored, according 
to a rescript of Antoninus Pius. 
50.16.133: Reckoning of "intra diem mortis'. 
50.16.135: Benefit of deformed offspring to parents. 
50.17.209: Definition of servitude. 
4 
Liber 5 
37.14.14: Establishing of right to patronal succession. 
38.10.6: Explanation of terms 'gener', 'nurus', 'sorer' and 
' socrus' (24). 
50.16.136: Explanation of 'gener'. 
Liber 6 
4.6.36: Explanation of absence for the sake of the Republic (25). 
4.6.38: Expansion on absence for the sake of the Republic, 
-50- 
description of legitimate reasons for delayed return. 
23.2.31: Licence of senator to-have a freedwoman as iusta uxor by 
the indulgence of the Emperor (26). 
Liber 7 
24.3.64: Obligation of a husband to restore to his wife any gain 
made from manumission of a dotal slave. 
50.16.139: Definition of terms 'Romae' and 'perfecisse' in relation 
to buildings. 
Liber 8 
31.51: Legacy of maximum which may by law be taken or given; 
inefficacy of adoption to acquire what has been left 'ad 
tempus liberorum'. 
35.1.61: Legacy made by husband to his wife with condition 'ad 
tempus liberorum'. 
39.6.36: Conditional legacies. 
48.8.15: Distinction between 'occidere' and 'causam mortis 
praebere' (28) . 
49.17.3: Expansion on 'castrense peculium' (29). 
50.16.141: Explanation of term 'filium habere'. 
Liter 9 
26.5.4: Prohibition against appointment by praetor of himself as 
tutor. 
50.16.143: Definition of 'spud se habere'. 
Liber 10 
37.14.11: (lib. II? v. Index Interp. III, 51) Exclusion from entry 
to inheritance by terms of law of Twelve Tables. 
37.14.16: Attempt by freedman to evade law by making himself 'minor 
centario'(30). 
50.16.145: Explanation of term 'virilis' (31). 
Liber 11 
37.14.17: Description of Imperial rescript concerning rights of 
patrons and descendants to possession of property of 
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freedmen accused of capital offences. 
38.1.36: 'Libertatis causa societas' formed between patron and ex- 
slave. 
38.2.37: Right of patron to bonorum possessio contra tabulas of 
freedman. 
Liber 12 no excerpt. 
Liber 13 
1.3.31: Freedom of Emperor from laws, status of Augusta. 
8.1.7: Example of servitude (32). 
29.2.81: Entry of substitute into inheritance. 
29.3.10: Opening of will. 
29.3.12: Opening of will. 
38.8.4: Circumstances in which a legacy is 'pro non scripto'. 
35.1.59: Destiny of conditional legacies where legatee has died, 
left the state or gone into servitude. 
32.2.64: Legacies and lex Falcidia. 
Liber 14 
34.9.9: Hostility between testator and legatee. 
33.2.22: Legacy of proceeds from testator's patrimony. 
Liber 15 
39.6.37: Comparison between mortis causa donationes and legacies. 
Liter 16 
31.60: Institution of a conditional trust, senatorial ruling 
" concerning case of death of intended beneficiary of trust. 
Liber 17 no excerpt. 
Liber 18 
22.6.6: Activities of informers. - 
29.2.83: Attempts to evade law by tacita fideicommissa. 
31.61: Trusts in cases of incapacity of heir. 
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35.2.66: Legacies and mortis causa donationes left conditionally. 
49.14.16: Disposition of Trajan concerning self-delation. 
Liber 19 
4.4.2: Remission by law of one year for each child possessed in 
age prescribed for holding magistracies. 
Liber 20 
1.6.14: Rules concerning proconsular fasces (34). 
27.1.18: Explanation of term 'bello amissi' through whom is 
granted exemption from tutorship (35). 
Paul 'ad leerem Iuliam et Paaiaza' 
Liber 1 
23.2.44: Description of marriages forbidden to those of the 
senatorial order. 
50.16.129: Definition of 'liberi'. 
Liber 2 
1.9.6: Definition of 'son of a senator'. 
22.5.4: Release from obligation to give evidence against those in 
certain relationships by the lex lulia iudiciorum 
publico rum. 
23.2.47: Circumstances in which a senator's daughter may marry a 
freedman with impunity. 
24.3.63: Manumission of a dotal slave. 
35.2.63: Estimation of value of things in an inheritance (36). 
38.1.35: Release of freedwoman over 50 from obligation of 
performing operae for her patron. 
38.1.37: Release of freedman from obligation to perform services 
for his patron by possession of two or more children. 
50.16.134: Definition of 'anniculus'. 
50.16.137: Definition of 'ter enixa'(37). 
Liber 3 
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1.7.45: Transferral of obligations of adopted son to adopting 
father. 
4.6.35: Definition of absence for the. sake of the Republic. 
4.6.37: Example of absence which is not for the sake of the 
Republic(38). 
49.15.8: Recovery of a wife 'iure postliminii' by husband. -. 
50.16.132: Definition of 'anniculus' and of 'filium peperisse'(39). 
50.17.208: Definition of 'desinere habere'. 
liter 4 
32.87: Inclusion of trusts and mortis causa donationes in term 
legacy. 
50.16.138: Inclusion of bonorum possessio in term hereditas (40). 
Liber 5 
1.3.28: Relationship between earlier and subsequent laws. 
28.5.72: Conditional institution of heir. 
29.2.68: Entry of jointly owned slave into inheritance. 
29.2.80: Institution of a sole heir to more that one property. 
29.7.201 Relationship of codicilli to will. 
31.49: Legacies in kind. 
32.88: Legacies in kind. 
34.4.6: Definition of 'translatio' of legacy. 
41.5.4: 'Pro herede usucapere'. 
42.5.29: Decision concerning ownership of public statues. 
Liber 6 
12.4.12: Mortis causa donations. 
30.29: Circumstances in which a legacy is inutile. 
32.89: Institution of joint legatees. 
34.3.29: Inclusion of an incapax in a will. 
35.2.65: Conditional legacies. 
36.2.24: Conditional legacies. 
39.6.35: Senatorial ruling that the provisions of the law relating 
to legacies should also apply to mortis causa donationes. 
50.16.140: Definition of 'cepisse'. 
50.16.142: -Institution of joint heirs (41). 
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Liber 7 
32.90: Acceptance of a legacy. 
33.2.21: Conditional legacies. 
35.1.60: Conditional legacies. 
35.3.7: Ruling of Antoninus Pius concerning 'annua legata'. 
49.14.13: Imperial rulings concerning self-delation. 
Liber 8 
37.14.15s Loss of patronal rights in relation to freedman through 
contravention of the terms of the lex Aelia Sentia. 
Liber 9 
40.10.5: Acquisition of free status. 
Liber 10 
25.7.2: Position of freedwoman concubine of patron who becomes 
insane. 
38.5.13: Rights of an adopted child to property of dead father. 
50.16.144: Definition of 'pellex'. 
Liber 11 no excerpt. 
Liber 12 25.7.2? (42). 
TERENTIUS CLEMENS 'ad legem Iuliam et Papiam'. 
Liber 1 no excerpt. , 
Liber 2, 
22.6.5: Harming knowledge or ignorance of another (43). 
50.16.146: Definition of 'sorer' and 'socrus' (44). 
Liber 3 
22.3.16: Declaration of children by mother and grandfather (45). 
23.2.21: Freedom of filiusfamilias from compulsion to marry. 
23.3.61: Various rules concerning duties of a curator responsible 
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for a woman's dowry. 
31.52: Enquiry into condition of designated heir or legatee. 
50.16.147: Explanation of 'Romae nati'. 
Liber 4 
28.5.73: Institution to an insolvent inheritance of a sole heir 
who is partially incapax. 
28.6.6: Substitution by an impubes in case of partial incapacity. 
31.53: Legacy made as compensation for dowry and rules relating 
to the actio de dote. 
35.1.62: Conditional legacies; conditions relating to remarriage 
or to offspring of legatee. 
35.2.67: Implication of terms of lex Falcidia in determining 
capacity. 
Liber 5 
24.1.25: Admission of wife to usucapio of gift made by husband. 
35.1.64: overruling by law of conditions in legacy limiting or 
forbidding remarriage of legatee. 
40.9.31: Injunction of temporary widowhood on freedwoman by 
patron. 
50.16.151: Definition of 'hereditas delata'. 
Liber 6 no excerpt. . 
Liber 7 no excerpt. 
Liber *8 
23.2.48: Rights of sons of patrons to freedwomen, loss of patronal 
rights in case of marriage to a freedwoman who is 
ignominiosa; assignation of patronal rights. 
38.1.14: Absence of obligation. on freedwoman to perform o rae 
when she is no longer married. 
40.9.32: Placing of obligation on freedwoman that she should not 
marry; provision of lex Aelia Sentia that patron may not 
force'his freedman to give money in lieu of operae. 
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Liber 9 
37.14.10c Exclusion of patron from bonorum possessio contra tabulas 
of the will of a freedman whom he has accused of a 
capital crime. 
38.2.38: Rights of grandsons of patron to property of freedman if 
son has been disinherited. 
40.9.24: Manumission of several slaves by master who is in debt. 
Liber 10 
38.2.39: Right of patron's daughter who is 'in adoptiva familial 
to property of her father's freedmen. 
Liber 11 
50.16.153: Status of child left in womb of deceased mother. 
Liter 12 
34.3.21: Legacies involving debts and conditions. 
38.2.40: Rights of disinherited son to freedman. 
38.4.10: Conditional 'adsignatio' of freedman. 
Liber 13 
31.54: Conditional legacy. 
Liber 14 no excerpt. 
Liber 15 
31.59: Conditional legacies involving slaves. 
33.5.16: Legacy involving 'optio,. 
Liber 16 
29.2.82: Manumission or sale of the slave of an incapax instituted 
heir. 
Liber 17 
28.2.22: Conditional institution of a postumus. 
33.5.17: Legacies of slaves involving 'optio'. 
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Liber 18 
7.7.5: Legacy-of services of a slave. 
40.6.1: Taking away of liberty by the law. 
Liter 19 no excerpt. 
Liber 20 no excerpt. 
!4 RCELLUS 'ad leaem Iuliam et Papiam' 
Liber 1 
23.2.32: Debarring of freedman from a senatorial marriage even if 
adrogated into a senatorial family. 
23.2.49: Permitted and forbidden marriages. 
25.3.8: Responsibility for children. 
39.6.38: Clarification of mortis causa donatio. 
Liber 2 no excerpt. 
Liber 3 
23.2.33: Circumstances in which the return of the same woman to the 
same man is 'idem matrimonium'. 
23.2.50: Licence of a freedwoman manumitted because of a trust to 
marry against the will of her patron. 
Libri 4-6 no excerpt. 
t 
IUNIUS MAURICIANUS gad legem Iuliam et Papiam' 
Liber 1 no excerpt. 
Liber 2 
31.57: Rulings of Hadrian and of Antoninus Pius concerning legacy 
made to Augusta. 
33.2.23: Ruling of Antoninus Pius concerning recovery of a legacy 
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of usufruct by testator. 
Liber 3 
49.14.15: Senatorial and Imperial rulings concerning delatores. 
It is clear that discussion of the provisions of the lex Iulia 
at Papia was not confined to the books of commentary ad lege luliam 
et Papiam nor to these jurists alone. Some excerpts from other 
commentaries actually name the laws, while more suggest by their 
content that they belong to a discussion of the provisions of the 
laws or at least of issues which relate closely to these provisions. 
Lenel (46) has attributed to the following books of commentary 
discussion of the provisions of the lex lulia et Papia. His 
conclusions are based on the content of the excerpts from those books 
preserved in Justinian's Digest and on references to them by other 
jurists : 
Celsus, 30-36 digestorum : in book 30 the jurist discussed permitted 
and forbidden marriages (47) and in books 31-36, caduca (48). 
Julianus, 68-85 diaestorum : rules relating to patrons and ex-slaves 
are discussed in books 68,69 and 75 (49). The remaining books are 
mostly concerned with caduca. Book 69 also includes a discussion on 
incapacity (50), conditional legacies between husbands and wives (51) 
and the 'actio de dote'(52). Books 70-82 (excluding book 75) discuss 
legacies and inheritances which are conditional, 'pro non . scripto', 
divided, or which involve 'optio' (53). In book 80 there is 
discussion of mortis causa donationes (54) and in book 81 of legacies 
which are void (55). The treatment of caduca continues in book 82 
(56) and tacita fideicommissa are discussed in book 83 (57). An 
excerpt from book 85 (58) concerns the status of a child of an 
adoptee and suggests that Julian is discussing the benefits secured 
through the possession of children. 
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Marcellus 26-30 digestorum : the. excerpts cover disreputable women, 
legacies of dowry, mortis causa donationes, caducous legacies and the 
destruction of a will (59). 
Marcian 9-12 institutionum : book 10 includes discussion of marriage 
between a patron and his freedwoman, book 11, claims by the fiscus. 
Two excerpts from book 12 are concerned with concubinage and legacies 
(60). 
Papinian 32-34 cguaestionum : the excerpts discuss caducous legacies 
and inheritances, conditional legacies and inheriting between husband 
and wife (61). 
Paul 19-21 guaestionum : Paul discusses incapacity between husband 
and wife, caducous legacies and inheritances and tacita fideicommissa 
(62). 
Further excerpts in Justinian's Digest suggest that commentary 
on the marriage laws or on issues closely related. to them was 
included in the libri disputationum of Ulpian and in the libri 
responsorum of Paul and of Papinian. Several other jurists seem to 
have commented on the law s Africanus, Atilicinus, Octavenus, 
Proculus, Sabinus, Scaevola, Servilus and Trebatius (63). 
As has already been observed, there are difficulties involved 
in using the jurists' commentaries ad leerem luliam et Papiam in an 
attempt to reconstruct the provisions of the laws and to establish 
their order. It is clear that there are variations in the jurists' 
order of commentary: for instance, Ulpian appears to have devoted the 
last two books of his commentary to privileges in the magisterial 
cursus and exemption from civil duties which were the reward for 
obedience to the laws. According to Gellius (64), the provision 
relating to privileges among consuls belonged to the seventh chapter 
of the lex Iulia, and was therefore one of the earlier provisions of 
the law.. It is'possible that Gellius made a mistake, or that the 
privileges awarded to such high-ranking officials as consuls were 
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separated from the other privileges granted by the law. But a more 
likely explanation is that Ulpian discussed these issues at the end 
of his commentary because that part was devoted to the provisions 
relating to public law. 
There is also some variation-in the place given by the 'jurists 
in their commentaries to the discussion of the rights of patrons and 
freedmen in the area of succession. Whereas a discussion of these 
rules occupies a fairly central position in the commentaries of 
Gaius, Ulpian and Terentius Clemens, it occupies the last three books 
of Paul's commentary. Ferrini (65) has suggested that the 
provisions concerning the property of freedmen appeared in the lex 
Papia in the middle of the provisions relating to caduca and that 
Gaius, Ulpian and Terentius Clemens chose to comment on it before 
going on to caduca, while Paul discussed it after his treatment of 
caduca. But this is not a convincing hypothesis : it is highly 
unlikely that the provisions concerning the property of freedmen 
would have been placed in the middle of the provisions de caducis in 
the lex Papia. It is much more likely that these rules preceded 
those concerning caduca (as the commentaries of Gaius, Ulpian and 
Terentius Clemens suggest), and that Paul combined the provisions of 
the lex Papia relating to caduca with those of the lex Iulia, leaving 
his commentary on the property of freedmen to the end. 
Similarly, Ulpian is alone in commenting at an early stage on 
the provision of the lex lulia which forbade a freedwoman married to 
her patron to leave him and to remarry (book 3). His evidence 
suggests that it was among the early provisions of the lex Iulia. 
The other jurists, however, deal with this topic at a later stage in 
their commentaries, ' and it is possible to conjecture that they 
incorporated it into a section devoted to all of the rules relating 
to patrons and ex-slaves. 
It is interesting that the jurists Ulpian, Gaius, and Terentius 
Clemens do not appear to have discussed all of the issues relating to 
inheritance in one section of their commentaries. Instead they seem 
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to have discussed some of these issues at a fairly early stage in 
their commentaries while incorporating a longer discussion into the 
later books. Since it is clear that bothi laws introduced rulings 
relating to inheritance, it may well be that the later discussions 
belong to a commentary on those provisions of the lex Papia Poppaea 
regarding inheritance which could be treated separately from those of 
the lex Iulia. 
In spite of the difficulties involved in drawing firm 
conclusions from the juristic evidence, it is nevertheless reasonable 
to provide a tentative reconstruction of the two laws in order to 
facilitate discussion of the provisions. The distinctions and order 
proposed are based partly on the hints provided by the juristic 
sources and partly on conjecture as to the most logical order for the 
provisions. 
`LEX IULIA DE MARITANDIS ORDINIBUS' 
Lifting of censorial penalities against marriages. between non- 
senatorial ingenui and freedwomen who are not famosae. 
Prohibition against marriages between non-senatorial inaenui and 
famosae. 
Introduction of a legal ban against marriages of senators (and of 
their descendants in male line) with freedwomen or actresses, and of 
the daughters (and of, demale descendants in male line) of senators 
with freedmen or actors. 
Withdrawal of right of a freedwoman married to her patron to divorce 
him and to remarry. 
Obligation to marry within certain age limits, probably 25+ and 60 
for men, 20+ and 50 for women, unless absent 'rei publicae causa'. 
Obligation for women to remarry within a year of death of husband or 
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within six months of divorce. 
Reservation of seats at theatre for married plebeians. 
Grant of ius stolae to women who obey law. 
(Chapter 7) Privileges in honores granted as a reward for lawful 
marriage and procreation: priority in taking symbols of consular 
imperium due to consul who is married or who has more children; 
magistracies to be obtained one year before the legal age for each 
child possessed. 
Exemption from civil duties through the possession of children, e. g. 
from tutela and curatela. 
Release of free-born women from tutors through ius trium liberorum. 
Appointment of tutor by praetor for the constitution of dowry for a 
woman in tutela pupilli. 
Obligation of a husband to restore to his wife any gain made from the 
nanumission of a dotal slave. 
Immunity of freedmen from the obligation to perform services for 
their patrons promised as a condition of manumission through the 
possession of two children. 
Release of freedmen and freedwomen from oaths made to patrons that 
they will not marry. 
Penalties: 
Prohibition against spectating at games and partaking of banquets by 
the unmarried. 
Imposition of a tax on unmarried women. 
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Total incapacity of the unmarried to inherit. 
Grant of 100 days in which to obey the law. 
Exemption of cognati to sixth degree from obligation to provide 
evidence in cases of incapacity. 
Overruling by law of widowhood enjoined in a will. 
(? Or introduced by Lex Papia Poppaea? ) Inheriting between husband 
and wife: taking of one tenth permitted, and an additional tenth for 
each child of a previous marriage, or for a common child who has been 
lost; grant of the usufruct of one third of the spouse's property, 
and ownership of this part on birth of children; grant of total 
capacity to spouses who are not within ages specified by laws or who 
are cognati to sixth degree, or if the husband is absent for the sake 
of the Republic; grant of. right to make a will. without restrictions 
to those who have obtained the ius liberorum from the Emperor, or who 
possess a common child etc. 
(Chapter 35) Ruling against unreasonable opposition of a 
paterfamilias to the marriage of his daughters and granddaughters. 
LEX PAPIA POPPAEA 
% 
Lifting of censorial penalties against marriages between non- 
senatorial inaenui and freedwomen who are not famosae. 
Prohibition against marriages between non-senatorial inaenui and 
famosae. 
Ban on marriages of senators and descendants with freedwomen or 
actresses and of daughters of senators with freedmen or actors. 
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Requirement of registration of births of legitimate children within 
30 days. 
Obligation for women to remarry within two years of death of husband 
and within l8 months of divorce. 
Limitation of betrothals to two years or less if the betrothed are to 
enjoy the privileges of the law. 
Grant of increased privileges to those possessing children: e. g. 
release of freedwomen by ius quattuor liberorum from tutors. 
Rights of patrons, patronesses and children of patron to the estates 
of their freedmen and freedwomen who are testate or intestate: 
benefits gained by both patrons and ex-slaves by possession of 
children. 
Prohibition against childless inheriting more than one half of 
bequests. 
Exemption of adfines in addition to'cognati to sixth degree from 
obligation to provide evidence in cases of incapacity. 
Introduction of detailed rulings concerning caduca: Caducous 
legacies assigned to colegatees in will possessing children; claims 
of colegatees possessing children preferred to those of heirs; 
caducous inheritances granted to close relatives in will who enjoy 
ius antiquum. 
Rules regulating inheriting between spouses (see lex Iulia) 
Immunity of some women from restrictions of lex Voconia. 
Offer of rewards to informers. 
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FORBIDDEN AND PERMITTED MARRIAGES 
It is clear from the juristic evidence that provisions 
concerning forbidden and permitted marriages appeared in both the lex 
Iulia and the lex Papia (66) and at an early stage in the laws. 
Ulpian, Paul and Marcellus certainly discussed these provisions in 
the first books of their commentaries, and Gaius and Terentius 
Clemens may have done so also. The position of the provisions in 
the laws is indicative of their importance. 
The jurist, Paul, purports to reproduce the exact wording of the 
lex lulia : 
(Lege Iulia ita cavetur: ) 'Qui senator est quive filius neposve ex 
filio proneposve ex filio nato cuius eorum est Brit, ne quis eorum 
sponsam uxoremve sciens dolo malo habeto libertinam auf eam, quae 
ipsa cuiusve pater materve artem ludicram facit fecerit neve 
senatoris filia neptisve ex filio proneptisve ex nepote filio nato 
nata libertino eive qui apse cuiusve pater materve artem ludicram 
facit fecerit, sponsa nuptave sciens dolo malo esto neve quis eorum 
dolo malo sciens sponsam uxorem eam habeto' (67). 
'Let no-one who is a senator, or who is or will be his son or 
grandson born to his son, or great-grandson born to his grandson born 
to his son knowingly and maliciously have as a fiancee or wife a 
freedwoman or a woman who, or whose father or mother, is, or has 
been, an actor or actress; and let no daughter of a senator, or 
granddaughter born from his son, or great-granddaughter born from his 
grandson born from his son be knowingly and maliciously engaged or 
married to a freedman or to a man who himself, or whose father or 
mother, is or has been an actor or actress, nor let any such 
ataliciously and knowingly have her as fiancee or wife'. 
This excerpt is taken from Paul's first book of commentary AA 
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lea-em Iuliam gt Papiam ; given the title' of the lex lulia de 
maritandis ordinibus, it is likely that this provision appeared at 
the beginning of the law. The ruling reported by Paul is confirmed 
by Ulpian, who also assigns it specifically tö the lex Iulia: 
Lege Iulia prohibentur uxores ducere senatores quidem liberi eorum 
libertinas et quae ipsae quarumve pater materve artem ludicram 
fecerit, item corpore quaestum facientem (68). 
Since there is no indication in the excerpt cited from Paul (D. 
23.2.44. ) that senators were not allowed to marry prostitutes, 
Mommsen believes that the 'item corpore quaestum facientem' of Reg. 
13.1 should belong to the following paragraph (Reg. l3.2) in which 
Ulpian describes various categories of women with whom marriage was 
forbidden to all inaenuis 
Ceteri autem ingenui prohibentur ducere lenam et a lenone lenave 
manumissam et in adulterio deprehensam et iudicio publico damnatam et 
quae artem ludicram fecerits adicit Mauricianus et a senatu 
damnatam. 
Elsewhere (69) Ulpian describes these women generally- as 
'famosae' (70). Mommsen argues that prostitutes must be included"in" 
the category of 'famosae', and that while senators were indeed 
forbidden to marry prostitutes, it would hardly have been necessary 
for Ulpian to say this when they were included in the category with 
whom marriage was forbidden to all ingenui. In fact, Req. 13.1 and 
13.2 are difficult texts: in 13.1 there should clearly be an 'eas' 
after 'libertinas et' (line 2) and 'fecerit' should be 'fecerint". 
It is also doubtful whether the 'et quae artem ludicram fecerit' 
should be in 13.2, since elsewhere the prohibition against marriages 
to actresses is only applied to senators. Certainly 'item corpore 
quaestum facientem' does not fit well into 13.1 where the other women. 
to whom marriage with senators is forbidden are listed in the plural. 
It would fit, more satisfactorily into 13.2, and therefore Mommsen's. 
. 
argument that the phrase has been misplaced by a copyist is very 
plausible. 
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To return to the purported quotation in D. 23.2.44, Brenkmann 
and Schulting (71) rightly argue that 'nepote' needs to be inserted 
between 'ex' and 'filio' in line 1 (after 'proneposve'). In 
addition, the 'natal of line 5 seems to be superfluous, given that 
there is no 'natus' in line 1 after 'ex filio nato', and should, 
perhaps, be omitted. 
Castello (72) notes that Ulpian omits the 'sciens dolo malo' 
mentioned by Paul as part of the provision concerning the marriages 
of senators. He raises the question of whether this phrase (which 
is a common one in legislative language) was dropped from the text of 
Ulpian or added to the text of Paul. He cites D. 23.2.58 where 
Marcianus (4 regularum) describes a constitution of Antoninus Pius 
which granted an action to a senator married to a freedwoman who had 
passed herself off as an ingenua, because the dowry is void. He 
believes that, since the Emperor's intervention was necessary in the 
case of this senator whose marriage to a freedwoman was not made 
'sciens dolo malo', this qualification did not appear in the original 
lex, but was added later. In fact D. 23.2.58 is a rather doubtful 
text and the constitution of Antoninus seems to be related to the 
changed status of marriages contracted against the rules of the lex 
Iulia. The evidence suggests that such marriages were rendered null 
and void following Imperial enactments of this period (see below). 
In addition Ulpian, in the text cited, does not, like Paul, claim to 
be giving a verbatim quotation from the law. It is possible that, 
since the qualification 'sciens dolo malo' was such a common one, it 
was added to this ruling at some stage out of sheer habit on the part 
of a jurist or a copyist, but it seems to be more likely that it was 
indeed part of the original lex Iulia. 
Volterra (73) believes that the appearance of 'sponsa' as well 
as 'uxor' in the excerpt is due to interpolation by Justinian's 
codifiers. He refers to passages such as D. 23.2.27. (Ulpian 3 ad 
leg. I. et P. ), regarding a senator who 'amiserit dignitatem', to 
show that senatorial status was not necessarily permanent, while the 
application of the sanctions of the law presupposed that this was the 
4 
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case. In addition)he cites D. 23.1.16 where Ulpian (3 ad leg. I. et 
P. ) describes an. oratio of Antoninus and Commodus concerning 
marriages prohibited to senators and says' 'de sponsalibus nihil 
locuta est'. However, his arguments are rather doubtful. -As 
Riccobono (74) argues, senatorial status was more or less permanent 
and would surely have been assumed to be so for the purpose" of the, 
law. It is clear from the evidence that betrothal was regarded as 
equivalent to marriage in relation to other aspects of the laws thus 
bachelors were able to gain the privileges of married men by becoming 
betrothed, and according to Suetonius and Dio (75), this necessitated 
the placing of a time limit on the duration of betrothals. As for 
D. 23.1.16, the absence of any mention of betrothal in the oratio 
certainly does not provide conclusive evidence for a similar omission 
in the original lex. The evidence suggests that the Imperial 
enactments made null and void marriages contracted against the 
provisions of the lex Julia et Papia which previously merely exposed 
participants to the penalties of the law and deprived them of its 
privileges (see also D. 23.2.16 and D. 24.1.3.1). Such sanctions 
would not have been relevant to betrothal which by this time was not 
in any case actionable. 
The excerpts from the jurists' commentaries ad legem Iuliam at 
Papiam show that they discussed at some length the limitations placed 
on senatorial marriages, but that they did not always discriminate 
between provisions of the original law and later additions. Paul 
goes on to say in the excerpt cited that a person whose grandfather 
or grandmother is an actor or actress is not included in the 
forbidden category and that it is irrelevant whether or not he is a 
natural or an adopting father. This sounds like juristic 
interpretation rather than an original provision of the law. The 
whole of the excerpt is taken up with determining precisely the 
people with whom marriage was forbidden to those of senatorial rank, 
as are the other excerpts relating to this subject (76). An excerpt 
from Ulpian (77) shows that a later sc forbade senators to marry 
a woman 'damnatam publico iudicio'. 
One of-the main sources of debate in relation to this aspect of 
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the lex Iulia is the apparent conflict between the evidence from Paul 
and Ulpian and that of Dio. Dio does not mention any prohibition, 
but portrays the measure of 18 B. C. as a concessionary one which, for 
the first time, gave licence to all ingenui except senators to marry 
freedwomen (78) s 
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Dio implies that such marriages were not formerly permitted, nor was 
the offspring from them legitimate (&VVp0 . Similarly, the jurist 
Celsus attributes to the lex Papia a concession which allowed all 
ingenui except senators to marry freedwomen (79) : 
Lege Iyi a cavetur omnibus ingenuis praeter senatores eorumque 
liberos libertinam uxorem habere licere. 
The evidence for the status of marriages between free-born 
persons and ex-slaves during the Republic is poor. There was 
certainly a provision forbidding marriage between patricians and 
plebeians in the last two tables which were added by the decemviri to 
make up the Twelve Tables (80). Agitation for the repeal of this 
rule led to the passing of the lex Canuleia in 445 B. C.. This is the 
only law regulating marriage between the orders for which there is 
evidence in the Republic, and scholars who believe that marriages 
betwen free-born persons and ex-slaves were valid before the 
enactment of the lex Iulia have generally associated this freedom of 
intermarriage with the lex Canuleia. 
Mommsen (81), however, believed that the Twelve Tables merely 
reaffirmed a long-standing tradition that patricians should not marry 
plebeians, that this was unaffected by the passing of the lex 
Canuleia, and that marriages between free-born persons and ex-slaves 
were regarded in the same way. 
The main source usually cited in this argument is Livy 39.19.5. 
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Livy records a senatusconsultum of 18)B. C.. which granted various 
privileges to a freedwoman and prostitute, °'Hispalla Fecenia, as a 
reward for her part in exposing the involvement of some citizens in 
Bacchanalian rites. Among the privileges granted to her was one 
allowing her to marry a free-born man 
... utique ei ingenuo nubere liceret neu quid ei qui eam duxisset ob 
id fraudi ignominiave esset. 
Mommsen argued from this text that such a marriage would normally 
have been invalid. He rightly observed that the concession made to 
the woman was not merely to overcome the restrictions placed on the 
marriage of a prostitute, since there is, at least for this period, 
no evidence for a specific prohibition against marriages between 
prostitutes and free-born men. Mommsen believes that a marriage 
between an ingenuus and a libertina during the Republic would have 
been regarded legally as concubinage. 
There are considerable difficulties involved in explaining this 
passage. Livy's use of the word . 'liceret' does suggest'a prohibition 
against such a marriage and it obviously does not refer to a release 
from the ignominy associated with such"a union which is mentioned as 
well. It might be argued that the 'liceret' phrase has some 
connection with the 'gentis enuptio' mentioned elsewhere in the sc in 
the list of privileges. Thus the phrase could be taken to mean that 
she was permitted to marry any free-born man even if he belonged to a 
gens other than that of her patron. But Livy, in fact, mentions the 
'gentis enuptio' as a privilege additional to and distinct from, that 
to which the phrase 'utique... liceret' refers. 
However, the problem with Mommsen's view is that there is no 
other evidence to support the existence of a prohibition introduced 
by law against a marriage of this kind in the Republican period. 
Mommsen tries to get around this by suggesting that the law 
forbidding such marriages in the Republic was not strictly enforced. 
This is a very unsatisfactory explanation. Livy must be referring 
not to a legal prohibition but to a censorial one which gave rise to 
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censorial penalties. The view that marriages-between freeborn and 
freed during the- Republic were not invalid but were regarded as 
socially and morally reprehensible is. widely held (82). Other 
theories have been suggested, such as that of Jbrs (83)-, who -makes 
the very speculative and unsubstantiated suggestion that Augustus in 
28 B. C. placed a legal prohibition on marriages between ingenui and 
libertae (which had formerly been permissible) and that this 
prohibition was removed in 18 B. C.. 
Another, more plausible, view has been proposed by Humbert (84) 
who, while not going as far as Mommsen, believes that Livy's use of 
the word 'liceret' implies the removal of more than mere social and 
moral disapproval. He argues that, while the prohibition derived 
from mores rather than from ius and did not (as Mommsen believed) 
render such marriages null and void, yet it was no less constraining 
than a statutory prohibition, the sanctions of the censor (he argues) 
being just as effective as those of the praetor. He believes that a 
marriage between freeborn and freed under the Republic would have 
been regarded as a matrimonium iniustum, even illicitum. Humbert 
argues that the penalties involved in incurring the disapproval of 
the censor would have been, for senators, loss of senatorial status, 
for equites, loss of the public horse and, for ordinary citizens, 
exclusion from their tribe and demotion to an inferior century. (He 
believes that the sanctions only applied to the upper ranks of 
citizens). The children born from such marriages were, he believes 
iniusti and not of the same social rank as their father, nor could 
the freedwoman wife be regarded as a materfamilias. 
The attraction of Humbert's arguments is that they provide a 
more satisfactory explanation for the apparent contradiction between 
Dio (and Celsus) and Paul (and Ulpian) concerning the Augustan 
marriage laws than do the arguments of those who believe that 
marriages between free-born and freed in the Republic merely involved 
moral and social disgrace. Humbert believes that the Augustan 
legislation lifted the Republican censorial penalties against 
marriages between ex-slaves and non-sectorial. inaenui, and 
0 
introduced, ' for the first time, a statutetry prohibition against 
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marriages between ex-slaves and those of senatorial status. He 
argues that Dio . (and Celsus) and Paul (and Ulpian) are merely 
describing different provisions of the Augustan marriage legislation 
and that a reconstruction from the evidence of Celsus and of Paul 
could be made to run as follows 
Omnibus ingenuis, praeter senatores, libertinam uxorem habere licet; 
qui senator est erit ne quis ... uxorem libertinam habeto. 
The main problem with Humbert's arguments is the lack of 
evidence (which he acknowledges) for the application of the penalties 
which he describes in the late Republic to those who entered into the 
forbidden marriages. He cites Cicero Pro Sestio 110, where an eques, 
L. Gellius Poplicola, who has lost his status, is accused of having 
married a freedwoman. Humbert argues that, if he had already lost 
his status for another reason and not because of his marriage, there 
would have been no need for Cicero to harangue him for entering on 
such a marriage. Humbert also cites the case of Anti%ny who was 
reproved by Cicero for marrying the freeborn daughter of a 
freedwoman (85). However, neither of these cases provides conclusive 
evidence for his arguments : indeed, the pro Sestio passage rather 
provides support for the view that marriages between freeborn and 
freed were merely regarded as disgraceful. Humbert's view of "mixed 
marriages" as iniusta is supported only by the evidence of Dio, who 
says that Augustus made the offspring of such marriages legitimate 
(86) : in the absence of any other supportive evidence, it is 
reasonable to conclude that Dio, not uncharacteristically, has failed 
to achieve strict accuracy here. 
This is not to deny that Humbert is right to argue that 
censorial penalties were incurred by "mixed marriages" as well as 
social and moral disapproval. However, his conclusions concerning 
the nature of these penalties are rather speculative and his belief 
that such marriages were iniusta seems, in fact, to differ little 
C 
from Mommsen's view which he himself critiýizes. In addition, his 
insistence that the Augustan marriage legislation brought no change 
whatsoever for senators is dubious : the replacement of censorial by 
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statutory penalties must surely have had considerable significance. 
It is not, however, necessary to accept all of Humbert's 
arguments in order to be able to reconcile the accounts of Dio and 
Celsus and of Ulpian and Paul. Clearly the former had in mind the- 
lifting of the censorial penalties from "mixed marriages" by 
Augustus, whereas the latter were concerned with the introduction of 
a statutory prohibition against marriages between members of the 
senatorial order and ex-slaves. 
The issue of statutory penalties leads on to the other main 
area of contention among scholars, the question of the exact legal 
status of marriages contracted in defiance of the rules of the lex 
Iulia et Papia. Most scholars agree (87) that marriages contracted 
against the provisions of the Augustan laws were not null and void, 
but that they failed to qualify the participants for enjoyment of the 
privileges and exemption from the penalties associated with the laws. 
Thus such offenders, although married, were regarded, for the 
purposes of the law, as caelibes. This places the lex Julia et Papia 
in the category of a 'lex minus quarr perfecta', defined as follows 
by Ulpian (88): 
Minus quarr perfecta lex est quae vetat aliquid fieri et si factum 
sit, non rescindit, sed poenam iungit ei qui contra legem fecit. 
This helps to explain the purpose of the subsequent Imperial 
enactments mentioned in the juristic sources (89). The texts 
suggest that marriages which had previously been subjected to the 
penalties and deprived of the privileges of the lex Iulia et Papia, 
were later rendered void. 
This view is disputed by Moi sen (90) and by Nardi (91). 
They argue that-marriages contracted contrary to the provisions of 
the lex lulia et Papia were always void, and that the sc merely 
reaffirmed this. 
All of the evidence seems to go against this view. Ulpian 
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says, in connection with inheriting between-'spouses (92) 
Aliquando nihil inter se capiunt, id est si contra legem Iuliam 
Papiamque contraxerint matrimonium... 
Ulpian does not say here that such a marriage is void: he refers to 
one of the penalties imposed on those who enter on it. There would 
have been no need for the jurists to have outlined the penalties 
attached to a marriage contracted in defiance of the rules of the lex 
Iulia et Papia if such a marriage had been void, since it would have 
incurred the penalties applied to any other invalid union. Moreover, 
Ulpian in describing a union 'contra legem Iuliam Papiam 
Poppaeamque' employs the words 'matrimonium' and 'uxor', terms which 
he would have avoided had the marriage been null and void. 
While Nardi denies that the jurists consistently avoided such 
terms in connection with invalid marriages, he is unable to give any 
convincing examples. The use of the terms was not due to a poverty 
of vocabulary, and in Justinian's Insts. 1.10.12, concerning invalid 
marriages, we find: 
Si adversus ea quae diximus aliqui coierint, nec vir, nec uxor, nec 
nuptiae, nec matrimonium, nec dos intelligitur. 
Another important text is Frag. Vat. 168 (Olp. de 
excusationibus): 
... quidam tarnen iustos secundum has leges putant dici... sed, iustorum 
mentio ita accipienda est, ut secundum ius civile quaesiti sint. 
Here a contrast is drawn between children born 'secundum has leges' 
(lex Iulia and lex Papia), and those born 'secundum ius civile'. 
Nardi suggests that the contrast is between the ius civile before and 
after the Augustan laws which enlarged the category of marriages 
forbidden by, the ius civile. However, this is a distortion of the 
text: there is no indication that the ius civile mentioned here was 
that in existence previous to the lex Iulia et Papia. If marriages 
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contrary to these laws were invalid, children who were iusti 
secundum has leges' would also have been 'secundum. ius civile 
quaesiti' and there would have been no need to mention them as two 
distinct categories. A comparable text is found in Paul, Sent. 
4.8.4, and Collatio 16.3.41 
Sui heredes sunt hi: primo loco filius filia in potestate patris 
constituti: nec interest, adoptivi eint an naturales et secundum 
legem Iuliam Papiamve quaesiti: modo maneant in potestate. 
This text clearly implies that children who were not born from a 
marriage 'secundum legem Iuliam" et Papiam' could still be sui 
heredes: hence such a marriage must have been valid cure civili. 
As. Jbrs observes (93), in the texts cited by Monmsen to 
demonstrate that marriages contrary to the lex Iulia et Papia were 
invalid, the jurists were,. no doubt, commenting on the lex lulia and 
the lex Papia combined with the subsequent enactments. There are 
three excerpts from Justinian's Diciest which refer to later measures 
concerning marriages between those of senatorial rank and those of 
freed status: in 23.1.16, ( Ulpian 3 ad lea. I. et P. ) we find: 
Oratio imperatorum Antonini et Commodi, quae quasdam nuptias in 
personam senator= inhibuit... 
Again, D. 23.2.16 (Paul 32 ad edictum): 
t 
Oratione divi Marci cavetur ut, si senatoris filia libertino 
nupsisset, nec nuptiae essent: quarr et senatus consultum secutum est. 
The third text is D. 24.1.3.1 (Ulp. 37 ad Sabinum): 
... ergo si senatoris filia libertino contra senatus consultum 
nupserit... valebit donatio, quia nuptiae non sunt. 
Since the latter two texts cited mention only daughters of senators 
some scholars, such as Corbett (94) believe that the purpose of the 
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later enactment was to extend the prohibition against marriages 
between senators and freedwomen to marriages between daughters of 
senators and freedmen (95). Corbett believes that D. 23.2.44j2r. 
represents not the wording of the original lex Iulia (as is 
purported) but an amalgamation of the text of the lex lulia and of 
those of later enactments. In favour of his view is the fact that 
Ulpian (86) does not say anything about a prohibition affecting 
female descendants of senators and freedmen. In addition, it does 
seem odd, if the lex Julia mentioned restrictions on the marriages of 
both senators and of the daughters of senators, that the oratio of 
D. 23.1.16 ignored the latter group, so that another oratio was 
needed: on Corbett's view the oratio of D. 23.1.16 was the first 
enactment to make any reference at all to the marriages of daughters 
of senators. However, it is significant that in D. 23.2.16 and 
D. 24.1.3.1, marriages between daughters of senators and freedmen are 
clearly designated as null. Since those marriages forbidden by the 
lex Iulia et Pais were not (as has been argued) rendered null, it is 
clear that the purpose of, the Imperial enactments was not to place 
marriages between daughters of senators and freedmen in the same 
position as those contracted between senators and freedwomen. 
Moreover it is difficult to believe that the entire second part of 
the purported quotation from the lex Iulia preserved by Paul (98) is 
an interpolation. Presumably in D. 23.2.16 and D. 24.1.3.1 the jurists 
simply happen to be referring to that part of the later rulings which 
applied to marriages between daughters of senators and freedmen. 
Thus the evidence suggests that marriages contracted against the 
rulings of the lex lulia et Papia (that is by senators as well as by 
daughters of senators), although initially valid legally, were at 
some stage rendered void. The Imperial enactments mentioned in the 
texts cited are the only measures attested-by the sources . to which 
the introduction of sanctions of, nullity may be attributed. 
MARRIAGES OF PATRONS WITH THEIR FREEDWOMEN 
The " provision which forbade freedwomen married to their 
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patrons to leave them and to remarry is specifically attributed by 
Ulpian to the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus: 
'... liberta ab invito patrono divortit: lex Iulia de maritandis 
ordinibus retinet istam in matrimonio, dum eam prohiberet alii nubere 
invito patrono... ' (98) 
The existence of this provision is also attested in D. 24.1.62.1, 
D. 24.2.10 and CJ 5.5.1. Elsewhere, Ulpian purports to give the exact 
wording of the provision s 
Quod ait lex : 'Divortii faciendi potestas libertae, quae nupta est 
patrono ne esto'.... Ait lex : 'Quamdiu patronus eam uxorem esse 
volet'(99). 
Deinde ait lex 'invito patrono' (100). 
These excerpts have caused, a great deal of debate. Levy (101) argues 
that the law only forbade divorce and not remarriage, on the ground 
that a second valid marriage would have been impossible in the 
absence of a valid divorce. He believes that the 'invito patrono' 
does not refer to remarriage, but that the jurists added the second 
prohibition in order to make clear the practical consequences of the 
first prohibition. He reconstructs the provision as follows 
Divortii faciendi potestas libertae, quae nupta est patrono invito eo 
non esto, quamdiu patronus eam uxorem esse volet. 
i 
on the other side, Solazzi (102) rejects any prohibition 
against divorce in the law, and believes that it was only remarriage 
against the will of the patron which was forbidden. He believes 
that it would have gone against the traditional Roman idea of liberum 
matrimonium to have forbidden a liberta to divorce her patron, and 
argues that the nullity of the second marriage would have implied the 
continuation of the first in spite of the divorce. Bonfante (103) 
also doubts that divorce was forbidden until- after the classical 
period on the same grounds. Volterra (104) believes that there were, 
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indeed, ' two distinct rules, each applying to a different case. 
Solazzi's arguments are more. convinaing than Levy's, but a 
rejection of the texts cited does not seem to me to be necessary. It 
is important to remember that there was no set form of divorce. laid 
down in Roman law (except for that laid down for the application of 
the lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis), so that it must 
sometimes have been difficult to ascertain whether or not a true 
divorce had actually taken place. By incorporating the double 
prohibition into the lex Iulia, the legislator presumably wished to 
ensure that the freedwoman could not evade the obligation. In 
addition, while the concept of liberum matrimonium was important, it 
was perhaps thought to be less so for a freedwoman than for an 
ingenua. in any case, one of the interesting things about the 
marriage laws of Augustus is the way in which they sometimes rode 
roughshod over traditional Roman institutions. 
Ulpian discusses the definition of a patron to whom this right 
applies (105), the exclusion of'men who are engaged from the right 
(par. 4) the meaning of 'invito patrono' (par. 5) and the right of a 
patron who is in captivity (par. 6). In the same book of 
commentary, Ulpian mentions the opinion of the jurist Julian that the 
law also forbade concubines to leave their patrons (106) : this 
extension of the provision of the lex Iulia was, no doubt, due to 
later interpretation. Ulpian also discusses here the various 
circumstances in which it is clear that the patron no longer wishes 
to have a freedwoman as his wife (par. 2). 
t 
In his eighth book of commentary ad leciem Iuliam et Papiam, 
Terentius Clemens discusses the extension to the son of a patron of 
the right to a freedwoman enjoyed by his father (107). He says that 
the patron has no right in relation to a freedwoman who is 
'ignominiosa' (par. l). An excerpt from Modestinus (108) suggests 
that the prohibition does not apply to a freedwoman who has been 
manumitted because of a trust. 
Since -(as has already been observed), the evidence for 
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marriages between ingenui and libertae before and after 18 B. C. is 
poor, we do not know how common marriages between patrons and their 
freedwomen were. But the presence of such a provision in the lex 
lulia and the evidence which we have in Justinian's Digest that the 
jurists discussed it in considerable detail in their commentaries 
leads us to believe that such marriages were not uncommon. A patron 
could not have hoped for any pecuniary gain from a marriage with his 
ex-slave, but he may have wished to elevate her position and to make 
any offspring from their union legitimate. The purpose of the rule 
cannot have been merely to confirm the validity of marriages between 
these two orders, although Augustus may have hoped to encourage such 
marriages by the grant of this privilege to the patron. The most 
obvious purpose of this provision of the law is the prevention of the 
situation whereby a slave woman might marry her patron in order to 
gain her freedom and subsequently divorce him. 
Concubinage 
Both Paul and Ulpian discuss issues related to concubinage in 
their commentaries ad legem Zuliam et Papiam (Ulpian book 2, Paul 
book 10) (109) and some scholars have therefore presumed that the 
marriage laws contained provisions regulating concubinage. 
Jars (110) has concluded from D. 25.7.3 (Marcianus 12 inst. ) that the 
lex Iulia et Papia contained provisions of considerable significance 
for concubinage: 
/-" In concubinatu potest esse et aliena liberta at ingenua... r... nain 
quia concubinatus per leges (lex Iulia and lex Papia- he believes) 
nomen assupsit, extra legis (lex lulia de adulteriis coercendis) 
poenam est .. 
Jars believes that-the laws of Augustus first gave legal recognition 
to concubinäge. " This view is supported by other scholars such as 
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Buckland (111). 
Csillag (112)'. points out the difficulty in distinguishing y 
between marriage and concubinage (113) and suggests that the Augustan 
marriage laws introduced a formality by which a distinction could be 
made. He also suggests that the Augustan laws limited concubinage 
to unions existing between parties to whom marriage was forbidden by 
the lex lulia et Papia. 
These suggestions are largely speculative, and in those 
excerpts from the jurists' commentaries ad leciem luliam et Papiam 
which discuss concubinage, there is no mention of any rule introduced 
by these laws. It is true that the evidence for concubinage in the 
Republic suggests that there were no legal consequences attached to 
this institution then (114) whereas some rules did develop under the 
Empire (115). But the development of such rules cannot be 
conclusively linked to the lex lulia et Papia and Jörs' assumption 
that the 'leges' of D. 25., 7.3 are the two marriage laws cannot be 
substantiated. No doubt the jurists found it necessary to discuss 
various issues relating to the institution of concubinage in' their 
commentaries ad legem luliam et Papiam because it was an institution 
so similar to marriage. Questions would have been raised concerning 
the application of certain provisions of the marriage laws to 
concubinage. Thus, for example, Ulpian discusses the question of 
whether or not the concubine of a patron is permitted-to leave him 
against his will and to become the concubine or wife of another. He 
also discusses the minimum age of a concubine (116). In addition, 
the penalising of stuprum by the lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis 
meant that it became important for men to ensure that they did not 
lay themselves open to a charge of stuprum by taking a concubine of a 
certain-status. Hence the jurist Marcian lists those women who may 
be taken as concubines without the risk of accusation of' stuprum 
(117). 
Csillag has also suggested that the ban on marriages between 
senators and freedwomen resulted in an increased 'frequency of 
concubinage as an alternative. But since marriages between an 
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ingenuus and a freedwoman had previously been subjected to censorial 
penalties and regarded as degrading, senators would certainly not 
have been in the habit of marrying freedwomen during the Republic. 
They would therefore have been just as likely to have had freedwomen 
as concubines before the lex Iulia as after it. What is more likely 
to have resulted in an increase in concubinage was the introduction 
of a ban on the marriages of soldiers. This ban, which seems to 
have been lifted by Septimius Severus (118) and was certainly 
introduced in the early Empire (119) cannot, however, be conclusively 
linked with Augustus. Buckland (120) also suggests that the ban on 
governors of provinces marrying women from their province encouraged 
concubinagec this, however, would have affected a very small number 
of people (121). 
Ages within which the law demanded marriage/children 
Having dealt with forbidden marriages and the restriction 
placed on a freedwoman married to her patron, the lex Iulia went on 
to state the obligation placed on men and women to marry. The 
evidence suggests that people were obliged to marry and to procreate 
by a certain age in order to enjoy the privileges and to avoid the 
penalties of the law, and that after a certain age they were freed 
from the obligation. There is no specific evidence for the ages laid 
down by the lex Iulia, but, according to Ulpian, the lex Papia 
specified the ages of 25 and 20 (for men and women respectively) and 
60 and 50, as the limits within which people were obliged. to have 
children: 
... velut si uterque vel alteruter eorum nondum eius aetatis sint, a 
qua lex liberos exigit, id est si vir minor annorum 7IXV sit auf uxor 
annorum 7OC minor: item si utrique lege Papia finitos annos in 
matrimonio excesserint, id est vir LX annos, uxor L (122). 
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We do have the evidence of Tertullian (123), who asserts that the lex 
Papia required people to have children at an earlier age than the lex 
Iulia required them to marry: 
Nonne vanissimas Papias legen, quae ante liberos suscipi cogunt quarr 
Iuliae matrimonium contrahi, post tantae auctoritatis senectutem hers 
Severus constantissimus principem exclusit? 
If Tertullian is not exaggerating, the lex Iulia must have set limits 
higher than 25 and 20 as the ages by which men and women must marry 
in order to avoid the penalties and to enjoy the privileges of the 
law. 
The wording of Ulpian Reg. 16.3 suggests that the upper age 
limits set by the lex Iulia were the same as those set by the lex 
Papia: 
Qui intra sexagesimum vel quae intra quinquagesimum annum neutri legi 
paruerit, licet ipsis legibus post hanc aetatem liberatus esset.. 
The words 'neutri legs' must refer to the lex Iulia and the lex 
Papia. The distinction between the provisions of the two laws was 
probably. that the limits of 60 and 50 laid down by the lex Iulia 
referred to the obligation to marry, whereas those of the lex Papia 
referred to the obligation to have children. Certainly, while there 
is no justification for asserting that the lex lulia provided 
incentives only to marriage and not to procreation as well, there 
was. undoubtedly an increased emphasis in the lex Papia on the 
procreation of children (124). In addition, in Re q. 16.1, Ulpian 
seems to assign specifically to the lex Papia the demand for children 
by certain ages. 
The age limits prescribed by the laws are confirmed by the 
evidence of the Gnomon of the Idios Logos, a papyrus from the 
Antonine"period (125). It is worth noting that the ages of 50 (for 
women) and. 60 for men) frequently appear as dividing criteria for the 
application of rulings on inheritance. 
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Ulpian provides information (126) about later senatusconsulta 
which regulated the rules of the lex Iulia'et Papia in cases where 
the husband or wife or both were outside the 20/25 - 50/60 age 
limits. The sc Pernicianum subjected men over 60 and women over 50 
to penalties if they had failed to obey the law before then. - The se 
Claudianum provided that a man over 60 who married a woman under 50 
was regarded as having married before 60. The sc Calvisianum 
provided that where a woman who was over 50 was married to a man 
under 60, the marriage was 'impar' and of no benefit towards rights 
to inheritances, legacies and dowries. It is easy to guess at the 
abuses which the senatusconsulta were designed to preclude. 
Requirement of a second marriage after the dissolution of the first 
It is clear from a text of Ulpian (127) that where a marriage 
was dissolved through death or divorce, women were obliged to remarry 
within a specified period, in order to enjoy the privileges and to 
avoid the penalties of the lex Iulia et Papiat 
Feminis lex Julia a morte anni tribuit vacationem, a divortio sex 
mensum, lex autem Papia a morte viri biennii, a repudio anni et sex 
mensum. 
Here a clear distinction is made between the provisions of the two 
laws. The lex iulia allowed a vacatio after the death of a husband 
of one year, and of six months after divorce. The lex Papia 
increased the vacatio, allowing two years after the husband's death, 
and eighteen months after divorce. Probably the brevity of the 
periods set by the lex iulia provoked opposition, so that Augustus 
was obliged to extend them in the lex Papia. 
Gaius deals with the issue of second or subsequent marriages in 
his third book of commentary (128), Terentius Clemens in his fourth 
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and fifth (35.1.62, (129) 64,40.9.31), and Ulpian in his eighth 
(130). The implication of the provision of a vacatio specifically for 
women is that no similar concession was provided for men. 
Presumably the only concession made to their was the grant of a 
hundred days made to all caelibes in which to obey the law if they 
wished to enjoy its privileges (131). Here we encounter the 
Republican idea of reverentia due to a husband by his wife. The 
remarriage of a woman following the death of her husband without an 
intervening tempus lugendi would have brought dishonour to the memory 
of her husband. A widow who remarried within this period was 
penalised under the praetorian edict (132). 
When the vacatio had ended, the widow or divorcee was 
designated as caelebs and therefore subjected to the terms of the lex 
Iulia et Papia. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE 'LEX IULIA ET PAPIA' II 
PRIVILEGES 
Before considering the main block of privileges accorded to those 
who conformed to the demands of the lex Julia which are associated 
with the ius liberorum, two other minor privileges should be 
observed. Firstly, Dio, writing about the events of 12 B. C., 
mentions a dispensation made by Augustus on his birthday to those 
who were unmarried, allowing them to watch the public games, and 
to eat with married people*(1): 
icxt ocuTbV 5ioc Te -rOOrd... ET9AI6D V KPCL -rW Toi S -re KIUV'OLc 
Tos CCVOCV oLs Kat GWOEä46xL' ToL. s o XXoLs KK%L 6uv£E i. 7VELV 
Ev 
. 
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goOvmL- Ob yäe 
ESI VoSr fh 
The implication is that on normal occasions, married people 
enjoyed special privileges in these areas. This is supported by 
the evidence of the sc de ludis saecularibus, already mentioned, 
which granted a dispensation on the occasion of the ludi 
saeculares to the unmarried who would normally have been debarred 
from watching public games. 
Suetonius further mentions the assigning of certain seats at 
the theatre to those who were married (2): 
Maritis e plebe proprios ordines adsignavit. 
These measures were probably all part of the lex Iulia. ti 
0 
Secondly, the evidence of Propertius suggests the 
introduction of a ius stolae whereby women who obeyed the law were 
granted the privilege of wearing distinctive clothing (3) 
Et tarnen emerui generosos vestis honoree/nec mea de sterili facta 
rapina domo. - 
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If this evidence is to be taken seriously, the date of the poem 
and the nature of the privilege would support the inclusion of 
such a provision in the lex lulia. 
'Ius liberorum' 
The remaining privileges, although very diverse, are 
generally all associated with the ius liberorum, since they are 
privileges granted to those possessing children, and this is the 
term employed in connection with them. For example, Pliny employs 
the terms in connection with privileges in holding magistracies 
(4) and Gaius in connection with the grant of freedom from 
tutorship (5). The term also appears in the areas of inheritance 
and of the rights of patrons and freedpersons, but these are 
complex areas to be discussed later. 
There is evidence that the career of a senator could be 
accelerated if he possessed a iusta uxor and'legitimate offspring. 
Gellius attributes provisions of this nature to the seventh 
chapter of the lex lulia (6) 
Sed postquam suboles civitati necessaria visa est et ad prolem 
frequentandam praemiis atque invitamentis usus fuit, tum antelati 
quibüsdam in rebus qui uxorem quique liberos haberent senioribus 
neque liberos neque uxores habentibus... capite 7 legis Iuliae 
priori ex consulibus fasces sumendi potestas fit, non qui plures 
annos natus est, sed qui plures liberos quarr collega auf in sua 
potestate habet auf bello amisit. *.. etc. 
Hence priority in assuming the fasces was given to the consul who 
possessed, or had possessed, more children, and not, as 
previously, to the elder of the two. Gellius goes on to say that 
where both consuls have an equal number of children, the 
married man is preferred; if both are married with the same number 
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of children, priority goes to the elder, as previously. 
Ulpian seems to be commenting on these provisions of the law 
in book twenty ad legem Iuliam et Papiam (7) 1 
Proconsules non amplius quarr sex fascibus utuntur. 
Elsewhere, Ulpian in a discussion on whether or not children 
lost in war are of any use in securing freedom from tutorship, 
mentions the Julian law 'de fascibus sumendis' (e) : 
An bello amiasi a tutela excusare debeant? Nam in fascibus 
sumendis et in iudicandi munere pro superstitibus habentur, ut 
lege Iulia de maritandis ordinibus de fascibus sumendis... cavetur. 
This text confirms the statement of Gellius already cited: '... aut 
in sua potestate habet auf Bello amisit... ' 
According to Dio, as early as 27 B. C. a privileged position 
was granted to proconsuls through the possession of. a wife or 
children. These annual magistrates were normally assigned to 
provinces by lot (9). 
Tacitus informs us that possession of children brought 
advantages at the elections of praetors (10). Elsewhere (11), 
describing the principate of Nero, Tacitus mentions the corrupt 
practice which existed at that time, whereby fictitious acts of 
adoption were made before elections ; or the allotment of provinces, 
and were followed by acts of emancipation immediately after the 
governorships had been obtained. 
Pliny, writing under the principate of Trajan, mentions the 
'liberorum ius' in connection with the tribunate (12): 
Simul militavimus, simul quaestores Caesaris fuimus. Ille me in 
tribunatu liberorum iure praecessit, ego ilium in praetura sum 
consecutus cum mihi Caesar annum remisisset. 
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There is evidence that the ius liberorum further excused men 
from jury service (13) and from other munera civilia, including 
the duties of being a tutor or curator. There are several texts 
which refer to such exemptions (14). The number of children 
required for exemption varied according to the place of residence: 
Excusantur autem tutores vel curatores variis ex causis: plerumque 
autem propter liberos, sive in potestate sint sive emanc. pati. Si 
enim tres liberos quis superstites Romae habeat vel in Italia 
quattuor vel in provinciis quinque, a tutela vel curs possunt 
excusari exemplo ceterorum munerum (15). 
Some difficulty,. however, is involved in assigning a 
provision of this nature specifically to the lex Julia et Papia. 
In Frag. Vat. 197, where Ulpian is discussing whether children 
lost in war bring exemption from tutorship, the fact that he draws 
a parallel with other exemptions gained through such for the 
purposes of the lex lulia suggests that this was not a part of 
that law. Furthermore, some of the texts seem to suggest that 
release from civil duties through the possession of children was 
introduced by later Imperial enactments. For example, Paul in 
Frag. Vat. 247 purports to quote from a constitution granting 
exemption from civil duties by the possession of three, four or 
five children, and adds: 
idque imperator noster et divus Severus... rescripserunt. 
Whether a provision of this nature was introduced by the lex 
lulia or the lex Pavia and subsequently modified by Imperial 
constitutions (16) or first introduced by a constitution, there is 
no doubt that possession of the requisite number of children did 
at some stage bring release from the duties of tutorship, and 
since this was a topic at least closely related to the lex Iulia 
et Pavia, the jurists discuss it in their commentaries ad leerem 
Iuliam et Papiam. ' For example, in D. 27.1.18 (Ulpian 20 ad leg. I. 
et P. ) we find: 
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Bello amissi ad tutelae excusationem prosunt. 
There is further evidence that freeborn women could be 
released from the legitima tutela of their patron by the ius trium 
liberorum, as could freedwomen under the authority of a tutor 
Atilianus or a tutor fiduciarius. (17) Freedwomen in the legitima 
tutela of their patrons, however, needed four children in order to 
gain this privilege. This rule was made, presumably, as a 
concession to patrons. 
There are several juristic texts which support the 
introduction of release from the authority of a tutor by the lex 
lulia et Papias 
Tutela autem liberantur ingenuae quidem trium liberorum iure, 
libertinae vero quattuor, si in patroni liberorumve eius legitimes 
tutela sint; nam ceterae quae alterius generis tutores habent 
velut Atilianos auf fiduciarios, trium liberorum iure tutela 
liberantur (18). 
Sed postea lex Papia cum quattuor liberorum iure libertinas 
tutela patronorum liberaret... (19) 
... tantum enim ex lege Iulia et Papia Pop(pae)a iure liberorum a 
tutela liberantur feminäe... (20) 
Lex Papia Poppaea postea libertas quattuor liberorum iure tutela 
patronorum liberavit: et cum intulerit iam posse eas sine 
auctoritate testari, prospexit, ut pro numero liberorum libertae 
superstitum virilis pars patrono debeatur. (21) 
The text of Ulpian 29.3 is disjointed, and it is difficult to 
see how it fits together. However an important point is made, 
namely that a woman possessing the ius could make a will without 
the authority of 'a tutor, who in the case of a freedwoman would be 
her patron. . 
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The texts suggest that the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus 
introduced exemption from tutela for inaenuae through the ius 
trium liberorum, and that the lex Papier extended this to 
libertinae in tutela legitima through the ius quattuor liberorum. 
Two well known juristic passages explain why traditionally all 
Roman women who were sui iuris were placed under the authority of 
a tutors 
Tutores constituuntur... feminis autem... propter sexus infirmitatem 
et propter forensium rerum ignorantiam (22). 
Veteres enim uoluerunt feminas, etiamsi perfectae aetatis sint, 
propter animi leuitatem in tutela esse (23). 
Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that the institution of 
tutela mulierum became less important from the late Republic 
onwards. In one of his speeches (24), Cicero complained that at 
his time some women ruled their tutors instead of the other way 
round and texts of Gaius show that the praetor might compel a 
tutor to give his consent to certain transactions which the woman 
wished to undertake and that a woman might replace an 
uncooperative tutor (25). Nevertheless, given that the Twelve 
Tables only exempted Vestal Virgins from tutela (26), even if, in 
practice, release from tutela was not the great privilege that it 
at first appears, the formal release of some women from it was 
still a significant departure from tradition. 
It may well have been at this point in the lex Iulia that 
another provision relating to tutela appeared. There is evidence 
that the lex Iulia contained a provision which authorised the 
urban praetor to appoint a tutor to a woman who was in tutela 
u illi, for the consititution of dowry s 
Ex lege Iulia de maritandis ordinibus tutor datur a praetore urbis 
ei mulieri virginive, quam ex hac ipsa lege nubere oportet, ad 
dotem dandam dicendam promittendamve, si legitimum tutorem 
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pupillum habeat (27). 
Nam et lege Iulia de maritandis ordinibus-ei, quae in legitimes 
tutela pupilli sit, ' permittitur dotis constituendae gratia a 
praetore urbano tutorem petere (28) 
Thus provision was made for a woman whose tutor was unable to 
arrange for the provision of a dowry for her and a tutor might no 
longer try to hinder a woman's marriage by refusing to arrange a 
dowry. This represents an extension of the provision of the 
Republican lex Atilia whereby the praetor and a majority of the 
tribunes of the plebs were allowed to appoint a tutor to a person 
who had none. obviously marriage would be facilitated if 
provision were made for the smooth. settlement of dowry and it is 
easy to see why such a provision should have appeared in the lex 
Iulia. 
This. was not the only provision of the Augustan laws 
concerning the issue of dowry. According to Papinian, if couples 
contracted a marriage contrary to the provisions of the lex Iulia 
et Papia, the dowry had to be forfeited to the treasury on the 
death of the wife (29) s 
Dote propter illicitum matrimonium caduca facta exceptis impensis 
necessariis quae dotem ipso iure minuere solent, quod iudicio de 
dote redditurus esset maritus solvere debet. 
In addition, there seems to have been a provision in the lex 
Iulia which restricted the right of a husband to manumit dotal 
slaves. Ulpian says that a husband must restore to his wife any 
gain made from the manumission of a dotal slave and purports to 
quote from the law (30) : 
Si vero negotium gerens mulieris non invitae maritus dotalem 
servum voluntate eius manumiserit, debet uxori restituere quidquid 
ad eum pervenit... Dabit eum, ut ait lex, quod ad eum 
pervenit ... Adicitur in lege, ut si dolo malo aliquid factum sit 
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quo minus ad eum perveniat, teneatur... Quod ait lex 'quanta 
pecunia erit, tantam pecuniam dato'. 
Bruns (31) has suggested the following reconstruction: 
'... quoll ad eum pervenit, et si dolo malo aliquid fachuni est, 
quominus ad eum perveniat ... quanta pecunia erit, tantam pecuniam 
dato. ' 
Such a reconstruction is too speculative to be acceptable, 
especially given that in paragraphs 6 and 7 of this excerpt, 
Ulpian does not actually claim to be quoting the ipsissima verba 
of the law (although, since he discusses the implication of 
'pervenit' in paragraph 6, it is likely that this word at least 
appeared in the law). However, there is no reason to doubt that 
Bruns' reconstruction provides an adequate description of the 
rule. The purpose of this provision of the law seems to have been 
the protection of a woman's dowry, presumably . in order 
to 
facilitate a subsequent marriage in the case-of death or divorce. 
It was comparable to the actio rei uxoriae instituted towards the 
end of the Republic, whereby a wife, on the termination of the 
marriage, might recover a part or the whole of the dowry (32). 
Dowry was an institution of great significance in Roman law, for 
it was designed to ensure that a wife was provided for both in the 
duration of the marriage and upon the death of her husband, should 
she not be provided for in his will. 
To return to the ius liberorum, a provision which released 
freedmen from performing operae for their patrons promised as a 
condition of manumission by virtue of the possession of two 
children, is attributable to the lex Iulia (33) : 
Qui libertinus duos pluresve a se genitos natasve in sua potestate 
habebit, praeter eum, qui artem ludicram fecerit quive operas 
suas, ut cum bestiis pugnaret, locaverit; ne quis operas doni 
muneris aliudve' quicquam libertatis causa patrono patronae 
liberisve eorum, de quibus iuraverit vel promiserit obligatusve 
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erit, dare, facere praestare debeto. ' 
The existence of such a provision is also attested by a 
constitution of Alexander (34). As for the purported quotation, 
the 'a se genitos' of line 1 is rather odd, and it would be 
preferable to replace it, as Cuiacius (35) does, with 'ex se 
natos'. I am also doubtful about the 'natasve', since one would 
expect an 'eamve' after the 'eum' of line 2 if it were genuine. 
Seckel (36) suspects that the 'vel promiserit' of lines 4-5 is an 
interpolation. There seems little reason, however, for rejecting 
it on the ground of its sense as he does : the jurist, in fact, 
provides several examples of promises made to the patron by the 
freedman (paragraphs 3,4). However, the construction 'vel... -ve' 
seems extremely clumsy and I am suspicious of 'vel promiserit' for 
this reason. 
Freedwomen who married with the permission of their patrons 
enjoyed the same privilege.. Thus we find in D. 38.1.14 (Terentius 
Clemens ad leaem I. et P. ): 
Plane cum desierit nupta esse, operas peti posse omnes fere 
consentiunt. 
There is one other provision concerning relations between 
patrons and ex-slaves which certainly belonged to the lex iulia 
(37). According to Paul (38), freedmen and freedwomen were 
released by the lex lulia from oaths made to their patrons that 
they would not marry: 
Lege Iulia de maritandis ordinibus remittitur iusiurandum, ' quod 
liberto in hoc impositum est, ne uxorem duceret, libertae ne 
nuberet, si modo nuptias contrahere recte velint. 
This provision was reinforced in the lex Aelia Sentia. 
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PENALTIES 
Most of the penalties inflicted on the unmarried and 
childless by the lex lulia et Papier seem to have been in the area 
of inheritance, although it is important to bear in mind the fact 
that, because the innovations made in this area were of particular 
interest to the jurists, they perhaps devoted a disproportionate 
amount of space to it in their commentaries. There is, indeed, 
evidence for the introduction of other penalties by the lex lulia. 
As has already been observed, the sc de ludis saecularibus shows 
that the unmarried were forbidden by the law to watch public games 
(39). Dio confirms this (40) and mentions a further prohibition 
against partaking at banquets by the unmarried. In addition, 
there is evidence in P. Gnomon (par. 29)(41) that an annual tax was 
imposed on unmarried women if their property was worth more than 
20,000 sesterces : 
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If this is indeed an Augustan provision, it probably belongs to 
the lex Iulia, since it concerns caelibes. 
Provisions relating to inheritance in the Ilex Iulia' (42) 
A very complex system of rules governing inheritance was 
incorporated into the lex lulia et Papia. The manipulation of 
the law of inheritance to encourage marriage and procreation was a' 
concept introduced by the lex Iulia and expanded in the lex Papia 
Poppaea. It has already been suggested that the jurists in their 
books -ad Jeqem uýliam gt ai° commented first on the 
provisions of the lex Iulia together with those. of the lex Papia 
Poppaea which were inseparably connected with them, and later 
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dealt with the remaining provisions which only appeared in the lex 
Papia Poppaea. This, together with other evidence, provides some 
help in distinguishing the provisions of the lex iulia in this 
area from those of the later law. 
Gaius shows that by the terms of the lex Iulia unmarried 
people (caelibes) were forbidden to inherit from a will. He also 
mentions that the lex Papia Poppaea introduced a limitation which 
forbade married but childless people (orbs) to inherit more than a 
half : 
Caelibes quoque qui lege lulia hereditatem legataque capere 
vetantur, item orbi, id est qui liberos non habent, quos lex Papia 
plus quarr dimidias partes hereditatis legatorumque capere 
vetat ... (43). 
Item orbs, qui per legem Papiam ob id quod liberos non habebant 
dimidias partes hereditatum legatorumque perdunt... (44) 
Since Gaius refers to the incapacity only of caelibes under the 
lex iulia and to the loss of 'dimidias partes' under the lex 
Papia, the implication is that orbi were not penalised by the lex 
Iulia. This is endorsed by another text of Gaius (45) s 
... aut propter caelibatum ex lege Iulia summotus fuerit ad 
hereditate. 
Similarly, Ulpian says (46) 
.. Idem iuris est in persona caelibis propter legem Iuliam. 
This, however, appears to be contradicted by Dio (47) who says, 
when writing about the events of A. D. 9, that Augustus increased 
the rewards offered by the law (lex lulia) and made a distinction 
between married and unmarried by imposing different penalties 
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This suggests that the penalties were the same for both caelibes 
and orbi under the lex Iulia, and this is the view taken by, for 
example, Last (48). Jars (49) tried to reconcile the texts by 
arguing that Augustus passed another marriage law in A. D. 4 which 
imposed equal penalties on the unmarried and childless. However, 
the evidence for the existence of a third marriage law is 
extremely flimy. The only reasonable explanation for the 
conflict in the texts is that Dio failed to achieve strict legal 
accuracy here. In describing the terms of the lex Julia earlier 
in his narrative (50) he mentions the imposing of penalties 'Tots 
1- ö yöCo c Ko( Ta if ä v"SfuL ' but says nothing about the 
imposing of similar penalties on orbs. His account of the lex 
Julia is not very specific or detailed, and he does not even name 
it. Moreover, the introduction of limitations on the capacity of 
orbi to inherit fits in with the other evidence which we have 
that, while the lex Iulia was especially directed towards 
encouraging marriage, the lex Papia Poppaea was directed rather 
towards promoting procreation. 
A period of 100 days was granted. (from the opening of the 
will) within which the caelebs could acquire the capacity to take 
under the will by marrying: 
... caducum appellatur ... si caelibi ... legatum fuerit, nec intra 
dies centum vel caelebs legi paruerit... (51). 
t 
Since the grant of 100 days was aimed at the caelebs rather then 
the orbus, this was probably a provision of the lex Iulia. , 
As the issue of orbitas has been raised, it seems appropriate 
to discuss it here although it is relevant to the lex Papia 
Poppaea rather than to the lex Iulia. The juristic sources 
suggest that the possession of one child brought freedom from 
orbitas. Orbi are described by Gaius (52) as those 'qui liberos 
non habent' and excerpts from the jurists' commentaries 'jd le gem. 
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Iuliam et Papiam show that to possess one child is 'liberos 
habere' (53) : 
Non est sine liberis, cui vel unus unave filia est: haec enim 
enuntiatio 'habet liberos' 'non habet liberos' semper plurativo 
numero profertur, sicut et pugillares et codicilli. 
nam quern sine liberis esse dicere non possumus, hunc necesse est 
dicamus liberos habere. 
This, however, seems to conflict with the evidence of Dio 
(54) whose account of the honorary award of the ius trium 
liberorum to Livia in 9 B. C. implies that the possession of three 
children was necessary to free women at least from the penalties 
of orbitas : 
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This passage of Dio has led to the view that while men needed to 
have only one child to be free from the penalties of orbitas, the 
ius trium guattuor liberorum was necessary for women to be able to 
inherit (55). Corbett (56) believes that the ius trium liberorum 
was only necessary in order to exempt a person from the penalties 
of celibacy for failing to remarry after the dissolution of a 
marriage. Dio's account, in fact, implies that the ius trium 
liberorum was necessary for both men and women to be able to take 
6 
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under wills. However, the whole passage is suspect, since, as has 
just been argued, "there were no penalties associated with orbitas 
in 9 B. C. when the award to Livia was made f- these were introduced 
by the lex Pais Poppaea in A. D. 9. Thus a special dispensation 
made to Livia which permitted her to take bequests as though she 
had three children would have been meaningless at the time. No 
doubt Dio overlooked this and his account derives from the fact 
that the honorary award of the ius trium liberorum by the Emperor 
developed into a right which seems to have given to the recipient 
a general dispensation from the penalties of the law. The grant 
of the ius clearly became a useful way for the Emperor to reward 
favoured individuals (57). For those who gained the ius trium 
liberorum by actual possession of three children, there were 
special privileges, such as release from tutela and from munera, 
but possession of one child was sufficient for men and women to be 
able to inherit. Adoptive children were clearly included as well 
as natural children, hence the need for the measure attested by 
Tacitus (58), enacted at the time of Nero, which was designed to 
prevent people from adopting children in order to gain the 
benefits accorded by the law and subsequently emancipating them. 
The rules of the lex Iulia concerning inheritance appear to 
have been discussed (so far as can be deduced from the excerpts 
preserved in Justinian"s Digest) by Gaius in books 3-6, by IIlpian 
in books 2-8, by Paul in books 2-4 and by Terentius Clemens in 
books 3-5 of the commentaries ad leaem Iuliam et gapes . It is 
impossible, using the evidence for these commentaries, to 
disentangle all of the original provisions of the lex Iulia from 
juristic interpretation and later additions, but it is still 
interesting to look at the issues discussed by the jurists.. Gaius 
discusses such issues as the role of substitutes in wills (59) and 
legacies of usufruct (60). Ulpian deals with the acquisition of 
an inheritance through another party (61), partial incapacity of a 
legatee (62) and the implementation of a condition in a legacy 
(63). 
We possess very few excerpts from Pauls commentary in this 
- no - 
area. In D. 32.87, he discusses the term 'legatum', including in 
it 'fideiconmissum' and 'mortis causa donätio' (a gift made in 
contemplation of death which took-full effect on the donor's 
death) and in D. 50.16.138 he includes in the term 'hereditas', 
'bonorum possessio'. , Paul's comments show that the sanctions 
which affected the taking of legacies and of inheritances came 
also to apply to these other categories, presumably because their 
exclusion by the terms of, the Augustan laws had provided useful 
loopholes for those unwilling to conform to the provisions of the 
law. Paul, in fact, specifically attributes the extension of the 
sanctions of the laws to mortis causa donationes to a 
senatusconsultum (64). Gaius attributes the extension of the 
sanctions to fideicommissa to the sc Pegasianum (65): 
Caelibes quoque, qui per legem luliam hereditates legataque capere 
prohibentur, olim fideicommissa videbantur capere posse.... Sed 
postea senatusconsulto Pegasiano proinde fideicoamnissa quoque ac 
legata hereditatesque capeze posse prohibiti aunt; 
11 
Terentius Clemens discusses such issues as the institution of 
an heir to an insolvent inheritance (66) and the use of a 
'pupillus' as a substitute (67). Elsewhere he discusses conditional 
legacies (68) and the implications of the terms of the lex 
Falcidia in determining the legatee's capacity (69). 
Excepted Persons 
The juristic sources attest the existence of certain groups 
of people who were 'lege Iulia et Papia excepti'(70). These are 
sometimes thought to be people who were exempted from the 
sanctions imposed by the law in the area of inheritance on those 
who failed to marry and to procreate in accordance with its 
provisions. 
Important texts are Fraamenta yaticana 216 and 218 in which 
Ulpian describes those who, because they are 'lege Iulia Papiave 
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excepti' are not permitted to transfer the burden of tutela to 
another party: 
Excipiuntur autem lege quidem Iulia cognatorum sex gradus et sex 
septimo sobrino sobrinave natus, sed et nata per interpretationem, 
quive in alicuius horum potestate sunt quaeve in matrimonio, vel 
hi qui sunt cognatorum nostrarum hoc gradu nos contingentium 
mariti, vel eorum qui sunt in potestate nostra, cognati 
contingentes eos ea cognatione, quae supra scriptum graduni non 
excedit (71). 
Lege autem Papia ii adfines excipiuntur, qui vir et uxor et gener 
et nurus et socer et socrus umquam fuerunt (72). 
These passages seem to imply that the lex iulia exempted cognati 
to the sixth degree from the sanctions of the law, while the lex 
Papia extended this to adfines (73). There are also a few 
excerpts preserved in Justinian's Digest which appear to bear some 
relation to this topic by the mention of the terms 'gener', 
'socer', 'nurus' etc.. These suggest that the topic was discussed 
by Gaius in book 4 of his commentary 'ad legem I iam et 
Paciam'(74), by Ulpian in book 5 (75),. by Paul in book 2 (76) and 
by Terentius Clemens in book 2 (77). 
However, the relevance of the content of the texts cited 
above to exemption from the rules of the law on incapacity is 
rendered suspect by a comparison of Fraa. yat. 218 with the detailed 
regulation of succession between., spouses set out in Ulpian 
Reg. 15,16 and discussed fully below. If, as the Fraa. Vat. text 
suggests, the 'vir et uxor'etc. were among those totally exempted 
from the sanctions imposed by the marriage laws on inheriting, 
then the limitations outlined by Ulpian on inheriting between 
husband and wife are meaningless. In fact, the lists of persons 
excepted from the terms of the marriage laws preserved in Frag. 
Vat. 216 and 218 are far too extensive to be applicable to the 
restrictions placed on caelibes and orbi. 
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The implication is that Ulpian's list of excepted persons is 
not related to capacitas but to. something else. Kaser (78), 
supported by Astolfi (79), has proposed that the exceptions refer 
to release from the obligation of giving evidence (presumably in 
cases relating to the application of the terms of the marriage 
laws) against cognati and adfines to the sixth degree. Such 
exceptions also featured in the judiciary laws, the leaes de vi 
and the lex Aelia Sentia. Two excerpts from the jurists' 
commentaries ad legem Iuliam et Papiam are relevant here : 
Lege Iulia iudiciorum publicorum cavetur, ne invito denuntietur, 
ut testimonium litis dicat adversus socerum generum, vitricum 
privignum, sobrinum sobrinam, sobrino sobrina natura, eosve qui 
priore gradu sint, item ne liberto ipsius, liberorum eius, 
parentium, viri uxoris, item patroni patronae s et ut ne patroni 
patronae adversus "libertos neque liberti adversus patronum 
cogantur testimonium dicere (80). 
In legibus, quibus excipitur, ' ne gener auf socer invitus 
testimonium dicere cogeretur, generi appellation sponsum quoque 
filiae contieri placet : item soceri sponsae patrem (81). 
In the first text, Paul. lists those exempted from acting as 
witnesses by the. terms of the lex iudiciorum publicorum, and 
includes not only cognati and adfines but also patrons and 
freedmen. In the second text, Gaius'only mentions 'gener' and 
'socer'. The other excerpts from Justinian's Digest related to 
this subject give definitions of 'nurus', 'gener', 'socer' and 
'socrus' (82). These excerpts have an obvious connection with 
Praa. Vat. 216-218, and since they are taken from the commentaries 
ad leaem Iuliam et Papiam, there is good reason to believe that 
the exemptions from giving evidence set out in them are relevant 
to the application of the marriage laws. 
While- the references in Fraa. Vat. 216 and 218 to those 'lege 
Iulia et Papia excepts' are clearly not concerned with exemption 
from the penalties associated with celibacy and childlessness, 
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some scholars argue on other grounds that the Augustan marriage 
laws did provide' exemption from these penalties for those in a 
close relationship to the testator. " Voci (83) cites Ulp. Reg. l8. l 
which attributes to relatives of the testator to the third degree 
the right to caducous inheritances by the ius antiguum and argues 
that such relatives must, therefore, have been eligible to 
inherit. Astolfi (84) argues that, since in the case of intestate 
succession, bonorum possessio might be claimed by relatives to the 
sixth degree, such relatives, whether married or not, should have 
had the same rights to the property of a testator. Wallace 
Hadrill (85), cites a passage from the church historian Sozomen 
(86) which claims that close relatives were exempt from the rules 
concerning inheriting. He also cites the rules outlined by Ulpian 
concerning succession between spouses (87). Here the restrictions 
did not apply if the spouses were relatives to the sixth degree, 
and, since the other exceptions outlined by Ulpian also applied, 
for the most part, to the general rulings regarding caelibes and 
orbi, he infers that this exception applied. In addition, he 
observes that the Republican lex Furia testamentaria, which placed 
a limit on the size of legacies which might be bequeathed, also 
excepted relatives to the sixth degree. 
The issue is an important one, for if there were such 
exemptions in the legislation, this would affect any assessment 
not only of its severity but also of its purpose. The main 
problem with the theory that close relatives were exempt from the 
rules governing inheritance by caelibes and orbi is the complete 
absence of any mention of this by Gaius when he outlines the rules 
(88). Nor is there any indication whatsoever in the sources of 
such exceptions having been introduced at a later date. In 
addition, the argument based on inference from the rules relating 
to inheriting between spouses is very shaky, for these rules are 
distinct from those regulating other areas of inheritance. 
Nevertheless, the silence of Gaius, while odd, does not provide 
conclusive evidence for the absence of such exceptions, and in 
view of the strength of many of the arguments cited above, I 
favour the 'view that Augustus excepted at least some close 
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relatives from the rules concerning caelibes and orbi. 
There was another, less important, exception provided by the 
law (or laws). According to the Gnomon, people whose property was 
worth less than 100 sesterces were exempt from the sanctions (89). 
Inheriting between husband and wife. 
The rules laid down for inheriting between husband and wife 
were distinct from the more general rulings on inheritance. The 
subject was undoubtedly dealt with in the lex Pavia Poppaea, for 
Ulpian specifically mentions the lex Pavia when laying down the 
age-limits within which the sanctions introduced in this area were 
applicable. Moreover, the emphasis in the provisions on the 
procreation of children suggests the lex Pavia rather than the lex 
lulia. However, the jurists' remarks on the subject appear, for 
the most part, in the earlier sections of their commentaries, 
perhaps suggesting that there were rules relating to this area in 
the lex lulia which were expanded upon in the lex Papia Poppaea. 
It would, indeed, be surprising if the lex Iulia made no provision 
for this special area of inheriting, so that the rules relating to 
inheriting in general were applied. 
Detailed information on inheriting between husband and wife 
appears in Ulpian Rec. 15 ('De Decimis') and 16 ('De solidi 
capacitate inter virum et uxorem')., The rules set out there are 
as follows: men and women are permitted to inherit one tenth from 
each other by virtue of being married. A further tenth may be 
claimed- for each child of a previous marriage, and for a common 
child who has died 'post nominum diem'. In addition, they are 
allowed the usufruct of a third part of their spouse's property, 
and the ownership of this part when they have children from a new 
marriage. A woman is permitted to take dowry which is given in a 
legacy to her (90). 
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Ulpian goes on to say that a husband and wife may inherit 
from each other without restriction if they are outside the age 
limits within which the lex Papia requires children (i. e. 20/25 - 
50/60), if they are cognati to the sixth degree, if the husband is 
absent, if they have obtained the ius liberororum from the 
Emperor, if they have one common child or have lost a son of at 
least 14, a daughter of 12, two children of 3 years old, or three 
'post nominum diem' or if they have lost an impubes within 18 
months. A wife may inherit without restriction if she has a 
child of her husband's within 10 months of his death. They may, 
however, inherit nothing from one another if they have married 
contrary to the provisions of the lex Iulia et Papier. (91) 
A paragraph of the Gnomon confirms that a wife might only 
leave a tenth of her property to her husband if they had no 
children (par. 31) (92): 
PW)L4 E&o v äVcSPL, (Kýa roch oNeLv --o geka rvv wý v 
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Quintilian (93) draws attention to the anomaly created by these 
provisions. A man might leave a greater part of his property to a 
meretrix if he had no children, than to his wife: 
Placet hoc ergo, leges diligentissimae pudoris custodes, decimas 
uxorious darf, quartas meretricibus. 
The absence of a husband mentioned by Ulpian as bringing freedom 
from the restrictions imposed by the laws, no doubt had to be 'rei 
publicae causa'. This is confirmed by the juristic discussions 
found in several excerpts from Justinian's Digest concerning the 
exact definition of 'rei publicae causa abesse' (94). 
The limitations imposed in this area on those without children 
were severe and innovatory. Since manus marriages were, by this 
time, very rare, men and women depended on being named as heirs by 
their spouses if they wished to inherit from them, for they did 
not have a strong claim in case of intestacy. (95) 
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Alibrandi (96) believes that the laws also provided some 
regulation of gifts between husbands and wives. Gifts between 
spouses were certainly forbidden at some point, and in D. 24.1.1 we 
find the following statement by Ulpian (32 ad Sabinum): 
Moribus apud nos receptum est, ne inter virum et uxorem 
donationibus valerent, hoc autem receptum est, ne mutuo (mutuato 
F) amore invicem spoliarentur donationibus non temperantes, sed 
profusa erga se facilitate. 
From this excerpt, it appears that gifts were forbidden for the 
protection of both parties, should the marriage be dissolved. 
Alibrandi believes that the fragment of Ulpian cited has been 
interpolated, and that the prohibition of gifts was a provision of 
the Augustan marriage laws. He agrees that gifts between spouses 
were not possible in very ancient times when the wife was regarded 
as a filiafamilias, but he cites evidence to demonstrate that 
gifts were permissible during much of the Republican period. He 
also cites the lex Cincia of 204 B. C. which forbade gifts above 
a certain sum but excepted husbands and wives from the 
prohibition, and a constitution of Constantine (97) concerning 
gifts between spouses in which Constantine repeals the prohibition 
of 'prisca legum aequitas' and describes acts committed against it 
as 'ad eludendas legum sanctiones'. Alibrandi relates these 
expressions to the lex Iulia and the lex Papia. He argues that 
the reason given in D. 24.1.2 for the prohibition ('ne cesset eis 
Studium liberos potius educendi') sounds very much Augustan. His 
proposed reconstruction of D. 24.1.1. is as follows: 
Moribus antiquis penes nos receptum erat ne inter virum et uxorem 
donationes valerent, quum uxores apud viros filiarum familias loco 
essent. Postea Divus Augustus in lege Iulia et Papia decimaria 
eas prohibuit, ne coniuges mutuo amore invicem spoliarentur.... 
If Alibrandi's hypothesis be correct, it is surprising that 
4 
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the sources do not once specifically mention the lex Iulia et 
Papia in connection with the introduction of this prohibition, and 
that Ulpian should have used the word 'moribus' regarding a rule 
originating in the Augustan period. There is one excerpt in the 
title of Justinian's Digest 'de donationibus inter virum et 
uxorem' taken from a commentary ad legem Iuliam et Papiam (98). 
Here, Terentius Clemens discusses the admission of a wife to the 
usucapio of a gift made to her by her husband. But it is easy to 
see how discussion of such a topic would have arisen from a 
consideration of the rules of Augustus's legislation regarding 
inheriting between spouses. The absence of any other excerpts 
from the commentaries on the Augustan laws seems to confirm that 
the jurists did not regard the lex Iulia et Papia as having been 
of any great significance in the history of donationes inter virum 
et uxorem. 
Bequests forbidding or limiting the marriage of a spouse 
There is evidence that the lex Iulia intervened in the case 
of a conditional bequest which forbade or limited the remarriage 
of a surviving spouse if she were to benefit from a legacy or 
inheritance. A testator might do this to ensure that his widow 
remain faithful to his memory, and that his property should not 
fall into the hands of a future husband of the widow. Thus, 
according to Paul: 
Condiciones contra leges et decreta principum vel bons. mores 
adscriptae nullius aunt momentis. veluti "si uxorem non duxeris" 
"si filios non susceperis". (99) 
That the "leges' referred to by Paul include the Augustan marriage 
laws is supported by excerpts taken from the jurists commentaries 
ad leaem Iuliam et Papiam relating to this subject. Thus, in an 
excerpt from-his 3rd book of commentary on these laws (100) Gaius 
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gives various examples of conditional legacies which limit the 
remarriage of the widow. He concludes that the law only overrules 
a condition when it forbids remarriage altogether, or limits it to 
a person who is 'indignus'. Terentius Clemens in his 4th book 
book of commentary on the laws (101) observes the difference 
between the permanent injunction of widowhood by a condition and a 
temporary injunction for the sake of 'curs liberorum'. The former 
is overruled by the law, whereas the latter is not. In his 5th 
book of commentary ad legem Iuliam et Papiam (102) he describes 
cases in which such conditional bequests are not acceptable 
because they are designed to evade the requirements of the laws he 
ends with the words '... legem enim utilem rei publicae subolis 
scilicet procreandae causa latam, adiuvandam interpretatione'. 
. Further evidence to support 
the association of a provision of 
this kind with the lax Iulia de maritandis ordinibus is found in 
CJ 6.40.2, a constitution of Justinian (A. D. 531), which refers to 
the 'lax lulia miscella', in connection with testamentary viduitas 
indicta (103). Scholars are generally agreed that Justinian is 
referring to the Augustan lax Iulia, and that the constitution 
aims to free widows from the obligation to pronounce a 
'sacramentum procreandae subolis gratis' in order to take 
inheritances and legacies subjected to the condition of widowhood. 
There is a further reference to the lax Julia miscella in Novellae 
22.43: apparently the law granted to widows a period of one year 
in which to take this oath and so to inherit. This suggests that 
a widow who wished to be freed from a condition of widowhood in a 
will must remarry within a year of her husband's death, and swear 
that she had done so 'procreandae subolis gratia'. The only 
problem with this is that the vacatio after the death of a husband 
was extended by the lax Papia to two years, and it is strange that 
Justinian should have overlooked this. Humbert suggests that, 
while there was a vacatio of two years, one year was set as the 
period within which the widow must actually take the oath. It is 
clear from CJ 6.40.2 (as from the text of Paul cited) that 
subsequent enactments also provided rulings on the subject of 
conditional bequests of this nature, and it is, therefore, not 
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possible to ascertain exactly what was ruled by the lex lulia de 
maritandis ordinibus. However, it is easy to see how a provision 
of this nature which encouraged remarriage and procreation would 
have been very much in the spirit of the Augustan marriage laws. 
Overruling of unreasonable opposition by a 'paterfamilias' to the 
marriage of his children. 
There are two excerpts from Justinian's Digest concerning 
the marriages of those in potestate : 
Non cogitur filius familias uxorem ducere (104). 
Capite trigesimo quinto legis Iuliae qui liberos quos habent in 
potestate iniuria prohibuerunt ducere uxores vel nubere, vel qui 
dotem dare non volunt ex constitutione divorum Severs et Antonini, 
per proconsules praesidesque coguntur in matrimonium collocare et 
dotare prohibere autem videtur et qui condicionem non quaerit 
(105). 
The second excerpt has been the subject of much debate, and 
will therefore be discussed first. It appears to attribute to the 
lex Iulia (and to a complementary Imperial constitution), a 
provision which overruled the unreasonable opposition of a 
paterfamilias to the marriage of his children. The passage has 
justifiably been suspected of interpolation. The relationship 
between the lex Iulia and the 'constitutio divorum Severs et 
Antonini' is totally obscure, and if the reference to one were 
deleted, the whole provision could be attributed to the other. 
Further, while there is reference at the beginning of the excerpt 
to a father's opposition to the marriage of 'liberi', the 
subsequent words 'collocare' and 'dotare' can only refer to 
daughters. 
1Moriaud; (106) supported by Castelli (107) and Bonfante 
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(108), believes that neither 'liberos' nor 'ducere uxores vel' is 
genuine, and that the original text read: 
qui filial neptesve quos habent in potestate iniuria prohibuerint 
nubere... ' 
This would make the whole text apply only to the marriage of 
daughters and granddaughters : Moriaud thinks that alterations 
were made by Justinian's codifiers. 
Jörs (109) on the other hand, has suggested that 'liberos' is 
genuine, and that the ruling of the lex Julia applied to all 
descendants, whereas that of the complementary constitution only 
applied to female descendants. Thus, the constitution was 
designed to prevent parents from practically obstructing the 
marriages of their daughters by refusing to provide a dowry even 
though they might have given verbal consent. However, it is very 
difficult to deduce this from the text, and it is an unlikely 
explanation. Moriaud argues that the paterfamilias was much more 
likely to have been concerned to have complete authority over the 
marriage of his sons than of his daughters: it would certainly 
have been surprising if the rights of a paterfamilias in the 
question of the marriage of his son was so curtailed at this time, 
particularly since any offspring of the marriage would also be in 
his potestas. Moriaud also argues that, since there was doubt as 
to the validity of the marriage of a son of an insane 
paterfamilias, it is unlikely that the opposition of a sane 
paterfamilias could be overruled (110). There is no doubt that 
this excerpt has been interpolated, and the arguments for the 
original application of this provision only to daughters and 
granddaughters are the most convincing. 
Moriaud further wishes to insert the words 'per praetorem 
urbanum' just before 'vel ex constitutione', in order to make the 
reference to the Imperial constitution fit more easily into the 
excerpt. He refers to the extension of various rules originally 
applicable in Rome by the lex Iulia et Papia to the provinces by 
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later enactments (ill), and suggests that this was the purpose of 
the 'constitutio divorum Severs et Antonini'. This is a plausible 
argument, but it is difficult to. imagine how the words 'per 
praetorem urbanum' came to be left out of the text in Justinian's 
Digest. It may be that Marcian himself was unable to disentangle 
the provisions of the constitutio from those of the lex lulia, and 
hence to dismiss the ambiguity. 
Castelli (112) wishes to delete from the text 'vel qui dotem 
dare non volunt' and 'et dotare', thus removing all mention of 
dowry from the provision on the ground that the introduction of a 
legal obligation for a father to provide a dowry came much later 
than the lex Iulia. I do not believe, however, that the wording 
of D. 23.2.19 certainly implies the existence of a statutory 
obligation on all fathers to provide a dowry for their daughters. 
Marcian is speaking here of those fathers who oppose the marriage 
of their daughters iniuria, and in the overruling of their 
opposition is implied a requirement that they provide a dowry. 
There is certainly no other evidence which suggests the 
introduction of a legal obligation to provide dowry through the 
lex Julia, and while Castelli is, I believe, right to argue that 
such a ruling was introduced at a much later date (113), it is not 
necessary for him to alter the text of D. 23.2.19 so dramatically 
in order to sustain his argument. His omission of the reference 
to dowry would indeed overcome the problem of explaining why a 
provision of the lex Iulia regarding dowry should have appeared in 
35th chapter, given that the other rules concerning dowry appear 
much earlier. However, if one takes the view that this provision 
is not primarily concerned with the issue of dowry but with the 
issue of unreasonable opposition by a paterfamilias to the 
marriage of his daughters, so that dowry is an incidental issue, 
there is no problem in explaining why this provision is separated 
in the law from the others relating to dowry. 
While the filiusfamilias therefore appears to have had no 
rights at this time against the unjust opposition of a 
paterfamilias to his marriage, the excerpt cited from Terentius 
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Clemens' 3rd book of commentary on the laws (114), shows that at 
the same time he could not be compelled (presumably by the 
paterfamilias)to marry. It is difficult to see how this fits in 
with the rest of the law and it looks as though it was the result 
of subsequent juristic interpretation. Probably Terentius 
Clemens, in this 3rd book of commentary, having discussed the 
general encouragement of marriage by the law (including the 
provision of a tutor for the constitution of dowry)(115), added in 
this context that there was no means by which a paterfamilias 
could actually compel his male descendants to marry. This is not 
to say that a filiusfamilias was exempt from the penalties of the 
lex Julia et Papia for failing to marry but that he was induced to 
marry not by the authority of the paterfamilias but by the law, 
that is by the penalties and privileges of the lex Iulia et Pavia. 
LEX PAPIA POPPAEA 
Having considered those provisions which are either 
specifically attributed in the sources to the lex Iulia or which 
one may reasonably assume to have appeared in the lex Iulia, let 
us now turn to those which are attributed specifically to the lex 
Papia Poppaea. 
Betrothal 
The evidence suggests that at some point after the passing of 
the lex lulia, a limit was placed on the duration of betrothals 
and it is reasonable to assume that such a provision was 
incorporated into the lex Papia Poppaea. Betrothal was clearly 
regarded as equivalent to marriage for the application of the lex 
lulia. Thus betrothed couples were able to enjoy the privileges 
introduced by the law, and to escape the penalties imposed on 
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caelibes: (116) 
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It is clear from this passage that men were abusing the law 
by betrothing themselves to girls well below marriageable age, and 
by prolonging the period of betrothal, enjoying all the privileges 
of marriage while evading its duties. In order to preclude this 
abuse, Augustus set a maximum of two years for the duration of 
betrothals. 
Suetonius confirms the measures taken by Augustus to prevent 
abuse in this area of the law: 
cumque etiam immaturitate sponsarum vim legis eludi sentiret, 
tempus sponsas habendi coartavit... (117), 
Dio implies that the measure taken to limit the period of 
betrothal followed quite closely on the passing of the lex Iulia. 
Suetonius mentions the measure after describing the protest of the 
knights against the lex Iulia (recorded by Dio under the events of 
AD 9) but there is nothing to suggest that he was recording events 
in chronological order. It is unlikely that this abuse of the 
lex Iulia was noticed and dealt with as soon after the enactment 
of the lex as Dio's account suggests. He may well have mentioned 
it under the events of 18 B. C. because of its close connection 
with the terms of the lex Iulia. The new limitation placed on 
the duration of betrothals certainly came into force by A. D. 9. 
The existence of such a provision in the lex Papia is further 
supported by an excerpt from Gaius' Ist book of commentary ad 
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legem Iuliam et Papiam (118) in which he shows that some valid 
reasons for prolonging a betrothal came to be recognised : 
Saepe iustae ac necessariae causae non solum annum vel biennium, 
sed etiam triennium et quadriennium et ulterius trahunt sponsalia, 
veluti valetudo sponsi sponsaeve vel mortes parentium - auf 
capitalia crimina auf longiores peregrinationes quae ex 
necessitate fiunt. 
Since two years was set as the maximum period for betrothals, 
Volterra (119) wishes to delete the 'annum vel' of the excerpt. 
This amendment, however, is based on a misunderstanding of the 
text. 'Annum vel biennium' is distinguished from 'triennium 
etc. ' by the non solum... sed etiam': the implication is that a 
year or two is the normal length for a betrothal, whereas three or 
more years is an abnormal period which can only be justified by 
'iustae ac necessariae causae. ' 
The decision reported by Paul (120) forbidding a person to 
marry the mother of his sponsa provides further evidence that 
betrothal was viewed as equivalent to marriage. Augustus did not 
alter this concept in the lex Papia : he chose to check the abuse 
by limiting the period of betrothal during which the privileges 
associated with marriage could be claimed. 
Registration of Births 
There is evidence which assigns to the lex Papia Poppaea (and 
to the. lex Aelia Sentia) a provision which required that all 
legitimate births be registered. The evidence comes from an 
inscription: 
L. Iulius Vestinus praef. Aeg. nomina eorum qui a lege Pap. Popp. et 
Aelia Sentia liberos apud se natos sibi professi sunt proposuit 
P. Mario L. Afinio Gallo cos. (121). 
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This inscription, -together with others of a similar nature, has 
been discussed by Schulz. He shows. that. only legitimate children 
in possession of Roman citizenship were to be registered, and that 
the requirement was extended to include illegitimate children by a 
constitution of Marcus Aurelius (122). The passage which attests 
this later extension also shows that, at least by this time, such 
registration had to be made within 30 days of the birth of the 
child, and Schulz argues convincingly that this rule went back to 
Augustus. As for illegitimate children at the time of Augustus, 
the parents might apparently make a so-called testatio or 
statement of the birth before witnesses. 
Some excerpts from Terentius Clemens' 3rd book of commentary 
ad legem Iuliam et Papiam suggest that the registration of births 
was discussed in this book: 
Qui in continentibus urbis nati sunt Romae nati intelliguntur. 
(123) 
This is probably related to the requirement attested by the 
epigraphical evidence that the place of birth be registered. 
Another excerpt from the same book of commentary discusses the 
question of who is entitled to make the profession 
Etiam matris professio filiorum recipiturt sed et avi recipienda 
est (124). 
It is easy to see the need for such a system of registration 
of births, given the various privileges granted by the marriage 
laws (and especially by the lex Papia Poppaea) to those who 
possessed children. However, as Schulz shows, the accuracy of 
the register depended on the good fath of those making the 
professiones and judges would therefore have been free to use 
their discretion in estimating the value of this evidence. 
- 126 - 
Rights of patrons and ex-slaves 
An important group of provisions which Gaius attributes to 
the lex Papia Poppaea are those regulating the successorial rights 
of patrons and their ex-slaves (125). Since the lex Papia is 
specifically named in his discussion on this topic, while the lex 
Julia is not mentioned at all, it is reasonable to assume that the 
rules appeared for the first time in the second law. There is 
also the evidence of Just. Insts. 3.7 
Postea lege Papia audacta sunt iura patronorum qui locupletiores 
libertos habeant... 
The details provided by Gaius are as follows. In paragraphs* 
40 - 41 he outlines the position previous to the lex Papia. 
Under the law of the Twelve. Tables, if a libertus died intestate 
without a suus heres, his patron inherited his property. 
However, the praetor's edict, granted to the patron half of the 
inheritance whether the libertus died testate or intestate. The 
patron could only be excluded by the freedman's natural children, 
including those who had been emancipated or given in adoption, but 
excluding those who had been disinherited. Gaius goes on to 
describe the measures introduced by the lex Papia. " The law 
granted to the patron a share of the estate of a freedman who left 
a fortune of over 100,000 sesterces proportionate to the number of 
children left by the freedman, whether he died testate or 
intestate. Thus if the freedman died childless, or if he left 
one child, the patron inherited a half of his estate; if he left 
two children, the patron inherited a third; and if three, the 
patron was excluded (paragraph 42). 
Previous to the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus, a 
freedwoman would always have had as tutor her patron who would 
therefore have authorised her will and could make himself heir. 
If she died intestate, he again received the inheritance, since a 
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woman could not have sui heredes who would exclude him (paragraph 
43). The lex Papia, however, released some freedwomen from the 
tutela of their patrons by the ius ctuattuor liberorum, thus 
enabling them to make their wills without patronal "auctoritas. 
At the same time, a proportion of her estate was granted to the 
patron according to the number of children who survived her: thus 
if none of her children survived her, all of her property on her 
death went to the patron. The rights of the patron also applied 
to his sons and agnatic descendants (paragraph 45). 
While under the law of the Twelve Tables, female descendants 
of the patron enjoyed the same rights, they were excluded from 
bonorum possessio contra tabulas liberti by the praetor's edict. 
But under the lex Papia, a patron's daughter, by virtue of the ius 
trium liberorum, could claim bonorum possessio of a half of the 
estate against the will of her father's freedman, or, in the case 
of intestacy, against a freedman's adoptive son, wife, " or 
daughter-in-law in manus (paragraph 46). Gaius acknowledges a 
degree of ambiguity in'the law over the rights of the daughter of 
a patron to the estate of a freedwoman: he holds that., even if she 
had the ius liberorum, she had no right to a 'virilis pars' of the 
estate of a testate freedwoman with four children. However, the 
lex Papia granted to her a 'virilis pars' if the freedwoman died 
intestate. Her rights against the will of the testate freedwoman 
were the same as those which she had against the will of the 
freedman. The extranei heredes of the patron had no claims to 
succession whether the freedman died testate or intestate 
(paragraph 48). 
Before the lex Papia, patronae had the same rights to the 
estates of their freedmen as patroni had by the law of the Twelve 
Tables: their rights were not improved at all by the praetor's 
edict (paragraph 49). The lex Pais gave to a patrona ingenua 
with two children, and to a patrona libertina with three children, 
nearly the same rights as the praetor's edict gave to a patronus; 
this law further bestowed on a patrona ingenua with three children 
(but not on a patrona libertina) exactly the same rights as it 
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granted to a patron (paragraph 50). 
No new rights were granted to a patrona possessing children 
to the property of an intestate libertina. Hence, if neither had 
undergone capitis deminutio, the inheritance went to the Patrona 
by the law of the Twelve Tables, thus excluding the children of 
the libertina, whether the patron had children or not. But if 
the right of the patrons had been affected by capitis deminutio of 
either woman, the freedwoman's children excluded the patrona 
(paragraph 51). The lex Papia granted to a patrona who had 
children the same rights against the will of a testate freedwoman 
as the praetorian edict granted to a patron against the will of a 
freedman (paragraph 52). The son of a Patrona who possessed at 
least one child was granted by the lex Papia almost the rights of 
a patron (53). 
Ulpian confirms these provisions of the lex Papia, although 
he gives less detail (126)., After describing the rulings of the 
law of the Twelve Tables and of the praetor's edict, he mentions 
the release of the liberta from the tutela of her patron through 
the ius quattuor liberorum, and the right of her patron to a 
virilis pars of her property by the lex Papia. He confirms that 
male children of the patron enjoyed the same rights as the patron 
himself, while female descendants had no right of bonorum 
possessio against the will of the freedman or against the heirs 
'non naturales' of an intestate freedman, unless granted to them 
by the lex Papier through the ius trium liberorum. He also 
confirms that ingenuae patronae possessing two children, and 
"libertinae possessing three were granted the same rights as were 
granted to the patron by the praetorian edict and that ingenuae 
patronae possessing the ius trium liberorum were granted the same 
rights as the patron himself possessed. 
. It 
is. clear from the comments of Gaius and Ulpian" that 
Augustus intervened extensively in this area. Hence Terentius 
Clemens devoted (probably) four books of his commentary on these 
laws'to the provisions on patronal succession (9-12), Gaius three 
(8-10), Paul three (8-10), and Ulpian two (10-11). The rules 
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governing patronal succession to testate, and especially to 
intestate, ex-slaves became much more complex than they had been 
before. 
The outstanding feature of the rules introduced by the lex 
Papia was the provision of incentives to procreation both among 
patrons and among 'locupletiores liberti'. Hence patronae and 
daughters of patroni were encouraged to have children in order to 
improve their rights to the property of their ex-slaves, while 
liberti and libertae were encouraged to procreate in order to 
exclude their patrons from bonorum possessio. Patronae and female 
descendants of a patron could increase their rights by virtue of 
the ius liberorum, and the son of a patrona also improved his 
position by the possession of children. Libertae could dispose 
of their property as they wished if they possessed the ius 
quattuor liberorum. 
The juristic excerpts ad legem Iuliam et Papiam preserved in 
Justinian's Digest which relate to this area of the law add little 
to the detailed picture provided by Gaius. Terentius Clemens 
discusses such issues as the rights of the disinherited children 
of patrons (127) and manumissions in fraud of creditors (128). 
Ulpian defines 'virilis' (129), and discusses the case of a 
freedman who trys to evade the law by making himself 'minor 
centario' (130) and of a freedman accused of a capital crime 
(131). Paul discusses the loss of patronal rights by 
contravention of the terms of the lex Aelia Sentia (132) and the 
effect of the ius anulorum on a patron's rights (133). Other 
issues are discussed by the jurists, but these are of no 
particular significance. I 
These provisions were not the only rules of the marriage 
laws concerning relations between patrons and ex-slaves. The 
provision of the law which excused freedpersons from the 
obligation of performing operae promised as a condition of" 
manumission has already been mentioned. A liberta who was over 50 
years of age was also exempt from the obligation of performing 
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operae for her patron: 
Liberta maior quinquaginta annis operas praestare patrono non 
cogitur' (134). 
Caduca 
Some of the provisions of the lex Papier relating to 
inheritance modified those of the lex Iulia, and have already 
been discussed. But it is clear from the juristic evidence that 
the lex Papia introduced new and complex rulings on caduca, that 
is, property which could not be inherited because of the 
incapacity of a person or persons designated in the will. 
According to Ulpian (135): 
Quod quis sibi testamento relictum, ita ut iure civili capere 
possit, aliqua ex causa non ceperit, caducum appellatur, veluti 
cecederit ab eo... 
The provisions of the lex lulia which denied to caelibes the 
capacity to inherit must also have resulted in an increase in 
vacant property (and hence Ulpian's reference to the lex Iulia 
caducaria (136)), but apparently it was the lex Pais Poppaea 
which brought in detailed rulings on the destiny of such property. 
Hence the introduction of rules governing caduca are generally 
associated by the jurists with the lex Pa ias 
post legem hero Papiam deficientis portio caduca fit... (137). 
aed post legem Papiam Poppaeam, quae partem non adeuntis caducam 
facit (138). 
sed post legem Papiam Poppaeam non capientis pars caduca fit 
(139). 
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In addition, most of the jurists' comments on inheritance and 
caduca are to be found in the latter books of their commentaries 
on these laws, where (as has been suggested) the provisions of the 
lex Papia Poppaea are under discussion. 
The main innovation made by the lex Papia Poppaea in the area 
of inheritance has already been mentioned, namely the penalisation 
of orbi as well as caelibes: 
Caelibes quoque, qui lege Iulia hereditatem legataque capere 
uetantur; item orbi, id est qui liberos non habent, quos lex... 
(140). 
Item orbi, qui per legem Papiam [ob id quod liberos non habebant] 
dimidias partes hereditatum legatorumque perdunt... (141). 
This in itself would have considerably increased the amount of 
property which became caducous. 
Gaius provides details of the provisions of the lex Papia 
Poppaea relating to caduca (142). Previous to the lex Papia, 
under a legacy er danuºationem, the share of a legatee who 
failed to take, stayed in the inheritance, while in the case of a 
legacy er vindicationem, it accrued to the colegatee. But after 
the lex Papia, if a legacy became caducous, it was assigned to 
those co-legatees possessing children. Gaius goes on to say (143) 
that in the case of caducous legacies, the lex Pais gave 
preference to the co-legatee with children over the heirs (even if 
they had children). The preference given by the lex Papia. to co- 
legatees was the same for legacies per vindicationem and ehr 
damnationem (144). As has already been observed, the possession 
of one child was sufficient for a person to be classified as 
possessing children (145). 
Ulpian informs us that in the case of heirs being 
incapaces, the lex Papia gave to descendants and ascendants of the 
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testator to the third degree, the ius anticquum. Thus they were 
allowed to inherit caducous property in a will in addition to 
their own share: 
Item liberis et parentibus testatoris usque ad tertium graduni lex 
Papia ius antiquum dedit, ut heredibus illis institutis, quod quis 
ex eo testamento non capit, ad hos pertineat auf totum auf ex 
parte, prout pertinere possit (146). 
He also shows that, by the terms of the lex Pavia. a legacy did 
not go to the legatee, or else become caducous, until after the 
opening of the will, and not, (as previously), after the 
testator's death: 
Legatorum, quae pure vel in diem certum relicta sunt, dies cedit 
antiquo quidem iure ex mortis testatoris tempore, per legem autem 
(Papiam) Poppaeam ex apertis tabulis testaments... (147) 
Thus the period of 100 days granted to the incapax in order to 
remedy his disobedience to the law ran from the time of the 
opening of the will. 
When there were no parents nor close relatives designated in 
a will who might lay claim to caducous property, it was assigned 
to the treasury. Thus, according to Tacitus (148) : 
Lege Papia Poppaea praemiis inducti, ut, si a privilegiis 
parentium cessatur, velut parens omnium populus vacantia teneret. 
This is confirmed by a passage of the jurist Marcellus (149)": 
Proxime in cognitione principis cum quidam heredum nomine 
induxisset et bona eius ut caduca a fisco vindicarentur, diu de 
legatis dubitum eat a maxime de his legatis quae adscripta erant 
his, quorum institutio fuerat inducta. 
Ulpian (150) describes a constitution of Caracalla which abolished 
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the right of legatees possessing children to caducous property, 
and claimed for the treasury all such property except that due to 
relatives of the testator by the ius. antiguüm : 
Hodie ex constitutione imperatoris Antonini omnia caduca fisco 
vindicantur, sed servato iure antiquo liberis et parentibus. 
How much caducous property actually went to the treasury before 
the enactment it is difficult to say. Tacitus implies that one of 
Augustus's main motives for introducing these rulings was a 
financial one, but this accusation needs to be regarded with 
caution. If, as may well have been the case, close relatives of 
the testator enjoyed exemption from the provisions of the laws 
regarding inheritance, then, bearing in mind also the rights of 
co-legatees who were parents and of those relatives who enjoyed 
the ius antiguum, it seems unlikely that the treasury acquired a 
great deal of property from this source. 
The rulings of the lax Papia Poppaea on caduca clearly gave 
rise to numerous questions and problems of interpretation among 
the jurists. While there are difficulties involved in determining 
from the content of the many excerpts which we possess from the 
commentaries ad legem luliam at Papiam relevant to this issue, 
the exact provision under discussion and in distinguishing the 
terms of the lax Papia Poppaea from subsequent developments, it is 
still of interest to look at the issues discussed by the jurists. 
These are, for example, various excerpts relating to the opening 
of wills (151) and to entry into inheritances and the acceptance 
of legacies (152). In connection with the rights of coniuncti to 
take caducous legacies, Paul provides definitions of coniunctio 
(153). . Other excerpts refer to the role of substitutes 
in wills 
(154) and to the use of third parties, such as slaves, for 
acquiring legacies (155). A large number of excerpts is 
concerned with various different types of legacy, such as one 
which is inutile (156) null (157) or pro non scripto (158). 
Conditional legacies were evidently of great interest to the 
jurists in their consideration of the rules of the law concerning 
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caducous property, for the fulfilment or failure of conditions 
also affected the-destiny of property legated. Thus they are 
discussed by Gaius (159) by Paul (160) by Terentius Clemens (161) 
and by Ulpian (162). The jurists also discuss legacies left 'in 
diem' (163), legacies of optio (164) and legacies of usufruct 
(165): the nature of some of these legacies evidently raised 
interesting questions because they could not, if caducous, be 
appropriated by the treasury. 
Some of the jurists' comments are concerned with the various 
loopholes obviously exploited by those who wished to avoid the 
penalties of the law without obeying its injunctions. It has 
already been observed that people resorted to leaving their 
property to incapaces by way of fideicommissa or mortis causa 
donationes which were evidently not subjected by the lex Papia 
Poppaea to the same restrictions as were legacies and 
inheritances. Enactments were thus needed to extend the 
restrictions to all types of bequest. There are excerpts which 
confirm that, by the time that the jurists were writing, mortis 
causa donationes and fideicommissa were treated in the same way as 
legacies in a will (166). other excerpts provide further 
commentary on mortis causa donationes (167) and fideicommissa 
(168). 
It is interesting that fideicommissa should have been used as 
loopholes by which the terms of the law might be avoided, for it 
was during the Augustan period that they became legally binding so 
that a testator no longer had to depend merely on the good faith 
of the trustee (169). An excerpt from Gaius" fifteenth book of 
commentary on'these laws describes the taciturn fideicommissum as a 
fraus legis. This involved a person promising secretly to 
restore to an incapax property which the latter was forbidden to 
inherit (170). 
One further provision of the lex Papia Poppaea in the area of 
inheritance is mentioned by Dio (171). Describing the events of 
A. D. 9, he suggests that certain women were released from the rules 
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of the lex Voconia of 169 B. C.. By this law, women were not 
allowed to inherit more than 100,000 asses (172). Dio does not 
actually specify who the priviledged women were, but there is good 
reason to assume that they were the possessors of a certain number 
of children, and it is reasonable to associate this measure with 
the lex Papia Poppaea. 
The large number of juristic excerpts from the commentaries 
ad legem Iuliam et Papiam is an indication both of the great 
interest which the jurists had in the provisions of the laws 
concerning inheritance and of the significance of these 
provisions. If close relatives of the testator were indeed exempt 
from the restrictions imposed by the laws on the unmarried and 
childless, then intestate succession would have been little 
affected, for the persons entitled to inherit on intestacy would, 
for the most part, have come within the circle of persons excepted 
by the laws (173). However, in relation to testate succession 
the laws were of enormous significance. placing as they did severe 
and unprecedented restrictions on the right of a testator to 
bequeath his property as he wished. Such restrictions were 
unknown during the Republic, when the only way in which the wishes 
of a testator might be frustrated was through the guerela 
inofficiosi testamenti whereby a close relative of the testator 
might claim that he had been unjustly omitted from a will (174). 
The rules laid down by the laws concerning inheritance were of 
great interest to the jurists not only because they were 
innovatory but also because they would have affected a large 
number of people, especially those who had large amounts of 
property to dispose of in a will. The widespread Roman practice 
of legacy-hunting is well known, and since it played an important 
part in the patron-client relationship and in the concept of 
amicitia, the effect of Augustus' interference in the freedom of 
testators to leave legacies as they wished must have been 
profound. 
I 
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Delatores 
The lex Papia Poppaea provided no system for the application 
of the rules concerning inheritance and it was therefore left to 
informers (delatores) to expose incapaces and to claim for the 
treasury property which was due to it. One of the accusations 
which Tacitus makes against the lex Papia Poppaea is that it 
enabled informers to terrorise Roman society: 
Acriora ex eo vincla, inditi custodes e lege Papia Poppaea 
praemiis inducti, ut, si privilegiis parentum cessaretur, velut 
parens omnium populus vacanti teneret, sed altius penetrabant 
urbemque et Italiam et quod usquam civium corripuerant, 
multorumque excisi status, et terror omnibus intentabatur' (176). 
Similarly, he says elsewhere : 
Cum omnis domus delatorum interpretationibus subverteretur, utque 
antehac flagitiis, ita tunc legibus laborabatur (177). 
No doubt Tacitus gives an exaggerated picture of the horrors of 
this system, but since a portion of the caducous property was set 
aside for informers, the practice seems to have been fairly 
lucrative. There is no record of the proportion originally 
designated as due to the informer, but Suetonius tells us that it 
was reduced by Nero to one quarter of the property: 
Nero praemia delatorum Papiae legis ad quartas redegit 
(178). 
Hence it must originally have been greater than this. The jurists 
Paul, Ulpian and Mauricianus . (179) provide details of a 
constitution of Trajan concerning those who provided information 
against themselves. Presumably, such people had formerly 
received no reward but some concession seems to have been made to 
them by this constitution. 
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Intermediary Measures 
The accounts of Dio and (especially} of-Suetonius imply that 
intermediary measures were enacted between 18 B. C. and A. D. 9 
which modified the terms of the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus. 
However, as has been observed in Chapter two, neither author 
provides a comprehensive chronological account of Augustus' 
marriage legislation. Suetonius (180) mentions the lex iulia and 
subsequent modifications but not the lex Papia, while Dio provides 
a very brief description of some provisions of the lex Iulia 
without naming the law, and then describes concessions made by 
Augustus in this area in response to a demonstration by a group of 
equites in A. D. 9 and the subsequent enactment of the lex Papia 
(181). These accounts give rise to great difficulty in 
determining how the measures described, if they were intermediary 
measures, were enacted, and whether they were later incorporated 
into the lex Papia or whether they were, in fact, introduced. by 
the lex Papia. 
The measures mentioned by Suetonius are as follows: 
Hanc [the lex Iulia] cum aliquanto severius quarr ceteras 
emendasset, prae tumultu recusantium perferre non potuit nisi 
adempta demum lenitave parte poenorum et vacatione triennii data 
auctisque praemiis. 
Suetonius goes on here to describe the demonstration by the 
eguites which Dio ascribes to A. D., 9 (182) before the passing of 
the lex Papia. If Suetonius' chronology is correct here, this 
would suggest that these modifications to the lex Iulia were 
indeed made between 18 B. C. and A. D. 9. Since the juristic 
sources make no mention of any Augustan enactment other than the 
lex Papia which modified the terms of the lex Iulia, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the modifications were subsequently 
incorporated into the lex Papia. 
Suetonius continues his narrative by describing two further 
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measures which he does not assign to any particular law: 
Cumque etiam immituritate sponsarum et matrimoniorum crebra 
mutatione vim legis eludi sentiret, tempus sponsas habendi 
coartavit, divortiis modum imposuit. 
Dio, in fact, mentions the same measure under 18 B. C. presumably 
because of its close connection with the lex Iulia but, as has 
already been observed, it is highly unlikely that the abuse was 
noted and dealt with in the same year as the law itself was 
passed. The second measure described by Suetonius, 'divortiis 
modum imposuit', is more difficult. Since there is no other 
evidence for the placing of a limit on divorce, this phrase has 
tended to be associated with the set form of divorce introduced 
for the purposes of the lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis, modus 
being taken as a mode or form rather than a limit. However, 
there are two main objections to this interpretation. Firstly, 
Suetonius is clearly speaking about Augustus' marriage legislation 
here and it is strange that he should suddenly shift to describe a 
measure of the adultery law. Secondly, the construction of the 
sentence implies that the first abuse of the law mentioned was 
dealt with by the first measure described, while the second 
('matrimoniorum crebra mutatio') was dealt with by the 
introduction of a 'modus divortiis'. It is difficult to 
understand why, if Augustus did place a limit on divorce, there is 
no other evidence for this measure, but it may be that it was a 
measure designed to discourage people from getting married in 
order to take legacies and subsequently divorcing. If so, such 
an abuse would probably have become less attractive with the 
penalisation of orbi as well as caelibes by the lex Papia Poppaea. 
Since neither Suetonius nor Dio provides any indication of 
how the measures which they portray as intermediary ones were 
enacted, Jars, as has been mentioned (184), has concluded that a 
third marriage law was passed in A. D. 4. He argues that 
Suetonius' description of the modifications made to the lex lulia 
implies the enactment of another formal law. He also refers to 
4 
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Dio's description (185) of the agitation by the knights in A. D. 9 
for the repeal of-the law regarding the unmarried and childless, 
and concludes that this cannot refer to the. lex lulia which was 
only concerned with the unmarried. Further, Dio's account of the 
introduction of a distinction in the penalties for caelibes and 
orbi (186) leads him to believe thattwhile orbi were not penalised 
atall in the lex Iulia, they were subjected to the same penalties 
as were caelibes in the law of A. D. 4. Hence the -lex Papia 
Poppaea mitigated this ruling by allowing them to inherit a half. 
Jars dates the proposed law to A. D. 4 by assuming that the two 
vacationes (that is, periods during which the penalties of the law 
were temporarily lifted) of three and two years mentioned by Dio 
(187) followed on immediately from its passage, so that Augustus 
was never actually able to put it into effect. The vacationes 
were provided as a response to complaints against the severity of 
the law, and in A. D. 9, at the end of this period, the lex Papia 
was formulated, to modify some of the provisions of the previous 
law. 
There are, however, several objections to these arguments for 
a third marriage law. Firstly, it is very surprising that there 
is not one specific mention of such a law in the literary or 
juristic sources. The isolated reference to a lex Iulia 
caducaria by Ulpian (188) is very unlikely to refer to an 
enactment of A. D. 4, not least because by this time Augustus seems 
to have ceased to enact 'leges Iuliae', that is, plebiscita named 
after himself by virtue of his tribunicia potestas. Further, with 
reference to Dio's description of the call of the eguites for a 
repeal of the law concerning the unmarried and childless, the lex 
Iulia did indeed provide some rulings concerning procreation as 
well as. concerning marriage. In addition, while Dio's account of 
the provisions of the lex Papia gives the impression that before 
A. D. 9 the penalties for caelibes and for orbi were the same, he 
is at variance with the juristic sources in this, as has already 
been shown. Gaius, for instance, (189) speaks of orbi losing, 
rather than gaining, a half of inheritances and legacies by the 
lex Papia, implying that until A. D. 9 they were not penalised at 
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all. 
. It is very difficult to determine the dates and duration of 
the vacationes mentioned in the sources. Suetonius only mentions 
one 'vacatio triennii' (190) granted by Augustus to counteract the 
severity of the terms of the 1ex iulia. Dio, however, as 
mentioned, puts into the mouth of Augustus a speech made in A. D. 9 
just before the passing of the lex Papia in which he claims to 
have provided a vacatio of three years followed by another of two 
years. Dio's version seems to imply that the first vacatio at 
least was granted immediately after the passing of the lex Iulia 
in order to give people time to conform to its obligations. 
However, this conflicts with the evidence of the sc de ludis 
saecularibus (191) which indicates that at least some of the 
penalties applicable to the unmarried were in operation in 17 B. C. 
In addition, the implication of Suetonius' account is that the 
vacatio was granted in response to opposition to the application 
of the provisions of the lex Iulia. It is more likely that the 
rules of the lex iulia went into effect in 18 B. C. but aroused 
such hostility that Augustus was obliged to raise the sanctions 
for a period of three years. Since Suetonius seems to have 
overlooked the second vacatio (of two years) mentioned by Dio, it 
is unlikely that this period of grace followed on immediately from 
the first. In addition, Dio's wording implies that the two 
periods were entirely separate. Presumably the application of 
the sanctions of the lex Iulia following the three year vacatio 
once again aroused sufficient hostility for Augustus to consider a 
further vacatio to be necessary. 
Relationship between the'lex Iulia'and the'lex Papia' 
4 
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The use of the term lex Iulia et Papia in the juristic 
sources is indicative of the close. associätion between the two 
Augustan marriage laws, and the interest of scholars has thus 
generally been in the changes effected by the two laws together. 
The jurists clearly did discuss the collective effects of the- two 
laws and there are several areas in which it is not possible to 
distinguish between the provisions of the individual laws. 
Nevertheless, as has already been indicated in Chapter 2, the 
jurists also mentioned a number of distinctions between the two 
laws and thus a comparison is, to a limited extent, possible. it 
is surely of value and of interest to draw a comparison between 
two statutes relating to the same area of the law which were 
separated by a period of about 27 years and thus belong 
respectively to the early and latter years of the Augustan period. 
It is interesting, for example, to consider why it was necessary 
for Augustus to initiate not merely a few amendments to the lex 
Iulia but another long and, complex statute. was the lex Iulia in 
some respects inadequate, or was it simply too unpopular? Does 
the lex Papia represent a change of policy or merely a mitigation 
or tightening up of the rules of the lex Iulia? 
The picture which emerges from the non-juristic sources is 
not very clear, as has been shown above. Both Dio and Suetonius 
seem to imply that the second law was passed because of hostility 
to the first law (192). On the other hand, Tacitus (193) dwells 
on the 'acriora vincla' of the lex Papia Poppaea and Tertullian 
(194) complains about a specific area in which the second law was 
more severe than the first. If these writers are all to be 
believed, the picture which emerges is one of a law which was 
designed to supplement the inadequacies of the lex Iulia and which 
was in some respects more lenient, yet in others more severe, than 
the first law. 
As for the juristic evidence, this has already been discussed 
in Chapter 2. ' As observed there, apart from the frequent 
references in Justinian's Diciest to the commentaries ad legem 
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Iuliam et Papiam, the terms lex Iulia et Papia-(or a similar one) 
is, in fact, not often employed by the jurists (195) while there 
is a fair number of references to the lex'lulia and to the lex 
Papia individually (196). Clearly there was some tralatician 
material carried over from the first to the second law, but the 
juristic evidence suggests strongly that the lex Papia* was 
designed to revise and to complement, not to*completely supersede, 
the lex Iulia. There are, of course, problems involved in 
attaching too much significance to the exact words of the jurists 
as preserved in the sources, such as suspected interpolation and 
corruption of the texts, lack of precision on the part of the 
jurists and our lack of knowledge concerning the process of 
transmission of the texts of laws and concerning the way in which 
the jurists worked. However, it is still justifiable to attach 
some significance to the fact that certain provisions are singled 
out to be assigned specifically to one law or the other. As 
observed in Chapter 2, if the jurists had mentioned the individual 
laws completely at random, one would expect frequent 
contradictions among them and this is not the case. 
The most obvious distinction between the laws is the fact 
that the lex lulia was a plebiscitum, proposed by Augustus by 
virtue of his tribunicia potestas, while the lex Papier Poppaea was 
a lex, proposed by the consuls of A; D. 9. This illustrates a 
distinction already observed and discussed in Chapter 1 between 
the earlier and later statutes of the Augustan period. 
To turn to details, the various distinctions made, by the 
jurists between the two laws have already been mentioned as the 
provisions of the laws have been discussed, but it is useful to 
gather -them together. Firstly, - Tertullian claims that the lex 
Papia required people to have children at an earlier. age than the 
lex Iulia required them to marry. His statement {if it-is not an 
exaggeration) shows that the lex Papia was more severe than the 
lex Iulia in this respect, but it also'seems to imply- that the 
age-limits laid down by the lex Iulia applied to marriage, whereas. 
those laid down by the lex Papia related -to procreation. This 
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fits in with the other evidence which implies a much greater 
emphasis on procreation in the second law, and is confirmed by the 
wording of Ulpian Reg. 16.1 which assigns. specifically to the lex 
Papia the demand for children by certain ages. 
on the issue of remarriage, ' however, the lex Papia Poppaea 
mitigated the terms of the lex Iulia, by increasing the vacatio 
after the death of a husband from one year to two years and that 
following divorce from 6 to 18 months (197). This particular 
concession provides support for the pictures presented by 
Suetonius and by Dio of the lex Papia Poppaea as a statute which 
mitigated the harsh terms of the lex lulia. However, the 
concession made in the lex Papia Poppaea was not a very great one 
and it by no means represents a change of policy. 
The provision which forbade a freedwoman married to her 
patron to divorce him and to marry another man is specifically 
assigned to the lex Iulia by Ulpian (198), as is the provision 
which overruled the unreasonable opposition of a paterfamilias to 
the marriage of his daughters and granddaughters by a 
controversial excerpt from the writings of Marcian (199). Since 
most of the rules relating to patrons and ex-slaves are assigned 
to the lex Papia, it. is perhaps surprising that the rule regarding 
freedwomen married to their patrons belonged to the lex Iulia, but 
as the rule concerned marriages between ingenui and ex-slaves, 
there is, in fact, a clear connection with the lex Iulia. As for 
the second provision mentioned, it is easy to see how a ruling 
which removed a possible obstacle; to valid marriage would have 
fitted in with the general tenor of the lex lulia. The same 
applies to a further provision assigned to the lex Iulia by"Ulpian 
and by Gaius which authorised the praetor to appoint a tutor for 
women in tutela pupilli for the constitution of dowry (200). 
Obviously a ruling which encouraged marriage by providing for a 
smooth settlement of the issue of dowry was in the interest of 
the aims of the lex Iulia. 
The granting of certain privileges to those who were married 
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may confidently be assigned to the lex Iulia either because they 
are associated in the sources with a date prior to A. D. 9 or 
because the lex Julia is specifically mentioned. This applies to 
the exclusion of the unmarried from watching games (201) and from 
eating with married people (202) and to the advantages acquired 
through the possession of children in the cursus honorum (203). 
Release of freeborn women from tutela by the ius trium liberorum 
is also assigned to the lex lulia: this privilege was extended by 
the lex Pavia Poppaea to freedwomen who possessed 4 children 
(204). The provisions regarding the cursus honorum and 
liberation from tutela show that, while much more emphasis was 
placed in the lex Pavia on procreation, there were, nevertheless, 
some provisions in the lex Iulia which encouraged procreation. 
A number of provisions are attributed specifically to the lex 
Papia Poppaea. Thus, for example, the introduction of a 
requirement that all legitimate citizen births be registered is 
associated with the lex Papia Poppaea in an inscription (205). 
No doubt it was obvious by this time that a law which granted 
privileges to the possessors of children could not be. effectively 
applied in the absence of such a system. In addition, both Dio 
and Suetonius record Augustus' attempt to rectify an abuse of the 
lex Iulia by setting a maximum of two years for the duration of 
betrothals: this was designed to prevent men from betrothing 
themselves to girls well below marriageable age and enjoying the 
privileges associated with marriage over a prolonged period, while 
evading its duties. This ruling was probably incorporated into 
the lex Papia Poppaea and provides1another example of the use of 
the second law to tighten up the provisions of the first. 
An important area in which the lex Papia Poppaea seems to 
have introduced new rulings is that of relations between patrons 
and ex-slaves (206). The lex Iulia is not mentioned at all by 
the jurists in connection with these provisions whereas there are 
frequent references to the lex Papia Poppaea. The rules provided 
incentives to procreation both for patrons and patronesses and 
also for freedmen and freedwomen. 
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The final area of the law in which both laws provided rulings 
is that of inheritance. The evidence 'shows that, in this 
particular area, the lex Iulia was more concerned with caelibes 
and the lex Papia Poppaea with orbi. The latter were not 
penalised at all by the lex iulia in relation to taking bequests, 
whereas by the terms of the lex Papia Poppaea they lost one half 
of all bequests (207). In addition, the complex rulings 
concerning the destiny of caduca that is, property which might 
not be taken by those designated in the will because of 
incapacity, are assigned by the jurists to the lex Papia Poppaea 
(208). It is also likely that the rules regulating inheriting 
between spouses were introduced by the lex Papia Poppaea, as has 
already been suggested (209). On the other hand, the evidence 
suggests that a provision which forbade the inclusion in a will of 
a condition which prohibited or restricted the remarriage of a 
widow if she were to benefit from a will seems to be assigned to 
the lex lulia (210). This is, in fact, similar to another 
provision assigned to the lex Iulia (211) which released ex-slaves 
from oaths made to their patrons as a condition of. manumission 
that they would not marry. Overall, however, the lex Papia 
Poppaea seems to have considerably expanded the rules of the lex 
Iulia concerning inheritance and was clearly more severe in this 
area. The lex Papia Poppaea also made provision for more rigorous 
application of the rules by assigning a certain proportion of 
caducous property to be given to informers who exposed those who 
were not entitled to take bequests by the terms of the law (212). 
To sum up, it is clear that the two Augustan marriage laws 
overlapped to a great extent and that there are areas in which the 
provisions of the two laws cannot, from the evidence, be separated 
from one another. However, there are other areas in which 
distinctions may be made. Some of these are not particularly 
significant, but others justify some interesting conclusions 
concerning the relationship between the lex iulia and the lex 
Pa pia Poppaea . Firstly, there seems to be little difference in 
the motivation underlying the two laws, and in the problems at 
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which the laws were aimed. Secondly, Augustus appears in the lex 
Papia Poppaea not to have introduced totally new rules but to have 
developed those introduced by the lex Iulia. '- Thus, for example, 
the idea of the regulation of the rules of inheritance was present 
in the 1ex Iulia but was greatly extended and developed in the lex 
Papia Poppaea. Further, while there were some incentives to 
procreation in the lex Iulia, there were many more in the lex 
Papia Poppaea. Finally, it seems to me that the lex Papia 
Poppaea was a more severe law than was the lex Iulia. It is true 
that Dio and Suetonius both portray it as Augustus' benevolent 
response to complaints about the severity of the law of 18 B. C., 
and no doubt this is how Augustus wished the new law to appear. 
Dio says that Augustus increased rewards and mitigated penalties. 
However, the concessions attributed in the evidence to the lex 
Papia Poppaea, such as the prolonging of the vacationes allowed to 
widows and divorcees and the extension to freedwomen of release 
from tutela are not of great significance. On the other hand, 
there are many examples of a much more significant increase in 
severity in the lex Papia Poppaea. Loopholes were closed and 
abuses precluded, and far reaching provisions were introduced into 
areas barely touched by the lex Iulia. 
While the lex Papia Poppaea was introduced by the consuls of 
A. D. 9 rather than by Augustus, there can be little doubt, given 
the content of the two laws that it was just as much initiated by 
Augustus as was the lex Iulia. Augustus was clearly aware of the 
need to make some concessions in the lex Papia Poppaea because of 
the hostility aroused by the lex Iulia, but he was also aware of 
the need to supply the inadequacies of the lex Julia, to enforce 
the law more rigorously and to expand on the rulings in -those 
areas which he perceived to be the most effective areas of 
manipulation for achieving his aim. 
The purpose and significance of the Ilex Iulia et Papia' 
- 147 - 
The most obvious and generally acknowledged aim behind the 
enactment of the lex Julia et Papia was Augustus' desire to expand 
the Roman citizen body. Most of the attested provisions of the 
laws may be interpreted as providing encouragement to valid 
marriage and procreation, and this is the aim proclaimed by 
contemporary poets, notably Horace (213). Some scholars, for 
examples, Jonkers (214), have emphasised the loss of life caused 
by the proscriptions and civil wars of the very late Republic in 
order to demonstrate the need for such legislation. 
Hand in hand with this theme goes another alleged aim, the 
desire of the legislator to encourage a return to traditional 
Roman Republican values. The idea that Rome's recent 
catastrophes were due to an abandonment of traditional ideals, 
including those of valid marriage and procreation, is expressed in 
the Ode of Horace already cited, and the idea of Rome's greatness 
having been linked to these ideals is asserted in a speech. 
attributed by Dio to Augustus and allegedly delivered in A. D. 9 to 
the equites in response to their complaints about the severity of 
the lex Iulia (215). Dio reports elsewhere (216) that Augustus 
claimed that his legislation was traditional, and there is indeed 
some (although dubious) evidence for the imposition of penalties 
by the censors in 403 B. C. on those who reached old age without 
being married(217). Better attested is the speech of the censor 
Metellus Macedonicus of 133 B. C., read out by Augustus to the 
people and the Senate (218) which urged contemporary Romans to 
marry and to produce children. Among modern scholars this theme 
has been emphasised especially by Gardthausen (219). 
This dual purpose, expansion of the population along with a 
return to traditional Roman values, sounds straightforward enough. 
If, however, the marriage laws are to be explained purely in these 
terms, many questions arise. Why, for example, was Augustus so 
concerned to increase the number of citizens? Was he concerned 
to encouraged procreation among all groups of citizens? Now can 
the imposition of a limitation on the marriages of senators be 
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explained? Finally, why was it necessary for-laws with a fairly 
simple purpose to have been so large and complex and to have 
intervened so extensively in the laws of . inheritance? 
The obvious answer to the first question and one which seems 
to be supported by the testimonies of Horace and of Propertius, 
for example (220), is the need for a good supply of soldiers for 
the army. Strong arguments might be cited to support this view 
in terms of the loss of manpower in the catastrophic events of the 
end of the Republic and in terms of the essential role of the army 
in the Augustan, as in the Republican, system. However, a closer 
look at the details of the laws shows that, given the nature of 
the privileges and penalties introduced in order to encourage 
procreation, the rustic plebs from which the army was 
traditionally recruited would have been very little affected 
(221). For the sort of people likely to be affected by the laws 
were those with an interest in bequeathing or receiving 
property, in tutela and other munera civilia, in office holding, 
in relations with their ex-slaves or patrons and such like. It 
is therefore difficult to believe that the laws had, or were 
designed to have, an impact on military manpower. one can only 
conclude, as Wallace. Hadrill (222) does, that the testimony of the 
poets is ideological. 
Before pursuing this question further, it is helpful to 
consider the other questions which are all very closely related. 
It has been suggested that the incentives to procreation provided 
in the laws would not have affected, all types of citizen, and the 
theme of a "eugenic" policy has been taken up. by scholars such as 
Last (223). It has been argued that Augustus had no desire to 
encourage procreation among the population in general, but only 
among those in the upper ranks of society. Thus his introduction 
of a prohibition against marriages between senators and ex-slaves 
may be seen as an attempt to uphold the social superiority of 
members of the senatorial order over the other orders. This view 
has been disputed, for example, by Brunt and by Humbert (224), who 
point to such provisions of the laws as the banning of the 
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unmarried from spectating at games and the assigning of certain 
seats at the theatre to those who were married, as well as to the 
provisions which provided incentives to ex-slaves to procreate in 
order to argue that the laws were, in fact, designed to encourage 
procreation among all classes of citizen. Such arguments, are 
not altogether convincing. The rules concerning the games and 
the theatre would only have affected the urban plebs rather than 
all citizens, and it is clear from the texts regarding relations 
between patrons and ex-slaves that the law was concerned with 
propertied or 'locupletiores liberti'. It is certainly true that 
the privileges and penalties of the law would have affected a 
large section of the citizen body, but the most important and 
hardest-hitting rules, notably those concerning inheritance, were 
in areas which were of interest only to those of the higher and 
richer orders of society, and this suggests that Augustus was at 
least primarily concerned with these citizens. It seems to me 
that the few rulings which can be interpreted as encouraging 
procreation in general (as, for example, the release of women 
possessing a certain number of children from tutela, which, as 
has been shown, was an institution of already declining 
significance) were less important and, like the military theme, to 
a great extent ideological and designed mainly to make a harsh law 
more palatable. A general increase in the citizen population 
would have enhanced Augustus' reputation as a restorer and bringer 
of prosperity, but the traditional Republican aristocratic outlook 
(which Augustus would surely have possessed) would have measured 
prosperity largely in terms of the state of the higher orders of 
society. In addition, since some passages of Dio suggest that 
Augustus encountered difficulty in finding enough people to fill 
the Senate and some of the magistracies, it was i mportant that 
there should be enough citizens of the right calibre to ensure 
that these vestiges of Republican and aristocratic tradition be 
maintained. 
To move on to the final question, why should laws designed to 
boost the population, particularly in the upper ranks of society, 
have been so complex and innovative? It is clear from the 
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jurists' commentaries ad legem Iuliam et Papiam that they regarded 
these statutes as-enormously significant in the history of Roman 
law, for no Republican statute had intervened so extensively in so 
many areas and particularly in the area of inheritance. Does 
this suggest that Augustus was motivated by more than merely the 
desire to see the citizen population increase? 
A number of theories have been proposed regarding other 
motives underlying this legislation. Tacitus (225) saw the 
complex rules concerning inheriting as designed primarily to 
augment the resources of the treasury which benefited from 
bequests which might not be taken by those designated in 'a will. 
It is unlikely, however, that this was one of the primary purposes 
of the law, for, as has been shown, co-legatees possessing 
children had a prior claim in the case of legacies, as did close 
relatives in the case of inheritances. Thus the revenue from this 
source cannot have been very great. 
Among modern scholars, Wallace Hadrill has produced the 
interesting theory that the extensive intervention by the law in 
the area of inheritance was designed to "stabilise the 
transmission of property and consequently of status, from 
generation to generation" (226). He believes that relatives of the 
testator to the sixth degree were indeed exempt from the 
restrictions on inheriting introduced by the law, and that 
Augustus thus aimed to encourage the transmission of property 
within families and to discourage the breaking up of family 
estates through bequests to extranei and hence the widespread 
Republican abuse of. legacy-hunting. This theory is not without 
flaws, not least the fact that it depends on the rather uncertain' 
premise that a large group of family members was exempt from the 
inheritance rules. Nevertheless, it is interesting that it ties 
in with the view proposed by Nicolet that one of Augustus' main 
concerns was the protection of property. He argues, for example, 
(227) that the introduction of the vicesima hereditatum (228) was 
designed to encourage the handing down of property within families 
in order to-prevent estates from being fragmented. The theory 
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that Augustus wished to discourage legacy-hunting is certainly an 
attractive one, for the influence possessed by those with wealth 
to bequeath to friends and clients would not-have been welcome to 
him. 
While it may well be that this was at least one motive 
underlying the rules concerning inheritance, there are other 
provisions of the law which cannot be explained in these terms. 
The law did not only affect inheritance : it affected many more 
issues, such as relations between patrons and ex-slaves, relations 
between patresfamiliarium and those in their power, tutela and 
dowry. I believe that Augustus grasped the opportunity to 
intervene, through this legislation, in as many areas of the law 
as possible, in order to introduce more uniformity and control 
over these areas and to curtail the comparative independence and 
free hand formerly enjoyed, within their spheres, by 
patresfamiliarum, patrons, tutors and testators. Thus, while the 
theme of these laws, the encouragement of marriage and 
procreation, was in harmony with Republican ideology (and, indeed, 
in harmony with Augustus' interest, for the promotion of such 
ideology and the boosting of the citizen population was, as has 
been argued, to his advantage), yet, at the same time, the laws 
rode roughshod over a number of revered institutions and 
principles. Thus this ostensibly traditional legislation was, in 
fact, far-reaching, innovatory and ruthless, intervening as it did 
in areas of life barely touched by legislation during the 
Republic. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE 'LEX IULIA DE ADULTERIIS COERCENDIS' 
The Lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis is the name given in 
a number of juristic sources (1) to a law enacted by Augustus 
which regulated the consequences of adultery together with various 
issues related to this offence. 
The term lex iulia de adulteriis coercendis was probably the 
original and full title of the law : elsewhere it is abbreviated 
to lex Iulia de adulteriis (2). Justinian's codifiers also gave 
to it the name of lex Iulia de adulteriis et de stupro (3) and lex 
Iulia de pudicitia, (4) no doubt because of the content of the 
law. For the same reason, Suetonius calls it the lex de 
adulteriis et de pudicitia (5). There is also a reference in 
Justinian's Digest to the lex Iulia de fundo dotali : the jurist 
clearly has in mind the particular section of the law relating to 
dotal property. 
Like the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus, this law belongs 
to the earlier period of Augustus's reign, during which he 
favoured the enactment through the concilium plebis of plebiscita, 
which, by virtue of his tribunicia potestas, bore his own name. 
The lex Iulia was a lengthy statute, of considerable significance 
in the history of criminal law. 
The lex Iulia cannot be exactly dated, but there is enough 
evidence to suggest that it was passed around the same time as the 
lex de maritandis ordinibus, that is around 18 B. C.. The adultery 
law was certainly in force by 13 B. C. when Horace published his 
fourth book of Odes (7). Since Augustus was away from Rome between 
16 B. C. and 13 B. C., this period is ruled out and Horace's ode is 
I 
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in any case addressed to an absent Augustus. It is interesting 
that Horace links the marriage and adultery laws together. 
Dio's account of events suggests that both the marriage law 
and the adultery law belong to the period following Augustus' 
return from the East in 19 B. C. (8). Furthermore, there is 
evidence to show that the lex de maritandis ordinibus was in force 
by 17 B. C. when Horace composed the Carmen Saeculare (9), and from 
the sentiments expressed in this poem it is reasonable to deduce 
that the lex de adulteriis had also been passed by this date (10). 
Last (11) believed that the adultery law, as the fundamental 
reform, preceded the marriage law, while other scholars place it 
in 17 B. C. (12). 
Since both laws are generally dated to around 18 B. C., some 
scholars have taken the view that the lex de adulteriis was merely 
one chapter of the lex de maritandis ordinibus (13). However, 
there is no evidence in the juristic commentaries on the marriage 
law of a chapter devoted to the offence of adultery. The sources 
show clearly that the lex de adulteriis was a separate statute 
made up of a number of chapters (14). 
Most of the evidence for the lex Iulia de adulteriis 
coercendis is found in the juristic sources. The existence of such 
a law is, however, attested in a number of literary sources. 
Suetonius, for example, mentions the enactment of a law de 
adulteriis (15) and Dio attributes to Augustus a speech in which 
he claims to have laid down restrictions on the disorderly conduct 
of women and young men (16). Seneca (17) mentions the adultery law 
in connection with the immoral conduct of Julia, and Pliny in 
relation to a woman, Galitta, who was prosecuted for committing 
adultery with a centurion (18). The poets also mention the 
introduction of the adultery law : Horace, as already mentioned, 
describes a law which sought to discourage impurity, while Ovid 
attributes to Augustus a law which enforced chastity on women 
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(19). Martial also describes the discouragement of adultery and 
the encouragement of chastity by the lex iulia (20). 
It is clear from the evidence that a number of jurists 
commented on the lex Iulia. There is a title in Justinian's Digest 
(21) ad legem Iuliam de adulteriis coercendis, and one in the Code 
ad legem Iuliam de'adulteriis et de stupro (22), (23). Ulpian 
wrote a commentary ad legem iuliam de adulteriis (or de 
adulteriis) and Paul and Papinian wrote two commentaries de 
adulteriis, while Marcian wrote 'Notae' on one of Papinian's 
commentaries. 
Ulpian's first book de adulteriis is concerned with the 
prohibition of adultery and of stuprum (24), the father's ius 
necandi (25) and the husband's duty to repudiate an adulterous 
wife (26). In book two, he comments on the detaining of an 
adulterer (27), the prosecution of adultery (28), various 
circumstances of adultery and remarriage after divorce (29). Books 
three and four are concerned with the quaestio of slaves (30), and 
book four also contains comments on lenocinium (31), and on the 
time prescribed for the prosecution of adultery (32). The final 
book comments on rules relating to dotal property (33). 
Paul's liber sinaularis de adulteriis is attested by an 
excerpt from Justinian's Digest relating to the prosecution of 
slaves (34) and by a passage in the Collatio (35). Here Paul 
mentions the abrogation of former laws by the lex lulia (36), the 
ius necandi of a father and of a husband (37) and prosecution 
(38). 
As for his other commentary de adulteriis, book one deals 
with the ius patris (39) and prosecution in general (40), and book 
two with the time limits prescribed for adultery trials (41), 
penalties for adultery (42), dowry (43) and divorce (44). The 
third book is concerned with the manumission of slaves within the 
time prescribed for prosecution (45), forms of inscriptiones 
libellorum (46), desisting from a prosecution (47) and dowry (48). 
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Paul gives further specific information on the lex Iulia in a 
section of the Sententiae Receptae entitled de adulteriis (49) and 
a comment on false witnessing in Collatio 8.2-belongs to a title 
ad legem Iuliam de adulteriis in Paul's liber singularis de poenis 
omnium lequm. 
The main source for Papinian's liber sinaularis de 
adulteriis is Collatio 4.7 - 11, where Papinian comments on the 
right of a father to prosecute an emancipated daughter, his vitae 
necisque potestas, the husband's right to kill and the provision 
of a quaestio de servis. Another excerpt discusses the offence of 
incest (50). There are also some excerpts in Justinian's Digest 
taken from this book which discuss the penalty for adultery (51), 
the offences of lenocinium and of incest, the prosecution of 
adultery, the ius mariti, the continuation of a marriage following 
adultery and the remarriage of an adulterous woman (52) and 
prosecution and calumnia (53). In book one of his other 
commentary de adulteriis, Papinian comments on the definition of 
adultery and of stuprum, the ius mariti (54), the paternal ius 
occidendi (55), the prosecution of adultery (56), prosecution of a 
slave (57) and dotal property (58). Book two is concerned with 
incest (59), the definition of materfamilias (60), the guilt 
associated with a person who aids the commission of adultery (61), 
prosecution (62), abolitio criminis (63) and penalties (64). 
Papinian also incorporated a title ad legem Iuliam de adulteriis 
into his 15th book responsorum"in which he commented on the ius 
mariti (65). 
There are further excerpts relevant to the lex Iulia which 
are taken from juristic commentaries not specifically devoted to 
the offence of adultery. Such excerpts are found in Ulpian's 
books ad legem Iuliam et Papiam (66), disputationum (67), ad 
edictum (68) and de omnibus tribunalibus (69), in Paul's books ad 
edictum (70), guaestionum (71) and responsorum (72), in Gaius's 
books ad edictum provinciale (73) and ad leaem duodecim tabularum 
(74) and in Papinian's libri responsorum (75). Other jurists 
also provide comments relevant to the lex Iulia de adulteriis, 
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such as Marcian (76), Scaevola (77), Macer (78), Modestinus (79), 
Tryphoninus (80), Julian (81), Alfenus (82), Africanus (83), 
Iavolenus (84) and Marcellus (85). 
The provisions of the flex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis' 
The evidence for this law is sufficient to make possible a 
tentative reconstruction of the main provisions. A few juristic 
excerpts make reference to specific chapters of the law (86) and 
in Paul's commentary preserved in the Collatio (87) he proposes to 
discuss the points of the law in the order in which they appeared. 
(Chapter 1) : Abrogation of all former laws by the lex Julia. 
Prohibition of adultery and of stuprum s 'Ne quis posthac stuprum 
adulterium facito sciens dolo malo' (88). 
(Chapter 2) 1 Grant of authority to father to kill adulterer, 
together with his daughter, if caught in adultery, provided that 
she is in his potestas or was given by him into the manus of her 
husband, that they are found in his house or in that of his son- 
in-law and that he kills her immediately. 
'in filia adulterum deprehenderit' 
'in continenti filiam occidat' (89) 
Liability of a father to be prosecuted for homicide if he has 
killed the adulterer but not his daughter. 
Right of a husband to kill adulterer s restricted to adulterer 
of low extraction caught in husband's home. 
Prohibition against killing of adulterous wife 
(Chapter 5) : Right of husband to detain adulterer in his house 
for not more than 20 hours to call witnesses to the offence. 
'testandae eius rei gratia'(90) 
Husband's duty to make a statement within three days as to the 
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name of the man with whom he caught his wife and the place where 
adultery was committed. 
Obligation, of a husband to repudiate an adulterous wife. 
Introduction of a requisite form of divorce for the purposes of 
the law. 
Institution of a quaestio de adulteriis. 
Grant of exclusive right of prosecution to father and to husband 
of alleged adulteress for 60 days. 
Grant of preference to husband over father. 
Freedom of husband and of father from various restrictions 
applicable to other prosecutors. 
Provision of a quaestio in order to extract evidence by torture 
from slaves within 60 days of divorce. 
Stipulation that slaves used as witnesses be made public. 
Requirement that value of slave be paid to master as restitution 
if prosecution in which he gave evidence is unsuccessful 
Extension of right of prosecution to extranei after 60 days if 
neither husband nor father has taken advantage of opportunity. 
Prescription of period of 6 months from divorce for such 
prosecution. 
Exclusion of certain categories from prosecuting s libertini, 
infames, under 25s. 
(Chapter 7) : Exemption from prosecution of those absent rei 
publicae causa. 
'Ne quis inter reos referat eum, qui tum sine detrectatione rei 
publicae causa abierit'(91). 
obligation on extranei to give place to husband if, for good 
reason, he wishes to prosecute iure extranei. 
Prohibition against prosecuting adulteress and adulterer 
simultaneously and grant of permission to choose whom to 
prosecute first unless the woman has remarried. 
Extension, at discretion of judges, to extranei, of right to 
torture slaves to extract evidence. 
Prohibition against the instigation of a prosecution after 5 years 
from the offence if divorce is delayed. 
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Prosecution of adulterous slaves : requirement of payment of 
double the value of the slave to his master if he is accused of 
adultery and acquitted. 
Prosecution of offences related to adultery : Liability of a 
husband to be prosecuted for lenocinium if he fails to divorce his 
wife or to detain the adulterer. 
'adulterum in domo deprehensum dimiserit'(92). 
Liability for prosecution of an accomplice in an act of adultery 
or of a man who makes financial gain from the adultery of his 
wife. 
Liability for prosecution of a wife who makes financial gain from 
the adultery of her husband. 
Penalties for adultery etc. : for the adulterer, publicatio of a 
half of his property, relegation to an island. 
For the adulteress, forfeiture of one third of her dowry to her 
husband and of one third of her property to the aerarium, 
relegation to an island and prohibition against remarriage. 
Intestabilitas and prohibition against witnessing a Roman will. 
Capital punishment for some cases of stuprum. 
Prohibition against alienation of dotal property by husband 
without his wife's consent. 
Fixing of retentiones ex dote. 
Abrogation of former laws by the Ilex Iulia' 
The evidence for this introductory provision of the lex 
Iulia is in the Collatio (93) : 
Et quidem primum caput legis Iuliae de adulteriis prioribus 
legibus pluribus obrogat. 
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It is difficult to ascertain exactly which are the 'priores 
leges' referred to here, since the punishment of adultery was 
largely left to the censor and to private individuals during the 
Republican period rather than being regulated by law as a crime. 
There is evidence that in particularly shocking cases women 
accused of adultery were occasionally brought before an assembly 
of the people by an aedile (94) but it was more usual for an 
alleged adulteress to be summoned before her father or husband 
(according to whether she was in potestate or in manu) surrounded 
by a domestic tribunal, whose members would pass a sentence on her 
(95). There is little evidence from the Republic for any 
regulation by law of the activities of these domestic tribunals in 
relation to adultery. Romulus was traditionally reputed to have 
permitted a husband to kill or to divorce an adulterous wife (96), 
and a few sources mention a lex Scantinia (97) which appears to 
have censured stuprum. This law cannot be exactly dated, but it 
was certainly in force by the time of Cicero, and Rotondi places 
it in 149 B. C. (98). According to Plutarch (99), Sulla introduced 
laws concerning adultery and related issues. However, there is no 
evidence more specific than this, and such regulations may have 
been part of another law (100). There is no evidence for a law 
specifically de adulteriis previous to the lex Iulia and the 
provision cited here by Paul looks suspiciously like a standard 
formula. Certainly the lex iulia was the first statute to bring 
the offences of adultery and of stuprum, together with all related 
issues, under a comprehensive and uniform system of rules. 
Prohibition against adultery and 'stuprum' 
Ulpian (101) purports to quote the actual words of the lex 
Iulia s 
Ne quis posthac stuprum adulterium facito sciens dolo malo. 
Let no-one henceforth, knowingly and with evil intent, comvnit 
stuprum or adultery. 
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The content of this provision suggests that it appeared at 
the beginning of the lex Iulia, and this is confirmed by the fact 
that the excerpt is taken from Ulpian's first book of commentary 
de adulteriis. The 'ne quis... facito' formula was a standard one 
in statutes of the time, as comparison with D. 23.2.44Er., 
concerning the lex Julia de maritandis ordinibus shows. 
The terms 'adulterium' and 'stuprum' were evidently not 
defined in the lex lulia, but the jurists felt that some 
elucidation was necessary. Thus Papinian says that the terms were 
used indiscriminately in the lex lulia but that, strictly 
speaking, sexual relations with a married woman constitute 
adultery, whereas relations with an unmarried woman or a widow 
constitute stuprum 
Lex stuprum et adulterium promiscue et Kvrro 'b 6 rtr-&4r vappellat. 
sed proprie adulterium in nupta committitur, propter partum ex 
altero concepto composito nomine : stuprum vero in virginem 
viduamve committitur, quod Graeci 46o'ä v appellant (102). 
This is confirmed by Modestinus s 
Inter 'stupn ' et 'adulterium' hoc interesse quidam putant, quod 
adulterium in nuptam, stuprum in viduain cominittitur. sed lex Iulia 
de adulteriis hoc verbo indifferenter utitur(103). 
Adulterium in nupta admittitur : stuprum in vidua vel virgin vel 
puero comittitur (104). 
Nevertheless, sexual relations with a married woman who was 
of low repute such as a prostitute or actress, did not constitute 
adulterium. Hence Papinian refers to a 'roulier quae evitandae 
poenae adulterii gratia lenocinium fecerit auf operas suas in 
scaenam locavit... '(105). According to Paul (106) : 
Cum his quae publice mercibus vel tabernis exercendis procurant, 
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adulterium fieri non placuit. 
This is confirmed by a story told by Tacitus (107) from the 
year A. D. 19. A woman from a praetorian family, Vistilia, 
registered herself with the aediles as a prostitute in the hope of 
evading prosecution for adultery, since prostitutes were exempt. 
A sc was therefore passed forbidding anyone whose father, 
grandfather or husband was a Roman egues to become a prostitute. 
The term materfamilias is defined by the jurists commenting 
on the lex Julia (108) ; it is likely that this is part of a 
discussion on the question of what sort of women might be 
prosecuted for adultery. Ulpian gives the following definition of 
a materfamilias (109) s 
Matrem familias accipere debemus eam, quae non inhoneste vixit : 
matrem enim familias a ceteris feminis mores discernunt atque 
separant. proinde nihil intererit, nupta sit an vidua, ingenues 
sit an libertina : nam neque nuptiae neque natales faciunt matrem 
familias, sed bons mores. 
Similarly, relations with an unmarried woman who was not an 
'honesta mulier' did not constitute stuprum. Thus Ulpian, 
commenting on the issue of concubinage, mentions a category of 
women in quas stuprum non committitur'(110). 'Stuprum' thus 
appears to mean sexual intercourse with higher class unmarried or 
widowed women. It also included acts of pederasty and 
homosexuality s 
Lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis... punit et eon qui cum masculis 
infandam libidinem exercere audent (111). 
Qui masculum liberum invitum stupraverit, capite punitur (112). 
The prohibition against adultery and stuprum was qualified 
by the common phrase 'sciens dolo malo'. Thus, according *to 
Gaius, a man who unknowingly marries a woman who has not been 
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formally divorced is not an adulterer (113). 
The 'ius necandi' of a father and of a husband 
After affirming the prohibition against adultery and 
stuprum, the lex Iulia proceeded to outline the rights of a father 
and of a husband to punish an adulterous woman. A paterfamilias 
was given the authority to kill his daughter along with the 
adulterer provided that he had caught her committing adultery in 
his own house or in that of his son-in-law (114) and provided that 
he kill her immediately. The rights of a husband, on the other 
hand, were less extensive. He was only permitted to kill an 
adulterer of low extraction whom he had found committing adultery 
with his wife in his own house, and he might not kill his wife 
with impunity. A further provision of the law gave to him the 
right to keep an adulterer in his house for up to twenty hours in 
order to call witnesses to the offence. A husband was obliged to 
declare within three days where and with whom he had found his 
wife and to dismiss her immediately. 
Further details of these rights, outlined by the jurists 
Paul and Papinian, are found in the Collatio (115). Paul assigns 
to the second chapter of the lex Iulia the provisions which lay 
down the rights of the father. If a father failed to kill his 
daughter as well as the adulterer, he was liable for prosecution 
for homicide, and equally, if he failed to kill his daughter 
immediately. Papinian expands on this by saying that a father who 
kills only the adulterer is held by the lex Cornelia de sicariis, 
unless his daughter has escaped from him, so that he has not 
spared her dolo malo. This rather severe provision was mitigated 
by a rescript of Marcus Aurelius and Commodus (116) : 
Nihil interest, adulterum filiam prius pater occiderit an non, 
dum utrumque occidat: nam si alterum occidit lege Cornelia reus 
est. Quod si altero occiso alter vulneratus fuerit, verbis quidem 
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legis non liberaturs sed divus Marcus et Commodus rescripserunt 
inpunitatem ei concedi, quia, licet interempto adultero mulier 
supervixerit post tam gravia vulnera, quae ei pater infixerat, 
magis fato quam voluntate eius servata est. 
Paul also says (117) that a father may even kill an 
adulterer who is of consular rank or his own patron. This ruling 
sounds more like the result of juristic interpretation than an 
original provision of the law, as does his statement that an 
adoptive father possesses the ius necandi in the same way as a 
natural father (118). A more difficult question is whether or not 
the ius patris applied in the case of daughters who were sui 
iuris, since there is conflict among the juristic texts. Thus 
Paul says that a father possesses the right whether his daughter 
is in his potestas or has passed into the manus of her husband 
with his authority (119). This is confirmed by a passage of 
Papinian (120). Paul goes on to cite a passage of Marcellus which 
assigns to the father this right over a daughter who is sui iuris 
(121). On the other hand, an excerpt from the commentary of 
Papinian de adulteriis (122) attributes the ius patris only in the 
case of a daughter who is in the potestas of her father s 
Patri datur ius occidendi adulterum cum filia quam in potestate 
habet: itaque nemo alius ex patribus idem iure faciet: sed nec 
filius familias pater. 
Corbett (123) suggests that the text of Papinian has been 
interpolated by Justinian's codifiers who had no experience of 
manus marriage. This may, in fact, be a case of a difference of. 
opinion among the jurists in the absence of a clear statement in 
the lex. Presumably the law simply assumed that a daughter whose 
father was- alive would have been either in his potestas or 
(rarely) in the manus of her husband. The text of Papinian cited 
also stipulates that a father who is himself a filiusfamilias does 
not possess the right and this is confirmed by Ulpian (124) and by 
Paul (125) who says that this was so according to the letter of 
the law but that in practice such a father did exercise the right: 
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Filius familias pater si filiam in adulterio deprehenderit, uerbis 
quidem legis prope est, ut non possit occidere : permittitur 
tarnen etiam ei, ut occidat. 
A further issue discussed by the jurists was the exact 
import of the limitation that the father might only kill an 
adulterer found in his own house or in that of his son-in-law s 
Ius occidendi patri conceditur domi suae, licet ibi filia non 
habitat, vel in domo generis sed domus pro domicilio accipienda 
est, ut in lege Cornelia de iniuriis (126). 
A text of Ulpian (127) purports to provide two verbatim 
phrases from the lex Iulia, 'in filia adulterum deprehenderit' 
((if) he has caught someone in the act of adultery with his 
daughter) and in continenti filiam occidat' ((provided that) he 
immediately kill his daughter)(128). By comparing the purported 
quotation with the description of the ius patris given by Paul in 
Collatio 4.2.3, Bruns (129) provides the following reconstruction: 
[Pater si] in filia [sua quarr in potestate habet, auf in ea quae 
<eo> auctore cum in potestate esset, viro in manum convenerit] 
adulterum [domi suae generive sui] deprehenderit, [isque in eam 
rem socerum adhibuerit [lex permittit] ut is pater eum adulterum 
sine fraude occidat, ita ut] in continenti filiam occidat. 
Clearly the 'in filia adulterum deprehenderit' must have been 
preceded by 'si' and the 'filiam in continenti occidat' by 
something like vita ut', but, while there is little reason to 
doubt that the phrases provided by Ulpian are genuine, this does 
not justify such a reconstruction, especially since Paul, in the 
Collatio passage, does not claim to be quoting from the law. 
The limitations of a husband's right to kill an adulterer 
taken in the act are described in an excerpt from Paul's liber 
singularis de adulteriis (130) : 
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Ergo secundam leges viro etiam filiofamilias permittitur domi suae 
deprehensum adulterum interficere servum, et eum qui auctoramento- 
rogatus est ad gladium, vel etiam ilium qui operas suas, ut cum 
bestiis pugnaret, locavit. Sed et iudicio publico damnatum licet 
interficere in adulterio deprehensum, vel libertinum vel suum vel 
paternum, et tam civem Romanum quam Latinum. Sed et patris et 
matris et filii et filiae libertum permittitur occidere, quo loco 
et dediticius habetur. 
Elsewhere (131) the husband's right of killing is limited to 
'infames et eos qui corpore quaestum faciunt, servos etiam et 
libertos... '. But even such persons were only killed with 
impunity if the husband then made a statement regarding the 
circumstances, and dismissed his wife (132). According to an 
excerpt from Macer's first book of commentary publicorum (133), a 
husband may kill a man found committing adultery with his wife in 
his (the husband's ) home 'qui leno fuerit quive artem ludicram 
ante fecerit in scaenam saltandi cantandive causa prodierit 
iudiciove publico damnatus neque in integrum restitutus erit, 
quive libertus eius mariti uxorisve, patris matris, filii filiae 
utrius eorum fuerit... quive servus erst. ' Macer goes on to say 
that a husband. possesses the ius whether he is a filiusfamilias or 
sui iuris. This rule was in fact, the result of a rescript of 
Hadrian and not an original provision of the law as D. 48.5.6.2 
shows s 
Filius familiae'maritus ab eo, qui sui iuris est, in ea lege non 
separatur. divus quoque Hadrianus Rosiano Gemino rescripsit et 
invito patre filium hac lege reuen facere. 
Greater leniency towards a husband's illicit killing of an 
adulterer was shown in Imperial constitutions. Hence Paul states 
(134) t 
Sciendum est gutem divum Marcum et Commodum rescripsisse eum qui 
adulterum inlicite interfecerit, leviori poena puniri. Sed et 
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Magnus Antoninus pepercit, si quis adulteros inconsulto calore 
ducti interfecerunt. 
This idea is repeated in a passage from the Collatio (135) : 
Maritum, qui uxorem deprehensam cum adultero occidit, quia hoc 
inpatientia iusti doloris admisit, lenius puniri placuit. 
A constitution of Alexander (136) expresses similar sentiments 
with regard to the illicit killing of an adulterer s 
Sed si legis auctoritate cessante inconsulto dolore adulterum 
interemit, quamvis homicidium perpetratum sit, tarnen quia et nox 
et dolor iustus factum eius relevat, potest in exilium darf. 
Papinian discusses (137) the question of whether or not a 
husband who catches his wife in adultery and kills her is liable 
for prosecution by the lex de sicariis. He concludes that, since 
such an action may be partly excused on the ground of just anger, 
exile is regarded as a just penalty. In another excerpt from 
Papinian (138), two Imperial rescripts are quoted which mitigated 
the penalty for a husband who killed his adulterous wife : 
Imperator Antoninus et Commodus filius'rescripserunt s 'Si maritus 
uxorem in adulterio deprehensam impetu tractus doloris 
interfecerit, non utique legis Cornelia de sicariis poenam 
excipiet. ' nam et divus Pius in haec verba rescripsit Apollonio : 
'Ei qui uxorem suam in adulterio deprehensam occidisse se non 
negat,, ultimum supplicium remitti potest, cum sit dificillimum 
iustum dororem temperare et quia plus fecerit, quarr quia vindicare 
se non debuerit, puniendus sit. sufficiet igitur, si humilis loci 
sit, in opus perpetuum eum tradi, si qui honestior, in insulam 
relegari'. 
Ulpian (139) attributes to the fifth chapter of the lex 
Julia the provision which gave to a husband who did not wish, or 
who was not allowed, to kill the adulterer, the right to detain 
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him for up to twenty hours in order to obtain evidence against 
him. This is confirmed by Paul (140) s 
Capite quinto legis Iuliae cavetur, ut adulterum deprehensum 
viginti horas attestando vicinos retinere liceat. 
The text of Ulpian goes on to attribute this right to the father, 
and to the husband who has found the adulterer in a house other 
than his own, and to say that the adulterer may not be brought 
back after he has been dismissed, but if he has escaped, he may be 
brought back and detained. Ulpian purports (par. 5) to quote from 
the law the words 'testandae eius rei gratia', and on the basis of 
his description of the provision in D. 48.5.26(25)pr., Bruns (141) 
has proposed the following reconstruction : 
[viro adulterum in uxore sua deprehensum, quem auf nolit auf non 
liceat occidere, retinere Noras diurnal nocturnasque continuas non 
plus quam 7IX] testandae eius rei gratia [sine fraude sua liceto]. 
While there is little reason to doubt the accuracy of Ulpian'a 
purported quotation and of his description of this provision of 
the law, this by no means justifies such a reconstruction. 
The significance of these provisions of the law concerning, 
the ius necandi enjoyed by the father and husband of an alleged 
adulteress has to be assessed in the light of the situation 
previous to the lex Julia. According to Papinian (142), a 
paterfamilias had, from ancient times, enjoyed the vitae necisque 
potestas over his children (143). Augustus now extended this to 
the rare situation in which a woman was in the manus of her 
husband. More importantly, he curtailed the father's right to 
kill his daughter by introducing-limitations, namely that the act 
of adultery must have taken place in his house or in that of his 
son-in-law and that he must kill her immediately. His right to 
kill the adulterer was also qualified by the stipulation that he 
must kill his daughter at the same time. 
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As for a husband under the Republic, it seems that he was 
permitted to kill his wife taken in adultery. Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus says that Romulus made adultery and wine-drinking 
punishable by death (144). A husband was still allowed to put to 
death a woman taken in adultery by the time of Cato (145): 
... In adulterio uxorem tuam si prendisses, sine 
iudicio impune 
necares.. 
The words 'sine iudicio' imply that if the woman were not actually 
taken in adultery, the husband was under pressure to call together 
a domestic tribunal to try her. The tribunal might pass the 
death sentence, or else propose a more moderate course such as 
divorce, which would involve the forfeiture of part of the dowry: 
hence pecuniary issues could be involved. Although a domestic 
council had no legal status, the husband or father would have felt 
a strong obligation to call one together to deal with a woman's 
offence. The lex iulia deprived a husband entirely of any right 
to kill his wife taken in adultery even when she was in his manus 
in which case the right to kill (although restricted) belonged to 
her"father. 
Papinian seeks to explain-the reasoning behind this part of 
the lex lulia (146), and concludes that a woman's adultery is more 
of an affront to the name of her father than to that of her 
husband. Further, he says that a husband might more easily be 
carried away by anger than a father: 
... ceterum mariti calor et impetus facile decernentis fuit 
refrenandus. 
The jurist's explanation is not very convincing. It is more 
likely that the father's right was regarded as more sacred, rooted 
as it was in the archaic institution of P atria potestas. 
Not only was the husband deprived of the right to kill his 
wife whom he apprehended in adultery, but as has been observed, 
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his licence to kill the adulterer was subjected to considerable 
restrictions. It was stipulated that he must have caught the 
guilty parties in his own house, and if he killed an adulterer who 
did not belong to one of the specified lower categories he was 
liable for prosecution under the lex Cornelia de sicariis (147). 
Since a husband would not always have been able to determine 
immediately the status of an adulterer on finding him in the act 
of adultery, he would have been deterred from exercising the ius 
through fear of killing a man of higher rank and being prosecuted 
for homicide. 
Thus Augustus left the husband with a ius necandi which was 
very restricted indeed. He gave preference to the right of the 
father over that of the husband, yet even the father's ius necandi 
was not free from restrictions. Augustus' motive in so weakening 
the ius necandi must surely have been to ensure that as often as 
possible the adulterous parties, rather than being punished by 
private vengeance, would be brought to public trial. Obviously 
he was happy to allow an adulterer of low social status to be 
dealt with by the offended husband. He thus ostensibly retained 
the Republican ius so that his measure should not appear too 
drastic and untraditional, while depriving it of much of its value 
in. practice . 
While a husband was virtually deprived of any effective 
right to kill an adulterer, he was, as has been observed, allowed 
to detain him in his house for a period of up to twenty hours in 
order to gather witnesses. This provision was presumably 
designed to facilitate the prosecution of the adulterous parties. 
The husband was further obliged to report the circumstances to a 
competent magistrate within three days (148) and to divorce his 
adulterous wife (149), provided that he had caught her in the act 
of adultery. If he failed to comply with these' stipulations of 
the law, he could not kill an adulterer, even of low rank, with 
impunity. The texts show that a husband who failed to divorce a 
wife discovered in adultery, who let the adulterer go free, or who 
made some profit by condoning the adultery of his wife, was guilty 
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of lenocinium : 
... Maritus lenocinium lex coercuit, qui deprehensam uxorem in 
adulterio retinuit adulterumque dimisit: debuit enim uxori quoque 
irasci, quae matrimonium eius violavit (150). 
Ulpian goes on, in the same text, to provide a purported quotation 
from the law: 
... idcirco enim lex locuta est' adulterum in domo deprehensum 
dimiserit'. 
'If he has sent away the adulterer apprehended in his house'. 
As long as the marriage still existed, neither the husband 
nor the father could prosecute an adulterous woman, and an 
eutraneus must first successfully charge the husband with 
lenocinium for his failure to divorce her. The texts suggest 
that the offence of lenocinium was regarded as comparable to 
adultery itself (151). Augustus seems to have been concerned 
that no agreement among those involved should prevent the guilty 
parties from being brought to trial, that the treatment of an 
adulterous woman should not be wholly dictated by the attitude of 
her husband, and that a profitable compliance with an act of 
adultery should be regarded as an offence similar to that of 
adultery itself. The duty of a husband to make a prompt report 
to a competent magistrate was also designed, presumably, to ensure 
a public trial. 
The idea of a wronged husband being obliged to divorce his 
wife was not entirely new : the Republican censors might 
occasionally force a husband to divorce a wife taken in adultery 
since such an act was regarded as a serious affront to him. By 
incorporating this rule into his law, Augustus turned a 
traditional obligation enforced from time to time into a general 
rule with universal application. 
The law further ensured that third parties who were 
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accomplices in an act of adultery should not escape punishment. 
Thus a person who knowingly provided his house for acts of 
adultery or stuprum to be committed there was punishable as a 
defendant of adultery (152). Ulpian says that a person who 
provides his house merely for the planning of an act of adultery , 
even though the act does not actually take place there, is also 
penalised by the law (153). According to Papinian (154), women 
were not excluded from this, but were liable under the law if, they 
had provided their houses or had accepted a reward as accomplices 
in a known act of stuprum. This extension sounds as though it may 
be the result of juristic interpretation. According to Marcian 
(155) 'si uxor ex adulterio viri praemium acceperit, lege Iulia 
quasi adultera tenetur'. clearly such offences were regarded as 
comparable to the lenocinium of a husband who failed to divorce 
his adulterous wife. Presumably the rules were aimed not only at 
discouraging the commission of acts of adultery and of stuprum but 
also at precluding blackmail and corruption. They are indicative 
of Augustus' concern that the law be comprehensive and relentless 
towards anyone who played a part in the committing of adultery. 
In addition, a person who appeared to condone an act of 
adultery by marrying a woman successfully prosecuted as an 
adulteress was penalised : 
Quod ait lex, adulterii damnatam si quis duxit uxorem, ea lege 
teneri (156). 
The obligation on a husband to divorce an adulterous wife 
raises the question of forms of divorce. The evidence for the 
Republic indicates that, at least for a marriage without manus 
(auch marriages were almost universal by the time of Augustus), 
there was no set form of divorce required by law. Thus, just as a 
marriage without manus was a factual rather than a legal act 
(although having legal consequences), so was its dissolution. 
According to Plutarch, Romulus allowed husbands to divorce their 
wives for various specific offences (158). However the evidence 
for the period after 230 B. C. (when Carvilius Ruga divorced his 
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wife in the absence of any such misdeeds) (159), shows that, if 
Plutarch is right, the requirement of such grounds became 
obsolete: a passage of Cicero (160) speaks of a 'divortium sine 
causa'. ' Thus, following a mutual agreement by a husband and wife 
to separate, or the issuing of a repudium to either party for 
adultery or other misconduct, any ensuing legal action would be 
concerned with the division of the dowry or such like (161). The 
only set form which seems to have been involved was a declaration 
of 'res tugs tibi habeto', or a similar formula (162). The 
problems arising from the absence of a set form of divorce are 
illustrated by a controversy reported by Cicero (163). A man left 
his wife in Spain without sending a formal repudium to her, and 
married again. When both wives subsequently had sons, the 
question arose as to the status of each woman and her child. It 
was not clear whether, in the absence of a formal repudium, the 
fact of the man's second marriage automatically dissolved the 
first. 
There is evidence to suggest the introduction of a legal 
requirement of form for divorce by. the lex Julia de adulteriis. 
Some juristic texts suggest that by the terms of the lex Iulia a 
divorce must be witnessed by seven Roman citizens above puberty: 
Nullum divortium ratum est'nisi septem civibus Romanis puberibus 
adhibitis praeter libertum eius qui divortium faciet (164). 
... item Iulia de adulteriis, nisi certo modo divortium factum sit, 
pro infecto habet (165). 
Si non secundum legitiman observationen divortium factum sit, 
donationes post tale divortium factae nullius momenti sunt, cum 
non videatur solutum matrimonium (166). 
There are, however, considerable problems involved in taking these 
texts at face value, and, consequently, there has been little 
agreement among scholars on this issue. Firstly, interpolation 
is suspected, especially in the case of the first two excerpts. 
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Next, the second text cited is the only one which attributes an 
obligatory form of divorce specifically to the lex Iulia. 
Further, there are other excerpts concerned with divorce from the 
writings of the classical jurists which do not mention the 
existence of any legal requirement of form: a text of Ulpian, for 
example, which discusses the issue of dowry, includes the words 
'quoquo modo dirempto matrimonio' (167). The question of how a 
marriage was terminated is discussed by the jurists in connection 
with the prohibition of gifts between spouses, since it was 
requisite, for the application of this prohibition, to establish 
whether a man and a woman were husband and wife. Ulpian thus 
discusses a situation in which long separation does not end a 
marriage, surely implying that in other situations it did, and 
adds 'non enim coitus matrimonium facit, sed maritalis affectio' 
(168) ('maritalis affectio' presumably means the desire to be man 
and wife). Another important text, although a corrupt one, is 
D. 24.1.64 (169) in which an opinion of Proculus and Caecilius is 
reported, -namely that divorce is said to be 'verum' and hence a 
gift between spouses valid 'si alias nuptiae insecutae aunt auf 
tam longo tempore vidua fuisset, ut dubium non foret alterum esse 
matrimonium'. A similar excerpt from Marcellus (170) says that 
if the same woman returns to the same man, this is 'idem 
matrimonium', unless there has been a long separation, or either 
party has married another person, or the husband has failed to 
restore the dowry. 
The apparent implication of these texts is that a marriage 
could be dissolved without any set form, by the issuing of a 
repudium by either party, by a long separation, by the marriage of 
one of the spouses to a third party etc.. The issue is further 
complicated by a text of Gaius which associates the subject of 
divorce with the Twelve Tables (171), and which has been placed by 
Justinian's codifiers under the chapter heading 'ad legem Iuliam 
de adulteriis coercendis': 
'Si ex lege repudium missuni non sit et idcirco mulier adhuc nupta 
esse videatur, tarnen si quis earn uxorem duxerit, adulter non erit. 
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idque Salvius Iulianus respondit, quia adulterium, inquit, sine 
dolo malo non committiturs quamquam dicendum, ne is qui sciret eam 
ex lege repudiatam non esse dolo malo commnittat'. 
Scholars have discussed these texts endlessly. Levy (172) argues, 
since there are texts related to divorce which do not mention any 
special form, that the declaration with seven witnesses was a 
requirement not for divorce but for expelling a woman in a manus 
marriage from her husband's family if she had committed adultery. 
Corbett has raised objections to this view (173), the most 
convincing being, firstly, that manus marriages were very rare by 
the time of Augustus, and secondly, that in order to support his 
case, Levy is forced virtually to rewrite a number of Digest 
texts. Corbett believes that where the sources use terms such as 
'discidium' and 'discidere' to indicate divorce (174), the 
implication is that the form required by the lex Iulia has already 
been observed. Regarding the texts which seem to imply that a 
marriage could be dissolved by a long separation or by the 
marriage of one of the spouses to a third party, he explains that 
this was required in addition to the form laid down by the lex 
Iulia in order to indicate a serious intention on the part of the 
husband and wife to divorce. Corbett further explains that this 
additional requirement was not needed in a case of adultery in 
order to protect the husband from accusations of lenocinium. 
A differing view is expressed by Bonfante (175), who seeks 
to reconcile the texts by suggesting that the lex lulia only 
introduced formal divorce when it was unilateral, and that those 
texts which do not mention the form set out by the lex Iulia are 
referring to divorce by mutual consent. However, this is mere 
conjecture, -since none of the texts actually makes this 
distinction. 
Much of the disagreement among scholars has centred on the 
excerpt of Gaius cited above (176). Since this excerpt is taken 
from a commentary on the Twelve Tables, but appears in a chapter 
on the lex Julia, it is difficult to decide to which law the 'ex 
- 189 - 
lege' of the first line refers. Thus, it could be deduced that 
either the lex duodecim tabularum or the lex lulia required a 
certain form of repudium for the dissolution of marriage. Levy 
suspects the text, as does Solazzi (177), and believes that the 
'ex lege' refers to the law of the Twelve Tables, and that the 
absence of any evidence for a set form of divorce in the Republic 
is due to the fact that these forms were never legally binding. 
However, Volterra (178), followed by Thomas (179), believes that 
the text is genuine, and that the 'ex lege' refers to the lex 
Iulia which laid down a fixed form of divorce only for the 
application of the law, that is, only in cases of adultery. 
Thomas explains that Gaius, having dealt with the measures of the 
lex duodecim tabularum relating to divorce, then went on to 
discuss the measures introduced by the lex lulia. Another view 
is expressed by Yaron (180), who believes that the Twelve Tables 
regulated the grounds rather than the form of divorce, and that 
Gaius, in considering the interaction of the two laws, concludes 
that a marriage subsequent to a divorce not based on the Twelve 
Tables does not involve adultery. 
While several of the texts in question are undoubtedly 
suspect, the degree of interpolation which Levy claims cannot be 
justified, and the evidence for the introduction of a requisite 
form of divorce by the lex Iulia is too strong to be dismissed. 
It is difficult to see how the provisions of the lex lulia 
concerning prosecution for adultery and for lenocinium could 
possibly have been put into effect in the absence of formal 
divorce. On the other hand, the existence of excerpts relating 
to the dissolution of marriage from the classical jurists which do 
pot mention the requirement of the lex lulia is undeniable, and 
there is no justification for presuming, as Corbett does, that in 
these cases, the requisite form has already been observed. The 
varied means of divorce which existed in the Republic, that is 
repudium, mutual consent, prolonged separation and such like, must 
have continued to exist in the Empire, since they are mentioned by 
the classical jurists. The only way to reconcile the texts is to 
conclude that Augustus introduced a requisite form of divorce only 
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for the application of the lex Iulia. Thus in looking at Paul's 
statement in D. 24.2.9 ('nulluni divortium ratum eat' etc. ), the 
only plausible conclusion is that a divorce had to be legally 
'Tatum' only if the provisions of the lex Julia were applicable. 
It was essential for the application of the law that divorce be 
strictly defined, and it is obvious that a means of divorce such 
as prolonged separation was completely irrelevant in the context 
of the lex Iulia. At the same time, the existence of other means 
of divorce outside the context of the lex Iulia is well attested, 
and it is clear that when a question arose in an area such as that 
of gifts between spouses, the jurists encountered the same 
problems in determining whether or not a marriage was 'still in 
existence as did Cicero in the Republican period. 
It is difficult to determine the relevance of the law of the 
Twelve Tables to divorce as is suggested by Gaius in 
D. 48.5.44(43). The measures attributed by Plutarch to Romulus 
related to divorce have already been mentioned, and it is not 
impossible that similar limitations on the grounds of divorce were 
repeated in the lex duodecim tabularum. Alternatively, there may 
have been a provision which dealt with the question of the dowry. 
Cicero mentions the Twelve Tables in connection with the 
dissolution of a marriage: 
illam mimam suam suas res sibi habere iussit, ex duodecim tabulis 
clavis ademit, exemit (181). 
Cicero's association of the words 'res suas sibi habere' with the 
Twelve Tables may suggest that this formula, which persisted into 
the classical period, was introduced by that law. The formula, 
however, was only relevant to the issue of dowry. 
However, whatever rules were laid down by the law of the 
Twelve Tables, it appears (as has been shown), that by the later 
Republican period, there was no legal regulation of the form nor 
of the grounds of divorce. Hence Gaius cannot be implying in 
this excerpt that a woman who was not repudiated according to a 
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form set by the law of the Twelve Tables 'adhuc nupta esse 
videatur'. He must, as Thomas suggests, have passed on from a 
discussion of the provisions of the Twelve Tables on divorce to 
those of the lex lulia, so that the 'ex lege' of the first line 
refers to the lex Iulia. The words 'quia adulterium.... sine dolo 
malo non committitur' are reminiscent of the lex iulia in which, 
according to Ulpian, appeared the words 'ne quis posthac stuprum 
adulterium facito sciens dolo malo' (182). 
It is worth while looking at the report of Suetonius 
regarding Augustus's regulation of divorce (183): 
Cumque etiam immaturitate sponsarum et matrimoniorum crebra 
mutatione vim legis eludi sentiret, tempus sponsas habendi 
coartavit, divortiis modum imposuit. ' 
The implication of this is that a 'modus' was placed on divorce in 
order to counteract the 'matrimoniorum crebra mutatio's thus 
Suetonius seems to be suggesting that Augustus limited the 
facility and hence the frequency of divorce. However, it is 
difficult to reconcile this statement with the evidence from the 
juristic sources which, while attributing to the lex lulia the 
introduction of formal divorce for the application of this law, do 
not mention any legal measures which were designed to reduce the 
number of divorces. Suetonius' 'modus' could be taken to mean a 
mode or method of divorce and thus to refer to the form of divorce 
introduced by the lex Iulia, and this would fit in with the 
juristic evidence more easily. However, it would deprive the 
statement of all logic. Further, Suetonius is not describing the 
lex Julia de adulteriis at this point : he has already mentioned 
it and has passed on to describe the measures taken by Augustus in 
order to deal with abuses of the marriage law of 1B B. C.. If the 
'modus' was designed for this purpose, it is very unlikely to have 
been introduced by the adultery law in the same year as the 
marriage law was passed. Suetonius must be referring to some 
later measure introduced by Augustus which was designed to 
discourage people from entering into frequent marriages merely in 
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order to take bequests, for example, and subsequently divorcing. 
As has been suggested in chapter 3, the jurists perhaps fail to 
mention this measure because it became much less relevant after 
the passing of the lex Papia Poppaea which also penalised the 
married but childless (184). This measure may therefore be seen 
as an attempt to close loopholes which were being exploited by 
those anxious to gain the benefits associated with marriage 
without taking on the responsibilities. The absence of any 
evidence for such a measure other than that of Suetonius makes it 
impossible to be more specific about the nature of the action 
taken by Augustus in this area. 
Prosecution of the adulterous parties 
The 'ius mariti vel patris" 
It was provided in the law that prosecution of the 
adulterous parties instigated by the husband or father of the 
adulteress might not take place unless she had first been divorced 
or her husband accused of lenocinium for failing to divorce her 
(185). Provided that she had been divorced, the woman's husband 
and father enjoyed an exclusive right of prosecution for a period 
of 60 days following divorce, preference being given to the 
husband over the father : 
Marito primum, vel patri eam filiam, quarr in potestate habet, 
intra dies sexaginta divortii accusare permittitur nec ulli alii 
intra id tempus agendi potestas datur(186). 
Nisi igitur pater maritum infamem auf arguat auf doceat colludere 
magis cum uxore quarr ex animo accusare, postponetur marito (187). 
After the expiry of this period, prosecution was open to extranei 
for a period of 4 months, although even then the husband had 
precedence if he wished to prosecute, provided that he had good 
- 193 - 
reason for not having done so within the first 60 days. A new 
guaestio de adulteriis was set up specifically to deal with this 
offence. If divorce were delayed, no prosecution might be 
instigated more than 5 years after the commission of the offence. 
The privileged position enjoyed by the husband and father of 
the alleged adulteress over other would-be accusers is clear from 
the comments of the jurists. In addition to the grant of 60 days 
specifically to them, they were exempt from various restrictions 
applicable to extranei. The jurists mention more frequently the 
ius mariti in connection with such exemptions, and while the ius 
patris is sometimes mentioned as well (188), and in other cases 
should, perhaps, be understood, there is no doubt that the 
position of the husband was more privileged than was that of the 
father. Thus Ulpian says (189) that a person under 25 is debarred 
from instigating a prosecution unless it be to vindicate his own 
marriage. This is confirmed elsewhere (190) and obviously only 
applied to a husband. Similarly, a husband who was a 
filiusfamilias did not need to obtain the consent of his pater in 
order to accuse, according to Papinian s 
Filium familias publico iudicio adulterium in uxorem sine 
voluntate patris arguere constitutum eat t vindictam enim proprii 
doloris consequitur (191)'. 
A rescript of Hadrian later ruled that a husband who was a 
filiusfamilias and one who was sui iuris had the same rights 
(192). If a husband or father were infamis or a libertinus, he 
was permitted to accuse by the ius extranei, such categories 
otherwise being prohibited from prosecuting (193). A husband was 
. 
further exempt from the charge of calumnia should the prosecution 
fail (194). In one text, Paul also attributes this privilege to 
the father (195) s 
Iure mariti vel patris qui accusat, potest et sine calumniae poena 
vinci s si iure extranei accusat, potest calumniae poena puniri. 
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Elsewhere, however, he denies this (196) : 
Pater sine periculo calumniae non potest agere. 
Lenel (197) has suggested the insertion of the words 'qui iure" 
extranei accusat' after the 'pater' in the second excerpt. A more 
plausible emendation is the omission of the 'non' of this excerpt, 
since it is easy to see how a 'non' might have crept into the 
text. Scaevola (198) even denies this right to the husband, but 
since all of the other evidence ascribes it to him (199), this 
excerpt must be regarded with suspicion. 
If both husband and father wished to instigate proceedings, 
precedence was given to the former, as D. 48.5.3, cited above, 
shows :a father might take precedence over a husband only if the 
husband were discredited. Ulpian says elsewhere that if a husband 
is debarred from prosecuting because he holds a magistracy, both 
his right and that of the father should be suspended until the 
termination of the period of the magistracy (200). According to 
another text of Ulpian, if a husband instigates proceedings, time 
no longer runs for the father, whereas if an extraneus has begun a 
prosecution after the expiry of the 60 day period, he, (as has 
already been observed), has to give place to the husband, provided 
that the latter's failure to prosecute before was not due to 
negligence (201). A text of Papinian (202) suggests that if the 
woman's husband is dead, the father enjoys no special right : 
In accusationem viduae filiae non habet pater iua praecipuum. 
Ulpian attempts to explain the reasoning behind the 
preference granted to the husband over the father by the law s 
Si simul ad accusationem veniant maritus et pater mulieris, quem 
praeferri oporteat, quaeritur. et magic eat, ut maritus 
praeferatur : nam et propensiore ira et maiore dolore executurum 
eum accusationem credendum eat... (203) 
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This excerpt is comparable to D. 48.5.23(22) in which Papinian 
explains that greater restrictions are placed on the right of the 
husband to kill the adulteress than on that of the father because 
the husband would more easily be carried away by anger (204). It 
is indeed curious that, while the father enjoyed a less restricted 
ius necandi than did the husband, it was the latter who enjoyed 
precedence in prosecution. The explanations offered by the 
jurists are not particularly convincing : it is more likely that, 
while the law was designed to encourage the bringing of adulterous 
parties to trial (and it was fitting that the husband, as the 
wronged party, should instigate the trial in order to defend his 
honour), it was appropriate, in view of the ancient ius vitae 
necisgue of the pater, that he should enjoy the more extensive ius 
necandi. 
The jurists commented at great length on the Jus mariti vel 
atris and, judging from the nature of their comments, it is clear 
that, while Augustus laid down special rules for prosecution by a 
husband or father, these were developed by later enactments and 
especially by juristic interpretation. The provision of the 60 
day period during which the husband and father had exclusive 
rights were, no doubt, Augustan, as were the various exemptions 
and privileges outlined above which were granted to the husband 
and, in some cases, to the father. obviously, as the law was 
applied, questions arose concerning the exact extent of the ius 
mariti in particular. Might it be exercised with regard to a 
sponsa, a concubina, a uxor iniusta, a uxor voldaris and such 
like? A rescript of Severus and Antoninus evidently- laid down 
that as nsa might not be prosecuted cure mariti (205), but that 
she might be prosecuted for adultery iure extranei (206). 
According to Ulpian, the same applied in the case of a concubina 
(207)t 
Si uxor non fuerit in adulterio, concubina tarnen fuit, iure quidem 
mariti accusare earn non poterit, quae uxor non fuit, iure tarnen 
extranei accusationem instituere non prohibetur, si modo ea sit, 
quae in concubinatum se dando matronae nomen non amisit ut puta 
- 196 - 
quae patroni concubina fuit. 
It is very likely that this represents an extension of the lex 
Julia through juristic interpretation, as does another ruling 
mentioned by Ulpian (208) concerning the ex-prostitute wife, the 
uxor volgaris : 
Sed et in ea uxore potest maritus adulterium vindicare, quae 
volgaris fuerit.... 
In the same excerpt, Ulpian discusses the prosecution of a wife 
for incest, of a wife who has allegedly committed adultery before 
her marriage or who has been 'spud hostess or who committed 
adultery before the age of 12. Ulpian attributes to the husband, 
in these cases, the right to prosecute only iure extranei, apart 
from the case of the wife who has been 'spud hostess, who, he 
claims, may be prosecuted cure mariti. This is a very odd ruling 
which has led scholars to suggest various emendations (209). 
Thomas (210) proposes that Ulpian is, in fact, referring to the 
situation in which both husband and wife are 'spud hostess. 
Another important question discussed by the jurists was that 
-of the case of the iniusta uxor. We possess excerpts from the 
writings of Papinian and of Ulpian which are relevant to this 
issue : 
Civis Romanus, qui civem Romanam sine conubio sive peregrinam in 
matrimonio habuit, iure quidem mariti eam adulteram non Postulat 
(211). 
Plane sive iusta uxor fuit sive iniusta, accusationem instituere 
vir poterit : nam et Sextus Caecilius ait, haec lex ad omnia 
matrimonia pertinet... (212). 
The excerpt from Papinian states categorically that an iniusta 
uxor may not be prosecuted for adultery cure mariti, and it is 
therefore reasonable to assume that in the excerpt from Ulpian 
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prosecution iure extranei is envisaged. What is particularly 
interesting in the passage. of Ulpian is the fact that he defends 
the inclusion of iniustae uxores in a way which suggests that they 
were not originally envisaged in the application of the lex Iulia 
but came to be included through juristic interpretation. It is, 
indeed, very likely that Augustus was primarily concerned to deter 
Roman citizen women whose marriages were iusta from committing 
adultery, since their adultery posed a threat not only to the 
reputations of their husbands and families, but possibly also 
(since an adulterous woman might try to pass off another man's 
child as her husband's), to the purity of the citizen body. As 
the Roman citizenship spread during the centuries after Augustus, 
the significance attached to iustae nuptiae would have been 
gradually eroded, and this perhaps partly accounts for the later 
application of the precepts of the lex Iulia to 'omnia 
matrimonial. 
There are several other juristic excerpts preserved in 
Justinian's Digest relevant to the ius mariti vel patris. Some of 
the rules outlined are quite obscure and are very unlikely to have 
originated in the lex Iulia itself. Thus, for example, Papinian 
(213) discusses such questions as whether the sixty days granted 
exclusively to. the husband and father are 'dies utiles' and. 
whether the ius mariti may be exercised over a woman by a man to 
whom she was engaged although subsequently given by her father to 
another man. Ulpian discusses the issue of a woman's remarriage 
to her former husband after having been divorced by him for 
adultery (214), the committing of stuprum by a woman before her 
marriage (215), praescriptiones which. may be interposed against an 
accusing husband (216) and the remarriage of a woman in defiance 
of a prohibition by her divorcing husband (217). The jurist, 
Paul, discusses the issue of the remarriage of the alleged 
adulteress either to the adulterer or to her former husband (218) 
and Macer shows that the adulterous parties may not be prosecuted 
at the same time (219) although accomplices in the act may stand 
trial at the same time as either the adulterer or the adulteress. 
This may well have been an Augustan provision. 
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It is thus clear that, while Augustus drastically curtailed 
the rights of the husband and of the father of an adulteress to 
deal with the guilty parties privately, he nevertheless upheld 
their right to take action against a daughter or (particularly) a 
wife by the introduction of the privileged ius. Thus it was seen 
to be the duty and prerogative of the woman's husband primarily 
and, failing him, of her father, to instigate a public 
prosecution, which, however, was regulated by the terms of the lex 
Julia. 
Prosecution 'iure extranei' 
Prosecution iure extranei might take place either as soon as 
the husband (and, by implication, the father) had denounced any 
intention of prosecuting, or following the expiry of the 60 day 
period if neither the husband nor the father had taken advantage 
of the opportunity to instigate a prosecution. The period 
prescribed for prosecution iure extranei was four months : 
Extraneis autem, qui accusare possunt, accusandi facultas post 
maritum et patrem conceditur : nam post sexaginta dies quattuor 
menses extraneis dantur et ipsi utiles (220). 
The brevity of the prescribed period was presumably designed to 
bring alleged acts of adultery to justice without undue delay. 
This would help to ensure that such acts did not go unpunished. 
If divorce of the adulteress were delayed, no prosecution might be 
initiated more than 5 years after the committing of the offence : 
Hoc quinquennium observari legislator voluit, si reo vel rege 
stuprum adulterium vel lenocinium obiciatur (221). 
As has already been mentioned, various restictions were 
placed on a prosecution iure extranei. Thus the accuser might not 
be infamis, nor a libertinus, nor under 25 (222) and, if the 
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accusation should be unsuccessful, he was liable to an accusation 
of calumnia (223). Even if an extraneus had already begun 
proceedings, he had to give way to a husband who wished to 
prosecute iure extranei provided that the latter had good reason 
for not having acted sooner (224). 
An excerpt from Ulpian's second book of commentary de 
adulteriis in which he is describing a class of persons who may 
not be prosecuted for adultery, provides a purported quotation 
from the lex Iulia : 
Legis Iuliae de adulteriis capite septimo ita cavetur : 'ne quis 
inter reos referat eum qui tum sine detrectatione (retrectatione 
F) rei publicae causa aberit (225). 
Let no-one bring among the defendants a person who is at the time 
absent on public business without (attempt at) evasion. 
There is no evidence elsewhere to support the existence of such a 
provision and doubt has, therefore, been cast on it. Some 
scholars suspect the whole paragraph (226) while others suspect 
the 'sine detectratione'(227). 'Detrectatio' is rare, and does 
not appear in the juristic sources, but it does-appear in, for 
example, Livy, Tacitus and Pliny (228). It does not seem to be a 
common post-classical word. 'Detrectatio' does make more sense 
that "retrectatio', but the whole provision is indeed rather odd. 
Nevertheless, this does not provide sufficient justification for 
rejecting totally the evidence of this text. 
According to a constitution of Severus and Antoninus, the 
lex Julia contained a provision which forbade women to instigate 
prosecution for adultery (229) : 
Publico iudicio non habere mulieres adulterii accusationem, 
quamvis de matrimonio suo violato queri velint, lex Iulia 
declarat, quae cum masculis iure mariti facultatem accusandi 
detulisset, non idem feminis privilegium detulit. 
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It is also likely that the rule which forbade the prosecution of 
the adulterer and of the adulteress to take place simultaneously 
went back to the lex Iulia (230) : 
Si quis et adulterum et adulteram simul detulit, nihil agit. 
The prosecutor might choose which party to prosecute first unless 
the woman had remarried before the trial, in which case the 
adulterer was to be tried first (231) s 
Nuptam mihi adulteram ream postulari posse in priore matrimonio 
comissi dubium non est, cum aperte lege Iulia de adulteriis 
coercendis caveatur, si quidem vidua sit, de cuius adulterio 
agetur, ut accusator liberum arbitrium habest, adulterum an 
adulteram prius accusare malit : si vero nupta sit, ut prius 
adulterum peragat, tunc mulierem. 
The jurists describe various other rules relating to the ius 
extranei which are probably the result of interpretatio rather 
than originating with the lex Iulia. Thus Paul shows that no 
adjournment (dilatio) of an. adultery trial is permitted (232) and 
that not more than two " uxoris adulteri' may be prosecuted at one 
time (233). Elsewhere he discusses such issues as the exact 
reckoning of the 5 year period within which prosecution must take 
place (234), desisting from an accusation and bearing false 
witness (235). He also provides a description of the 'inscriptio 
libellorum" required by the lex lulia (iudiciorum) publicorum for 
adultery cases (236). Papinian says that a woman accused of 
adultery may not be defended in her absence (237) and discusses 
the case of a man who abandons the prosecution of his daughter-in- 
law because he hopes to profit from her dowry, of a woman who 
seeks a dilatio because she has an under-age child. He discusses 
issues relating to the accusation of calumnia (238) and to the 
abolitio of an adultery prosecution (239). 
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Rulings concerning slaves 
Slaves might be involved in an adultery trial either as 
defendants, or, more commonly, as witnesses, slaves being the most 
likely people to witness the adultery of their owners. In the 
latter case, the lex iulia, according to Papinian, gave to the 
husband and to the father of the alleged adulteress the exclusive 
right to torture slaves in order to make them produce such 
evidence, although a judge might extend this right to an extraneue 
if he saw fit (240). A constitution of Severus and Caracalla 
(241) suggests that this right was later extended to all extranei. 
The use of slaves to provide evidence is confirmed by D. 28.5.28.6 
(Ulpian 3 de adulteriis) : 
Haberi quaestionem lex iubet de servis ancillisve eius de quo vel 
de qua quaereretur, parentisve utriusque eorum, si ea mancipia ad 
usum ei a parentibus data sint. 
A woman accused of adultery was forbidden by the law to 
manumit or to sell any slave within 60 days of her divorce in 
order to prevent her from evading this provision of the law (242). 
If a slave were used as a witness he must subsequently be made 
public (243). Ulpian says that this rule was introduced so that 
the evidence of a slave would not be influenced by the prospect 
of punishment or reward on return to his master (244). Should the 
prosecution be unsuccessful, the value of the slave who had given 
evidence was to be estimated and paid to his master as restitution 
(245). 
Slaves might also be accused of adultery (246): 
Servos quoque adulterii posse accusari nulla dubitatio eat... 
Elsewhere, Ulpian specifically mentions the ninth chapter of the 
law in this connection (247) s 
Capite nono cavetur, si servus adulterii accusetur et accusator 
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quaestionem in eo haberi velit, duplum pretium domino praestari 
lex iubet... 
According to Papinian, however, slaves were not punished according 
to the terms of the lex lulia but by the terms of statutes which 
concerned slaves, such as the lex Aguilia (248). The lex Iulia 
ruled that, if the slave should be absolved, the accuser must pay 
to his owner twice the slave's value. 
Penalties 
The lex Julia clearly prescribed a variety of penalties for 
adultery, stuprum and other related offences (249) : 
Adulterii convictas mulieres dimidia parte dotis et tertia parte 
bonorum ac relegatione in insulam placuit coerceri : adulteris 
vero viris pari in insulam relegatione dimidiam bonorum partem 
auferri, dummodo in diversas insulas releguntur. 
This passage shows that the penalties differed slightly for women 
and for men. women convicted of adultery forfeited a half of 
their dowry and a third of their property, and were relegated to 
an island. Men convicted of adultery were also relegated to a 
(different) island and lost one half of their property. 
A passage from Justinian's Institutes suggests that, when 
the later distinction between honestiores and humiliores emerged, 
different penalties according to status were applied (250) : 
Poenam eadem lex irrogat peccatoribus, si honesti aunt, 
publicationem partis dimidiae bonorum, si humiles, corpus 
coercitionem cum relegatione. 
Thus releaatio became a penalty reserved for humiliores. That it 
was the penalty applied to offenders regardless of rank by the 
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terms of the lex Iulia is attested by the fate of Augustus' own 
daughter and granddaughter, who were punished for adultery by 
releaatio (251). 
One of the crimes embraced by the lex iulia seems to have 
incurred capital punishment (252) s 
Qui masculum liberum invitum stupraverit, capite punitur. 
This must have been regarded as the most heinous of all of the 
crimes embraced. The passage from Justinian's Institutes cited 
above also states, in fact, that the death penalty applies to 
'temeratores alienarum nuptiarum', but this could be a reference 
to the continuing (although limited) ius necandi of the pater. 
Esmein (253) argues that the death penalty was inflicted for 
adultery in later times as a result of trial by cognitio 
extraordinaria, and he cites CJ 9.9.9 (constitution of Alexander 
Severus) and CJ 2.4.18 (constitution of Diocletian) to support 
this. This may well be so, but there is no doubt, especially in 
the light of the well-attested imposition of the penalty of 
intestabilitas (see below), that the death penalty was not 
prescribed by the lex Iulia except for the crime mentioned. 
The penalty of intestabilitas, the inability to make a Roman 
will, is mentioned by Paul (254) : 
Qui voluntate sua stuprum flagitiumque impurum patitur, dimidia 
parte bonorum suorum multatur nec testamentum ei ex maiore, parte 
facere licet. 
Papinian discusses (255) the question of whether a person 
convicted of adultery might validly witness a Roman will and 
concludes that he may not. 
One final penalty attested in the sources was the 
prohibition against remarriage by a woman convicted of adultery on 
pain of involving her new husband in a charge of adultery (256): 
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Quod ait lex, adulterii damnatam si quis duxit uxorem, ea lege 
teneri. 
It is likely that the forfeiture of a part of the dowry of an 
adulteress was also designed to discourage her remarriage. 
As for the crime of lenocinium, this was very harshly 
punished z the same penalties seem to have been inflicted as were 
inflicted for adultery. Thus Papinian says that a person who 
knowingly provides his house for the committing of stuprum or 
adultery, or who makes some gain from his wife's adultery 'quasi 
adulter punitur' (257). The same is said by Marcian to apply to 
women, although, as has already been suggested, the extension of 
the rules regarding lenocinium to women may well have been a post- 
Augustan development (258) : 
Si uxor ex adulterio viri praemium acceperit, lege Iulia quasi 
adulter tenetur. 
Prohibition against the alienation of dotal land by husbands 
The final provision of the lex iulia de adulteriis 
coercendis, which, at first sight, seems to bear no relation to 
the other provisions, was a prohibition against a husband's 
alienation of dotal property s 
Lege Iulia de adulteriis cavetur, ne dotale praedium maritus 
invita uxore alienet (259). 
nam dotale praedium maritus invita muliere per legem Iuliam 
prohibetur alienare, quamvis ipsius sit, dotis causa ei datum 
(260). 
The relevance of such a provision to the lex lulia must be based 
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on the relationship between the issues of divorce and of dowry : 
dowry was clearly a very important issue in the event of divorce. 
Scholars also generally associate the rules concerning retentiones 
ex dote with the lex lulia : 
Retentiones ex dote fiunt auf propter liberos auf propter mores 
auf propter impensas auf propter res donatas auf propter res 
amotas (261). 
Morum nomine graviorum quidem sexta retinetur, leviorum autem 
octava. graviores mores"sunt adulteria tantum, leviores omnes 
reliqui (262). 
Esmein (263) parallels the provision of the lex lulia which 
regulated dowry with the iudicium de moribus attested in the 
Republic (264) c this provides further justification for the 
inclusion of such provisions in the lex lulia. 
The purpose and significance of the Ilex Julia de adulteriis 
coercendis' 
As in the case of the marriage laws, the lex Iulia de 
adulteriis coercendis, while no doubt regarded as severe by 
contemporary Romans, had what would have seemed, to those who 
hankered after Republican ideals, a laudable theme. If the 
catastrophes of the last years of the Republic were indeed due to 
Rome's decline from traditional moral standards, then the 
introduction of a law which penalised adultery so ruthlessly would 
have been in the interests of Rome's well-being. 
Similar questions to those which arose in attempting to 
determine the purpose of the marriage laws present themselves 
here. Was Augustus genuinely concerned about moral standards? 
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Did he wish to discourage adultery and stuprum among all orders of 
citizen? Did he have any motives beyond these? 
The first two questions need to be taken together. Any 
assessment of Augustus' concern for moral standards should be made 
against the background of traditional Roman morality. Marital 
infidelity in itself was not regarded in the ancient world as 
morally reprehensible. Thus, extra-marital sexual relations 
between a Roman citizen man and a lower-class woman were quite 
acceptable. What was unacceptable was adultery committed with a 
respectable citizen wife, for not only was this regarded as a 
gross affront to her husband and family and therefore improper, 
but it might also result in the birth of children of doubtful 
paternity and hence in "pollution" of a Roman citizen family and 
of the citizen body. The fact that the committing of adultery by 
a "respectable" man was not similarly regarded as an affront to 
his wife helps to explain why men had much more freedom in this 
area than did their wives. The attitude to sexual morality 
revealed in the lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis which, as has 
been shown, penalised adultery (as it penalised stuprum) only when 
it was committed with women of respectable status is thus a 
typically Roman one. Like the Republican censors, Augustus did 
not disapprove of nor penalise all acts of adultery nor of 
stuprum, but only those acts which were regarded as a threat to 
the name and honour of husbands and families, to the stability of 
society, to the purity of the citizen body and thus to the general 
well-being of Rome and to the reputation of Augustus as a restorer 
and bringer of prosperity. 
Nevertheless, the way in which Augustus carried through his 
"moral" purpose was by no means traditional. It has been observed 
that the punishment of adultery under the Republic was largely in 
the hands of patresfamiliarum, the regulation of the morality of 
individual citizens being regarded as the concern of the familia, 
so that intvervention by the censors or aediles was unusual. 
Augustus now greatly weakened the authority of fathers and of 
husbands to deal with alleged adulterers and clearly wished to 
4 
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ensure that such should, as often as possible, be brought to a 
public trial before the new guaestio de adulteriis. Adultery was 
thus transformed into a crime punishable by the terms of the lex 
iulia. While the encouragement of a return to ancient moral 
standards was a useful ideological banner and, indeed, was desired 
by Augustus, it is more significant that the authority and 
independent action of fathers and of husbands were curtailed in 
favour of uniformity and of control by the law over this area of 
life and this, I believe, was Augustus' primary purpose. It is 
easy to see parallels here with the aims of the marriage laws. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE *LEX AELIA SENTIA' AND THE 'LEX FUFIA CANINIA' 
THE 'LEX AELIA SENTIA' 
The lex Aelia Sentia was a law which placed restrictions on 
the manumission and enfranchisement of slaves, and regulated 
relations between patrons and ex-slaves. Its name associates it 
with the consulship of Sex. Aelius Cato and C. Sentius Saturninus in 
A. D. 4. It was thus passed a few years after the less complex lex 
Pufia Caninia (2 B. C. ) which also placed limits on , manumission. 
Both of these `laws belong to the latter part of the reign of 
Augustus when he seems to have ceased to pass plebiscita =which 
bore his own name in favour of leges which bore the names of the 
consuls. 
Neither Suetonius nor Dio specifically mentions the lex Aelia 
"Sentia, but it is clear that they both have this law in mind when 
describing certain enactments of Augustus. Two passages of Dio 
are relevant: (1)(2) 
7%ONXäwv -ý 74CO'"obs cCikfirws ýýFv(ýc-PoüvTcvý ýýFTaýE 
ýv TE n ý1 t, Ktocv Iv -rd v Te Epic-LOEPW6 ovrK -n vo( Kort -M% V 
o«4E9n6o c-vov Ü, c' autov tx&w gGk 6oi., FCIL Tbc SI oyUI LAXrac 
AS 0' Te hoc, 7V(ös 1T '5 EAEUt9e(0ly ft vows KpL" ocüro 
/o 
Se6wC TOCI 6jci%/ /EV 44 Vo( x't56OLVT0. 
... 
äiº%ots TE lac YT . )5 pr-ý r' 
äýC Eý1E v 6eýiw &. 
% navrosca -ov 6AAoo v 7cohLv AXq(w6 wCt 'r'av 'v N; J S 
X Avrc t. otV 6v5(voüs 6 rklw6LV rvoc ýcoAü Tö Dot opo OeüIis 
OS Tovs 5Aºýx0ovS ý. 
Suetonius provides a description of Augustus' general 
attitude towards the freeing of slaves and the expansion of the 
citizen body, and characteristically illustrates this with 
anecdotes (3). He then goes on to say: 
6 
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Servos non contentus multis difficultatibus a libertate et multo 
pluribus a libertate iusta removisse, cum et de numero et de 
condicione ac differentia eorum qui manumitterentur curiose 
cavisset, hoc quoque adiecit, ne vinctus unquam tortusve quis ullo 
libertatis genere civitatem adipisceretur. 
The main evidence, however, for the details of the lex Aelia 
Sentia comes from the juristic sources, notably the Institutes of 
Gaius and Justinian's-Digest which contains a chapter entitled 
'Qui et a quibus manumissi liberi non fiunt et ad legem Aeliam 
Sentiam' (4). Justinian's Digest also provides excerpts from 
books of commentary 'ad legem Aeliam Sentiam' written by the 
jurists Paul (3 books) and Ulpian (4 books) as well as various 
references to the lex Aelia Sentia and comments on issues 
relating to it, in excerpts drawn from a variety of juristic 
writings. There are references to a number of enactments passed 
after the lex Aelia Sentia which modified or supplemented its 
rules, and the common problem therefore arises of disentangling 
the original content of the law from subsequent amendments as well 
as from juristic interpretation. None of the evidence provides 
any verbatim quotation from the law. Moreover, no provision of 
the law is assigned by the jurists to any particular chapter, nor 
are the jurists' commentaries 'ad legem Aeliam Sentiam' 
particularly helpful in determining the order of provisions in the 
lex Aelia Sentia. Hence the order of the main provisions 
summarised below is merely one which seems to be logical and is 
proposed for convenience. (The provisions will be discussed in 
detail later). 
Manumission by a dominus under the age of 20 is void, unless for 
an honesta causa, accepted by a consilium, in which case 
manumission vindicta is valid. 
(The acceptance of a causa by a consilium is also necessary if a 
person under 20 wishes to free a slave informally) (5) 
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The consilium at Rome-consists of 5 senators and 5 eguites and is 
convened on certain specified days. In the provinces it consists 
of 20 recuperatores and is convened on the last day of the 
A slave manumitted under the age of 30 does not qualify for Roman 
citizenship unless he has been manumitted vindicta after the 
acceptance of a causa by the consilium. 
(A manumitted slave under the age of 30 who has acquired Latin 
status may become a Roman citizen if he marries a woman who is a 
Roman citizen, a Latin colonist or a freedwoman of his own status 
and has so testified before 7 Roman citizen witnesses above the 
age of puberty, and if he has a son of a year old and applies, 
with proof of this, to the praetor or provincial governor). (6) 
All legitimate births are to be registered within 30 days. 
Manumission in fraud of creditors is invalid, except for the 
purpose of instituting a necessarius heres. 
Manumission in fraud of patrons is invalid. 
Those slaves who have been put in chains, branded, convicted of a 
crime following torture, made to fight with men or beasts or put 
into a gladatorial school or prison, if freed, have the same 
status as peregrini dediticii. 
A patron may fozmally accuse a freedman as ingratus. 
A patron may not compel his ex-slave to swear an oath that he/she 
will not marry and have children. 
A patron who fails to support his ex-slave forfeits his right to 
what was laid down as a condition of manumission, and, in some 
cases, to the inheritance and to bonorum possessio. 
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A patron may not force his ex-slave to pay money in lieu of 
operae. 
Manumission by a'dominus' under the age of 20 
The ruling which made void manumission by a person under the 
age of 20, unless a just causa had been accepted by the 
consilium, is stated by Gaius (7) s 
Item eadem lege minori 7IX annorum domino non aliter manumittere 
permittitur, quam [si] vindicta apud consilium iusta causa 
manumissionis adprobata [fuerit]. 
This is confirmed by Ulpian (8) who, however, omits any mention of 
"vindicta': 
Fadem lea eum dominum, qui minor viginti annorum est, prohibet 
servum manumittere, praeterquam si causam apud consilium 
probaverit. 
Some scholars wish to emend Gaius, Insts. 1.38 by omitting 
'vindicta', and this would bring it into line with Ulpian (9). 
However, if 'vindicta' be omitted, the implication is that 
manumission by will as well as vindicta was permitted after the 
acceptance of a causa by the consilium. It seems much more 
reasonable . that a causa should be accepted in order that 
manumission might take place immediately before a magistrate. The 
text certainly needs emending : if 'vindicta' be the subject of 
'adprobata fuerit' (which would in any case be very odd), then 
'iusta causa' does not fit into the sentence at all. Other 
scholars suggest deleting 'si' and 'fuerit', or replacing 'Si 
vindicta' with 'vindicta ei'. This last proposed emendation is 
supported by David & Nelson (10) who suggest that the expansion of 
this section by Justinian's codifiers (11) to '... quam si vindicta 
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apud consilium iusta causa manumissionis adprobata fuerint 
manumissi' is based on the wording of Gai. Insts. 1.18 (regarding 
the exclusion of slaves under 30 from citizenship), where we finds 
'... quam si vindicta, apud consilium iusta causa manumissionis 
adprobata, liberati fuerint'. Given the fact that this latter 
section of Gai. Insts. 1.18 and that of 1.38 are parallel 
passages, and given the similarity of the wording of each, I would 
favour emending the 1.38 passage to bring it exactly into line 
with 1.18. 
We possess a number of juristic excerpts in which manumission 
by a dominus under 20 is discussed : there is no doubt that the 
rules laid down in many of them are the result of juristic 
interpretation rather than having originated in the lex Aelia 
Sentia. Gaius comments that, whereas it is legitimate for a 
person of 14 years old to make a will, to institute heirs and to 
leave legacies, yet, if he is under 20, he may not free a slave 
(12). 
Ulpian (13) provides a definition of 'minor viginti annis' 
and excludes from it a person who 'diem supremum agit anni 
vicesimi'. Modestinus shows that a filiusfamilias who is under 
20 may free a slave with the authority of his paterfamilias, since 
the latter is the true manumitter (14), while according to Paul, a 
person under 20 may manumit a slave in order to fulfill a 
condition in a will (15). Ulpian says (16) that a person under 
20 may manumit if asked to do so er fideicommissum provided that 
the slave is not his own (17) and Pomponius that if a person under 
20 has asked his heir to free his (the heir's) slave, the 
manumission is valid (18). In the opinion of Paul, an under 20 
who holds a slave in pignus may give assent to the manumission 
(19), since, while his consent is necessary, he is not the dominus 
and therefore not the manumitter. 
While in these cases the law was interpreted leniently, other 
juristic excerpts reveal greater severity of interpretation. It 
is clear that attempts were made to circumvent the restriction 
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imposed by the lex Aelia Sentia, and that subsequent enactments 
were needed in order to close loopholes. According to Marcellus 
(20), if an under 20 sells a slave in order that he should be 
freed, the sale is void, even if the slave has been handed over 
and even if the master intends that the manumission should only 
take place after he has reached the age of 20 (21). Paul says 
that if a man under 20 hands over his part in a common slave to be 
freed, nothing is achieved (22). In the same book of commentary, 
he says that if a person under 20 releases a debtor on condition 
that he promises to manumit a slave, the stipulation is void (23). 
Other rules mentioned by the jurists were certainly not 
Augustan. Thus, for example, Pomponius (24) says that the 
prohibition against testamentary manumission by an under 20 
extends to military wills and this is comfirmed by Marcellus (25). 
Since, however, the military will was not introduced until much 
later (26), this cannot have been a rule of the original lex. In 
addition, Gaius (27) asserts that it is necessary for an under 20 
to have a causa approved by a consilium if he wishes to free his 
slave informally. This is a very surprising statement, given 
that slaves freed informally at this time were not regarded as 
legally free and depended on the intervention of the praetor for 
the upholding of their limited rights. Following the passage of 
the lex Iunia, however, (which I place in A. D. 19), such slaves 
became Latina luniani and legally free, and it therefore seems 
much more likely that the extension of the rule of the lex Aelia 
Sentia under discussion to the informal manumission of slaves took 
place at some stage after A. D. 19 (28). 
There is also evidence for Imperial constitutiones which laid 
down further rulings relating to the provision of the lea Aelia 
Sentia on manumission by an under 20. According to a 
constitution of Severus and Antoninus (29), if a person over 20 
makes a codicil bestowing liberty, the fact that the confirming 
will was made when he was under 20 is immaterial. Julian 
mentions a rule (30) which is elsewhere attributed to a 
constitution of Alexander (31) that if an under 20 gives a slave 
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to someone else to be freed, the manumission is void. 
It was laid down in the lex Aelia Sentia that an under '20 
might manumit if he had had a causa approved by a consilium. 
The jurists discuss at length what should be regarded as a iusta 
causa. According to Ulpian (32) 1 
Illud in causis probandis meminisse iudices oportet, ut non ex 
luxuria sed ex affectu descendentes causas probent s neque enim 
deliciis, sed iustis affectionibus dedisse iustam libertatem 
legem Aeliam Sentiam credendum. 
Gaius (33) describes as a just cause the desire to manumit a 
father or mother, teacher or fosterbrother. The same applies to 
the manumission of a natural son or daughter, brother or sister, 
of a fosterchild, of a slave whom the manumitter intends to have 
as a procurator, or of a slave-woman whom the manumitter intends 
to marry (34). Ulpian provides a similar list: (35_) 
si collactaneus, si educator, si paedogogus ipsius, si nutrix, vel 
filius filiave cuius eorum, vel alumnus, vel capsarius, (id eat 
qui portat libros) (36), vel si in hoc manumittatur, ut procurator 
sit, du odo non minor annis decem et octo sit. 
These causae listed by Gaius and by Ulpian may well have been 
those outlined in the lex Aelia Sentia. Other juristic excerpts 
mention rules which look more like the result of interpretation. 
Thus Gaius (37) mentions a juristic controversy over whether the 
desire of a pupillus to manumit a slave in order to make him a 
tutor is an acceptable causa. He believes that this does not 
constitute a valid causa on the ground that a person who needs the 
help of a tutor to run his affairs does not have sound enough 
judgment to choose a tutor. However, as Buckland (38) points 
out, this purported reason is not very convincing, and it is 
surely more relevant that by the terms of the Republican lex 
Atilia certain magistrates had the right to appoint a tutor to a 
pupillus who lacked one. 
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Paul (39) provides further examples of causae: if a slave has 
helped his master in battle; defended him against robbers; 
restored him to health; uncovered an ambush. He adds that each 
case had, however, to be taken on its own merit. Similarly, 
Marcianus (40) includes among iustae causae the case in which a 
slave has freed his master 'periculo vitae infamiaeve'. 
Elsewhere (41), he discusses the case of foster children (alumni) 
and says that, while it is more natural for women to free them, 
men may also do so, and that a foster-child may be freed who has 
gained his master's favour in the course of his upbringing. 
Julian says that a common slave may be freed by his masters 
who are under 20 even though the causa has been approved by one 
'ex sociis' (42), presumably meaning in the case of one of them 
being a member of the consilium. According to Paul (43), a 
pupillus who is not infans may free apud consilium with the 
authority of his tutor, provided that the peculium does not pass 
(44). A person under 20 may validly sell his part in a common 
slave with a view to manumission only if he can show a causa (45). 
In the case of a slave being given or sold to an under 20 in 
order to be freed, Papinian mentions a constitution of Marcus 
Aurelius (46) which provides that*the slave should automatically 
be freed even if the recipient does not actually manumit him. 
Ulpian mentions the same constitutio Marci (47). and says it made a 
causa superfluous in such a case. On the other hand, another 
text of Ulpian (48) states that, in this case, it is necessary for 
the manumitter to show a causa, that is, either the lex donationis 
or some evidence of the intention of the giver. it is odd that 
here Ulpian does not mention the constitutio Marci and its 
effects, and it is hardly likely that he had forgotten about it. 
Buckland (49) suggests that Ulpian is here talking about the need 
which might sometimes have arisen of referring a case to the 
consilium if the praetor were not satisfied with the circumstances 
of the manumission. If this is so, it is strange that Ulpian 
should use the term 'causam ... probare', but there seems to be no 
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more satisfactory explanation of the conflict between these texts. 
. The jurists also discuss the issue of trusts which, as in the 
case of the marriage laws, must have been seen as a means of 
evading the terms of the lex. A constitution of Alexander ruled 
that a person under 20 might not, in his will, leave liberty by a 
trust (50) . It is surprising that this important issue should 
have been clarified so late: the constitution probably merely 
confirmed what had already been established by the jurists. Thus 
Ulpian says that a person under 20 may manumit er fideicommissus 
provided that he would have been able to show a causa had he freed 
when alive: only in this case is the gift valid (51). If a trust 
of liberty is made to an under 20, according to Papinian it is 
necessary for this person to show a causa (52): he contrasts this 
with the case mentioned above of a gift or sale of a slave in 
which the constitutio Marci intervenes to make the causa 
unnecessary (53). Presumably the causa needed is evidence of the 
fideicommissum, and this explains why in other texts which deal 
with this subject there is no mention of the need for a causa to 
be shown (54). Paul says that where a person under 20 has been 
given a trust of liberty or has bought a slave in accordance with 
the law, the sale of the slave with a view to manumission, is 
valid (55). 
An important causa which made it permissible for an under 20 
to free a slave woman was intended marriage. This rule was, no 
doubt, established by the lex Aelia Sentia but expanded upon by 
the jurists. Marcian says that women may free matrimonii causa 
but only if they have themselves been slaves and a fellow-slave 
has been left in a legacy. He addes that even a spado may free 
for this reason, but not a castratus (56). There were, however, 
various limitations on the right. Ulpian mentions a subsequent 
senatusconsultum which stipulated that the man must marry the 
woman within six months of her manumission (57). This is 
confirmed by Justinian (58). Celsus says (59) that if the woman 
was pregnant when manumitted before the consilium, and she 
meanwhile (presumably before marriage or the expiry of 6 months) 
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gives birth, the status of the child will be in the balance. The 
manumitter must not, of course, belong to a class to whom marriage 
to an ex-slave is forbidden (60) and, according to Paul, if two 
people (presumably joint owners) free a woman matrimonii causa, 
this is unacceptable (61). Modestinus says that a woman may not 
be freed matrimonii causa by anyone other than the man who wishes 
to marry her (62). If a third party does marry such a woman and 
subsequently divorces her to allow the manumissor to marry her 
within the 6 month period, the manumission is still invalid. 
According to Licinius Rufus, a slave-woman who is freed matrimonii 
causa may not marry anyone else unless the patron renounces his 
right to her (63). A controversial text of Ulpian (64) 
attributes to the lex lulia de maritandis ordinibus a prohibition 
also against divorce by the freedwoman. This apparent double 
prohibition has been the cause of considerable controversy among 
scholars, and has been discussed in Chapter 2. obviously the 
prohibition was designed to prevent a slave woman from gaining her 
freedom by agreeing to marry her master and subsequently divorcing 
him. 
According to Marcianus (65), a rescript of Antoninus Pius 
laid down that if a causa has been accepted, liberty must be 
granted: approved causae may not be revoked. Similarly, a 
constitution of Valerian (66) provided that ' si probata causa 
libertas praestita eat, restitutio in integrum contra libertatem 
locum habere non potest. ' 
Gains describes the consilium which had to approve a causa 
before manumission by a person under 20 might proceed (67): 
Consilium autem adhibetur in urbe Roma quidem quinque senatorum et 
quinque equitum Romanorum puberum (68); in provinciis autem 
viginti recuperatorum civium Romanorum, idque fit ultimo die 
conventus: sed Romae certis diebus apud consilium manumittuntur. 
This is confirmed by Ulpian (69): 
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In consilio autem adhibentur Romae quinque senatores et quinque 
equites Romani, in provinciis viginti reciperatores cives Romani. 
we also have two inscriptions (70) which provide evidence for the 
existence of such a consilium to deal with manumissions. 
The jurists provide a few comments on the consilium: Pomponius 
says (71) that a pupillus may manumit before a praetor who is also 
his tutor. According to Paul (72), a person may appear before a 
consilium in a province other than his own. Ulpian comments (73) 
that a consul who is under 20 may not preside over the manumission 
of his own slave (74). 
Manumission of a slave who is under 30 
Whereas previously a slave formally manumitted automatically 
became a Roman citizen (75), the lex Aelia Sentia placed 
restrictions on the acquiring of citizenship by slaves manumitted 
when under 30: 
Quod autem de aetate servi requiritur, lege Aelia Sentia 
introductum est. nam ea lex minores xxx annorum servos non aliter 
voluit manumissos cives Romanos fieri, quam si vindicta, apud 
consilium iusta causa manumissionis adprobata, liberati fuerint. 
lusta autem causa manumissionis est veluti si quis filium filiamve 
auf fratrem sororemve naturalem, auf alumnum, auf paedagogum, auf 
servum procuratoris habendi gratia, auf ancillam matrimonii causa, 
apud consilium manumittat (76). 
Eadem lege cautum est, ut minor triginta annorum serous vindicta 
manumissus civis Romanus non fiat, nisi apud consilium causa 
probata fuerit: ideo sine consilio manumissum Caesaris servum 
manere putat. Testamento vero manumissum perinde haberi iubet, 
atque si domini voluntate in libertate esset, ideoque Latinus fit 
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(77). 
Thus, according to Gaius, slaves of under 30 who have been freed 
only become Roman citizens if the manumission was vindicta, 
following the approval of a causa by the consilium. Ulpian's 
version makes it clear that it is only in the case of manumission 
vindicta that a causa needs to be shown and, like Gaius, he says 
that without the approval of such by the consilium, the ex-slave 
does not become a citizen if he is under 30. He adds that a 
slave under 30 who has been freed by will is placed in much the 
same position as a slave who is 'domini voluntate in libertate' 
and thus has Latin status. According to Gaius (78), a 
senatusconsultum forbade a testator 'proprium servum minorem annis 
xxx liberum et heredem instituere. ' What was added to the ruling 
of the lex Aelia Sentia by the senatusconsultum is not clear, 
since there could have been no doubt that a freedslave who was 
debarred from citizenship by the lex Aelia Sentia might not be 
instituted heir. David & Nelson (79) believe that the sc 
clarified the position of a freed slave on reaching the age of 30, 
while others think that 'senatusconsulto' should be emended to 
'lege Aelia Sentia'. Perhaps the principle had to be clarified 
because of attempts to evade the law. Gaius goes on to say that, 
according to the prevalent opinion, a slave may lawfully be 
ordered to be free on reaching the age of 30, and may then have 
the inheritance transferred to him. This is confirmed by other 
texts (80). 
The'very odd phrase, 'ideo sine consilio manumissum Caesaris 
servum manere putat', in the text of Ulpian cited, has been the 
subject of considerable controversy. It seems to be explaining 
what happens to a slave freed vindicta but sine consilio, but 
makes little sense as it stands. There is no subject for 'putat' 
unless one supplies 'lex' which, in respect of sense, is highly 
unlikely, and there are even greater problems with the sense of 
'Caesaris servum manere'. Vangerow (81) believes that the 
sentence is a gloss, while other scholars have suggested various 
emendations, most of which replace 'Caesaris' with a suitable 
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subject for 'putat', such as 'senatus' or the name of a jurist or 
a law. The implication of all such emendations is that, according 
to some enactment (or in the opinion of a jurist), a slave under 
30 who has been freed vindicta sine consilio remains a slave. If 
'Caesaris' be retained, the sentence could be referring to the 
exemption of Imperial slaves from the requirement of vindicta in 
order to be freed, but this still leaves 'putat' without a subject 
and does not fit well into the context. Since all of the proposed 
emendations are rather speculative, and since the sentence looks 
suspiciously like a gloss, I would favour rejecting it altogether. 
In any case, the sense resulting from most of the proposed 
emendations seems to me to be contradicted by the preceding words 
of Ulpian (82): here he says that a slave manumitted vindicta 
does not become a Roman citizen if he is under 30 (not that such a 
person remains a slave in which case he would, of course, not 
become a Roman ccitizen) unless a causa has been approved by the 
consilium. 
If a slave under 30 who had been freed vindicta sine consilio 
did not remain a slave, what then was his status? It was 
presumably the same as that of a slave under 30 who had been freed 
testamento, in which case a causa was irrelevant. According to 
Ulpian, in the text cited, he was in much the same position as one 
who 'domini voluntate in libertate esset'. He is referring here 
to slaves who have not been manumitted by one of the three formal 
methods, that is, vindicta, testamento or censu but have been 
informally freed. A man might, for example, free a slave by 
merely declaring him free 'inter amicos': such an act did not 
result in freedom in the eyes of the civil law, but, from the late 
Republic, the praetor might intervene at his discretion to grant 
de facto liberty to the slave who would then be termed 'in 
libertate'. Gaius (83) refers to such persons as having been 
formerly slaves by the ius Quiritum but now 'auxilio praetoris in 
libertatis forma servari solitos' and adds that their possessions 
belonged to their patrons as peculium. The Fragmentum Dositheanum 
(84) suggests that the de facto liberty was confined to freedom 
from the obligation to work for a master. Obviously they did not 
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become citizens. 
Ulpian's words 'ideoque Latinus fiat' raise the issue of 
Latinity and the lex lunia. In the text of Gaius cited (85), the 
jurist describes the effect of the lex Iunia on slaves in 
libertate who received the protection of the praetors 
... postea vero per legem Iuniam eos omnes, quos praetor in 
libertate tuebatur, liberos esse coepisse et appellatos esse 
Latinos Iunianos. 
He adds that the lex tunia, while making these slaves legally 
free, did not make them citizens, and that those who have freed 
them still have a right to their possessions on their death. 
The association of Latin status with the lex Aelia Sentia has 
led some scholars to believe that this law must have been later 
than the lex iunia which introduced the category of Latini 
luniani (86). They would argue that the isolated reference in 
Justinian's institutes (87) to the lex Iunia Norbana is 
insufficient ground for associating the lex iunia with the year 
A. D. 19 when, according to the Fasti, lunius and Norbanus were 
consuls. However, there is no evidence which associates the law 
firmly with any other date (88) and it seems very arbitrary to 
select a date on other, less secure, grounds. Moreover, it is 
significant that in one text, Gaius uses the term 'per legem 
Aeliam Sentiam at Iuniam' (89), perhaps implying that the lex 
Iunia was the later law. Sherwin White (90) also argues that the 
amendments to the lex lunia mentioned by Gaius (91) and by Ulpian 
(92), which belonged to the years 23 to 65 A. D., look like "the 
amendment of a recent and imperfect statute rather than the 
revival of interest in a law passed some 40 years earlier". More 
significantly, if the lex Iunia followed closely on the lex Aelia 
Sentia, it is easy to see how the jurists would have written as 
though Latin status already existed at the time of the enactment 
of the lex Aelia Sentia: Ulpian's words cited above, 'ideoque 
Latinus fit' do not imply that the lex Aelia Sentia made the 
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person concerned a Latin, but that he was then (that is, after the 
enactment of the lex Iunia) a Latin. There are, in fact, other 
problems associated with placing the lex lunia in A. D. 19, not 
least the provision assigned by Gaius to the lex Aelia Sentia 
which permitted a slave manumitted before the age of 30 (who 
before the lex Iunia would legally have still been a slave) to 
apply for citizenship upon marrying a citizen woman or Latin 
colonist and having a son (93). Nevertheless, the most 
satisfactory explanation seems to me to be that the lex Aelia 
Sentia gave to slaves under 30 who had been freed vindicta sine 
consilio the status already enjoyed by slaves freed informally 
whose de facto freedom was protected by the praetor, and that the 
lex Iunia subsequently classed them as Junian Latins. Since the 
lex lunia followed on so closely after the lex Aelia Sentia, the 
jurists tended to treat the rules introduced by both laws as 
though they had been laid down at the same time. 
Gains (94) lists those causae which provide acceptable 
grounds for the enfranchisement of a slave under 30 on 
manumission: 
Iusta autem causa manumissionis est veluti si quis filium filiamve 
auf fratrem sororemve naturalem, auf alumnum, auf paedagogum, auf 
servum procuratoris habendi gratia, auf ancillam matrimonii causa 
apud consilium (95) manumittat. 
Such cases came before the same consilium as did cases involving a 
master under 20. In addition to these causae, Gaius and Ulpian 
say that a slave under 30 becomes a citizen when granted freedom 
in the will of an insolvent master to whom he is solus et 
necessarius heres: 
Ab eo domino qui solvendo non eat serous testamento liber ease 
iussus et heres institutes, et si minor sit triginta annis vel in 
ea causa sit, ut dediticius fieri debeat, civis Romanus et heres 
fits si tamen alius ex eo testamento nemo heres sit. (96) (97) 
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The freedom given by the lex Aelia Sentia to an insolvent master 
to manumit a slave by will and to institute him as solus et 
necessarius heres is confirmed in Justinian's Institutes (98) 
where, however, there is no mention of the case of a slave who is 
under 30. Since the texts in Justinian's Digest which deal with 
this aspect of the lex Aelia Sentia also make this omission (99), 
it is reasonable to suppose that the provision mentioned by Gaius 
and Ulpian was no longer applicable by the time of Justinian. 
According to Gaius, the lex Aelia Sentia designated the means 
whereby a slave under 30 who became a Latin on manumission might 
subsequently achieve Roman citizenship: 
Statim enim ex lege Aelia Sentia minores triginta annorum 
manumissi et Latini facti si uxores duxerint vel cives Romanas vel 
Latinas coloniarias vel eiusdem condicionis cuius et ipsi essent, 
idque testati fuerint adhibitis non minus quarr septem testibus 
civibus Romanis puberibus, et filium procreaverint, cum is filius 
anniculus esse coeperit, datur eis potestas per eam legem adire 
praetorem vel in provinciis praesidem provinciae, at adprobare se 
ex lege Aelia Sentia uxorem duxisse et ex ea filium anniculum 
haberes et si is apud quem causa probata eat, id ita esse 
pronuntiaverit, tunc et ipse Latinus at uxor eius, si et ipsa 
[eiusdem condicionis sit, et filius, si et ipse] (100) eiusdem 
condicionis sit, cives Romani esse iubentur. (101) 
Thus, such a person merely had to present to the praetor or 
to the provincial governor evidence of possessing a one year old 
child, the offspring of a marriage with a Roman citizen woman, a 
Latin colonist or a woman of his own status. Gaius adds that 
according to a sc of the time of Hadrian, if the wife is a Roman 
citizen, the child will be born a Roman citizen (par. 30) and that 
another sc of the time of Vespasian extended the right to all ex- 
slaves who became Latins on manumission, not just to those under 
30 (par. 31). Furthermore, if the Latin dies before he can make 
his claim, the mother, if a Latin, may make it and thus gain 
citizenship for herself and for her child. If not, the son's 
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tutors or the son himself on reaching puberty may make the claim, 
and if the son is born a Roman citizen because he has a Roman 
citizen mother, he must prove his status in order to become suus 
heres to his father (par. 32). Gaius goes on to describe various 
other later enactments which granted citizenship to a slave who 
has become a Latin on manumission if he serves for 6 years in 
the vigiles at Rome, completes 3 years of military service, builds 
a certain size of ship for importing corn to Rome over a period of 
6 years, spends a certain amount of money on a house at Rome or 
produces a specified daily amount of wheat for 3 years 
(pars. 32b-34). In order to achieve citizenship on reaching the 
age of 30, a Latin must be manumitted again by one of the three 
formal methods (par. 35) (102). 
These rulings are confirmed by Ulpian (103) who, however, 
attributes to the lex lunia the provision which granted 
citizenship to a slave under 30 who has become a Latin on 
manumission and subsequently, having married a Roman citizen or 
Latin wife liberorum guaerendorum causa, is able to demonstrate to 
the praetor or to the praeses that he has a child of one year old 
from this union. If Ulpian is right, a major objection to placing 
the lex lunia chronologically after the lex Aelia Sentia would be 
removed, that is, the absurdity of a situation whereby a slave in 
libertate (the status of a slave manumitted under the age of 30 
after the lex Aelia Sentia but before the lex Iunia if this be the 
later law) might contract a valid marriage with a Roman citizen 
woman or a woman of Latin status and subsequently gain citizenship 
on providing evidence of having a child of one year old from the 
union. On the other hand, Gaius' treatment of this topic is more 
detailed than that of Ulpian, and he clearly attributes this 
ruling to the lex Aelia Sentia (104). If the later date for the 
lex Iunia be maintained, the only explanation for the apparent 
absurdity and for the contradiction between the two jurists is 
that, as has already been observed, the lex Iunia was passed very 
soon after the lex Aelia Sentia, and because the content of the 
two laws was, in some respects, closely related, the jurists 
sometimes treated them as one enactment when considering the joint 
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effects of the two laws, as, for example, they often treated the 
lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus and the lex Papia Poppaea. Thus 
Gaius, in describing the status of, children born from certain 
marriages, mentions the granting of conubium 'per legem Aeliam 
Sentiam et Iumiam' (105) (106). The ruling concerning the 
offspring of the marriage between a Latin and certain specified 
women cannot, even for a short time, have applied to people who 
were still legally slaves, and must, therefore, have been 
introduced with the lex lunia, but since it concerned a group of 
people who formed a distinct category as a result of the lex 
Aelia Sentia, it is not difficult to see how Gaius might assign 
the ruling to the lex Aelia Sentia when he is considering the 
effects of the two laws together (107). 
It is worthwhile observing here the close link between the 
marriage laws and the manumission laws of this period. A text in 
Justinian's Digest (108) which is taken from Paul's second book of 
commentary ad lecem Iuliam et Papiam provides a definition of the 
term 'anniculus' and this might be cited as evidence that the 
provision regarding anniculi probatio first appeared in the 1ex 
Iulia de maritandis ordinibus. Certainly a ruling of this nature 
would have fitted in well with the content of the lex Iulia, 
providing as it did an incentive to would-be citizens to marry and' 
procreate. However, the evidence provided by the Digest text is 
far too ambiguous to justify associating this ruling with the lex 
Iulia, and there is no other evidence to suggest such an 
association. There is no reason why encouragement to would-be 
citizens to procreate should not have been introduced by the lex 
Iunia, given that all of these laws were passed within a short 
period. The close association between the marriage and 
manumission laws is further borne out by the content of an 
inscription dated to A. D. 62 (109) which provides evidence for the 
introduction of an obligation to register citizen births and 
includes the words '... nomina eorum qui e lege Papia Poppaea et 
Aelia Sentia liberos apud se natos sibi professi aunt... ' (110). 
This ruling has already been discussed under the lex Papia 
Poppaea. 
- 242 - 
Manumission in fraud of creditors or of patrons 
The lex Aelia Sentia placed further restrictions on the 
manumission of slaves: manumissions in fraud of creditors or of 
patrons were void : 
Nam is qui (111) in fraudem creditorum vel in fraudem patroni 
manumittit, nihil agit, quia lex Aelia Sentia inpedit 
libertatem (112). 
Eadem lex in fraudem creditoris et patroni manumittere 
prohibet. (113) 
A definition of manumission in fraud of creditors is found in 
Justinian's Institutes: 
In fraudem autem creditorum manumittere videtur, qui vel iam eo 
tempore quo manumittit solvendo non est, vel qui datis 
libertatibus desiturus est solvendo esse (114). 
The passage goes on to say that a manumissor is only guilty if his 
defrauding of creditors is conscious and deliberate. The text is 
based on a passage of Gaius found in Justinian's Digest (115) 
where, however, there is no mention of the intentions of the 
manumissor. However, in the same text, Gaius mentions situations 
in which a manumissor who breaks this rule of the lex is not 
guilty of fraus, thus indicating that intentions were indeed 
relevant (116). 
Paul seems to have discussed this issue in more than one 
book of commentary ad lege aa Aeliam Sentiam : 
Ne quis creditorum fraudandorum causa servum manumittat, hac lege 
cavetur: creditores autem appellantur, quibus quacumque ex causa 
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actio cum fraudatore competat (117). 
The jurists describe various rules relating to this aspect of the 
law, many of which are, no doubt, the result of juristic 
interpretation. Paul discusses, in his third book of commentary, 
issues such as manumission by a person who owes under a condition 
(in which case a slave becomes a statuliber while the condition 
pends), and the prohibition against manumission by a son acting 
with the approval of his father who is not solvent if either of 
them is aware of this (118). He also mentions the inclusion of 
debtors to the fiscus in this ruling of the lex sa comparable 
text of Marcian (119) shows that this rule was introduced by later 
enactments. 
In an excerpt taken from his first book of commentary ad 
legem Aeliam Sentian (120), Paul argues that an insolvent testator 
may make free and institute as heir a person to whom he owes 
freedom by a fideicommissum because this is not done in order to 
defraud creditors (121). Elsewhere (122) Paul says that if an 
inheritance has become insolvent by the time of the entry of the 
heir, testamentary manumissions will be ineffectual, but if the 
inheritance has become solvent, they will be valid. A comparable 
text of Julian (123) explains that the validity of freedom granted 
in a codicil depends on the intention of the manumissor at the 
time of the drawing up of the codicil, not at the time of its 
confirmation in a will. Another text of Julian (124) states 
that if an inheritance is insolvent, the wealth of the heir cannot 
save testamentary manumissions (125). Julian goes on to show 
that this provision of the law is not contravened when an 
insolvent testator grants freedom on the condition that his 
creditors have been paid (126), but it is contravened when one of 
two slaves pledged as a gift is freed. Paul says (127) that 
slaves freed in fraud of creditors become statuliberi while it is 
uncertain whether the creditors will pursue their claims (128). 
According to Hermogenianus (129), manumission in fraud of 
creditors occurs no less if the debt is conditional or 'in diem' 
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than if the time for paying has expired. He adds that, in the 
case of a conditional legacy, the legatee does not qualify as a 
creditor before the condition is met, even though a legatarius 
does in other cases, as does a fideicommissarius. No exemption 
is made in the case of a well-deserving slave, according to 
Pomponius (130). Terentius Clemens (131) discusses the case of a 
debtor who frees more than one slave, and shows that the freedom 
of all is not invalidated. Both Ulpian (132) and Julian (133) 
mention the important exception that manumission in fraud of 
creditors is permissible for the sake of instituting a solus et 
necessarius heres, and this is confirmed in Justinian's Institutes 
(134). A text of Africanus (135) states that a military will 
which grants freedom in fraud of creditors is not exempt from the 
rule. This was certainly not an original provision of the lex 
Aelia sentia, given that (as has already been mentioned) the 
military will was not introduced until much later. 
The prohibition against manumission in fraud of creditors 
initially applied only to Roman citizens, but, according to Gaius, 
it was extended to peregrini by an sc of the time of Hadrian: 
In summa sciendum eat, cum (136) lege Aelia Sentia cautum sit, ut 
creditorum fraudandorum causa manumissi liberi non fiant, hoc 
etiam ad peregrinos'pertinere senatus ita censuit ex auctoritate 
Hadriani, cetera vero iura eius legis ad peregrinos non pertinere 
(137). 
The ruling against manumission in fraud of patrons is not 
mentioned in Justinian's Institutes and scarcely in the Digest 
(138), but was clearly part of the lex Aelia Sentia, as 
Gai. Insts. 1.37 and Ulp. Ree . 1.11, cited above, show. 
There is no 
indication in the Justinianic evidence of this specific rule 
having been revoked, and scholars have therefore suggested that it 
was included in the general revocation of acts committed in fraud 
of patrons (139). The problem with this view is the absence of 
any mention of manumission in the Digest title concerning such 
acts (140), but it is not possible to find a more satisfactory 
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explanation. It is hardly likely that the rule had merely fallen 
into desuetude. 
The two Digest texts which do seem to bear some relation to 
manumission in fraud of patrons are not at all -informative. A 
text of Paul (141) merely states that a patron is not defrauded if 
he has consented to an act of his freedman, and since this is 
taken from his third book of commentary ad legem Aeliam Sentiam, 
it may be assumed that manumission in fraud of creditors is being 
discussed. In the other text (142), Gaius mentions manumission in 
fraud of patrons in connection with his discussion 'de liberali 
causa', but does not shed any light on this issue. The lack of 
evidence makes it difficult to ascertain exactly what constituted 
manumission in fraudem patroni. Presumably it occurred when a 
manumitted slave would otherwise have been inherited by a patron 
on the death of his freeedman, or when a manumission affected the 
rendering of services or duties due to a patron by a freedman 
(143). The aim of these rules must have been to protect the 
rights of creditors and of patrons, and to restrict manumissions 
by ex-slaves who still owed obligations to their former masters 
and by debtors, two groups of people who may well have been 
regarded as unworthy of the right to manumit. 
Dediticii 
The lex Aelia Sentia designated certain disreputable slaves 
who, on manumission, were to be categorised with surrendered 
enemies (peregrini dediticii). Although legally free, they 
suffered various disabilities, notably permanent exclusion from 
Roman citizenship: 
Lege itaque Aelia Sentia cavetur, ut (144) qui servi a dominis 
poenae nomine vincti sint, quibusve stigmata inscripta aint, deve 
quibus ob noxam quaestio tormentis habita sit at in ea noxa fuisse 
convicti sint, quive ut ferro auf cum bestiis depugnarent traditi 
sint, inve ludum custodiamve coniecti fuerint, et postea vel ab 
eodem domino vel ab alio manumissi, eiusdem condicionis liberi 
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fiant, cuius condicionis sunt peregrini dediticii (145). 
Gaius explains that peregrini dediticii are those who have 
surrendered after taking up arms against the Roman people and 
being defeated. 
Ulpian also provides a description of these slaves: 
Dediticiorum numero aunt qui poenae causa vincti aunt a domino, 
quibusve stigmata scripta fuerunt, quive propter noxam torti 
nocentesque inventi. sunt, quive traditi aunt, ut ferro auf cum 
bestiis depugnarent, vel in ludum (146) vel custodiam coniecti 
fuerunt, deinde quoquo modo manumissi aunts idque lex Aelia Sentia 
facit (147). 
Another, less comprehensive, definition is provided in the Epitome 
of Gaius : 
Dediticii vero sunt, qui post admissa crimina suppliciis aubditi 
et publice pro criminibus, caesi aunt, auf in quorum facie vel 
corpore quaecumque indicia auf igne auf ferro impressa aunt, et 
ita impressa aunt, ut deleri non possint. Hi si manumissi 
fuerint, de¢iticii appellantur. (148). 
Suetonius also briefly mentions Augustus' ruling regarding slaves 
who have been put in chains or tortured : 
... hoc quoque adiecit, ne vinctus umquam tortuave quis ullo 
libertatis genere civitatem adipisceretur (149). 
An important question which arises from this ruling of the 
law is whether or not such slaves, if informally manumitted, 
became dediticii. In the text of Gaius cited (150), the words 
'quocumque modo... manumissos' appear, and in that of Ulpian (151) 
'quoquo modo manumissi sunt', apparently implying that informal 
manumissions were included. Gaius says, too, that the rules apply 
at whatever age the slave was manumitted, implying that 
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manumissions of slaves under 30 vindicta were also included. In 
addition, when commenting on the destiny of the property of 
dediticii on death, Gaius mentions a category who, but for some 
offence, would, on manumission, have become Latins (152): this 
would include slaves manumitted informally or under the age of 30 
vindicta, all of whom became Latini by the terms of the lex Iunia. 
There are, however, major difficulties with this if the lex lunia 
be placed in A. D. 19. The implication is that after the enactment 
of the lex Aelia Sentia, slaves informally manumitted (or those 
debarred from citizenship on manumission by this law) who had 
committed crimes which placed them in the category of dediticii, 
although subjected to various penalties, were legally free, 
whereas those who had not committed these crimes, while protected 
by the praetor and in libertate, were still legally slaves. In 
other words, a slave who had committed certain crimes might find 
himself in a better position than one who had not done so. This 
cannot, of course, have been the case, and it provides one of the 
stiongest arguments for those who favour an earlier date for the 
lex Iunia which gave legal freedom to those who were previously 
slaves in libertate. If. however, one holds to the later date for 
the lex lunia, an alternative explanation is necessary. I believe 
that the rules concerning dediticii must have originally applied 
only to formal manumissions and that they were extended to 
informal manumissions by a subsequent enactment passed at some 
stage after A. D. 19. As for criminal slaves freed informally 
after the lex Aelia Sentia, since it is unlikely that, simply by 
virtue of their informal manumission, they gained the status of 
Latini Iuniani by the terms of the lex Iunia rather than being 
classed as dediticii, the most plausible explanation is that such 
disreputable slaves were not protected by the praetor (who might 
use his discretion) and were not regarded as being in libertate 
the lex lunia would therefore not have made them Latins. 
As has already been observed, those manumitted slaves who 
were classed as dediticii, although legally free, were forever 
debarred from Roman citizenship. So low was their position that 
they were forbidden to live within 100 miles of the city of Rome, 
- 248 - 
serious consequences following disobedience to this stipulation : 
Pessima itaque libertas eorum eat qui dediticiorum numero aunts 
nec Ulla lege auf senatusconsulto auf constitutione principali 
aditus illis ad civitatem Romanam datur. Quin etiam in urbe Roma 
vel intra centesimum (153) urbis Romae miliarium morari 
prohibentur; et si qui contra ea fecerint, ipsi bonaque eorum 
publice uenire iubentur ea condicione, ut ne in urbe Roma uel 
intra centesimum urbis Romae miliarium seruiant neue unquam 
manumittanturf et si manumissi fuerint, serui populi Romani esse 
iubentur. Et haec ita lege Aelia Sentia conprehensa aunt (154). 
A question which clearly caused some controversy among the 
jurists was whether or not manumitted slaves classed as dediticii 
enjoyed the capacity to make a will. There was no doubt that they 
might not take under a will s 
Dediticiorum numero heres institui non potest, quia peregrinus 
est, cum quo testamenti factio non est (155). 
Hi vero qui dediticiorum numero sunt, nullo modo ex testamento 
capere possunt, non magis quam quilibet peregrinus... (156). 
According to Gaius, the prevalent opinion among the jurists was 
that they might not make wills either : 
... nec ipsi testamentum facere possunt secundum id quod magic 
placuit (157). 
Ulpian confirms this on the ground that dediticii did not belong 
to any state by whose laws they might draw up wills, implying that 
they were not only debarred from Roman citizenship but from any 
other citizenship as well : 
Latinus Iunianus, item is qui dediticiorum numero eat testamentum 
facere non potest : Latinus quidem, quoniam nominatim lege lunia 
prohibitus est, is autem qui dediticiorum numero est, quoniam nec 
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quasi civis Romanus testari potest, cum sit peregrinus, nec quasi 
peregrinus, quonium nullius certae civitatis civis est, ut 
secundum leges civitatis suae testetur (158). 
The reason for the controversy comes to light in another text of 
Gaius (159) which is concerned with the destiny of the property of 
manumitted slaves who are classed as dediticii : 
Eorum autem, quos lex Aelia Sentia dediticiorum numero facit, bona 
modo quasi civium Romanrum libertorum, modo quasi Latinorum ad 
patronos pertinent. Nam eorum bona qui, si in aliquo vitio non 
essent, manumissi cives Romani futuri essent, quasi civium 
Romanorum patronis eadem lege tribuuntur. Non tarnen hi habent 
etiam testamenti factionem; nam id plerisque placuit, nec 
immerito; nam incredibile videbatur pessimae condicionis hominibus 
voluisse legis latorem testamenti faciendi ius concedere. Eorum 
vero bona qui, si non in aliquo vitio essent, manumissi futuri 
Latini essent, proinde tribuuntur patronis, ac si Latini 
decessissent. Nec me praeterit non satis in ea re legis latorem 
voluntatem suam verbis expressisse. 
Gaius distinguishes here between those who would have become Roman 
citizens had they not fallen into the category of dediticii and 
those who would, in this case, have become Junian Latins. The 
property of the former group reverts to their patrons as if they 
were Roman citizens, whereas that of the latter reverts as if they 
were Latins (160). The implication of this seems to be that the 
property of both groups is regarded as if the owners were not 
dediticii, and this is confirmed in the Berlin Fragment (161) : 
.. sed cum lege de bonis rebusque eorum hominum ita 
ius dicere 
iudicium reddere praetor iubeatur, ut ea fiant, quae futura 
forent, si dediticiorum numero facti non essent, videamus, ne 
versus sit, quod quidem senserunt, et de universis bonis et de 
singulis... (162). 
Gaius, howver, strongly rejects the view that those who would have 
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been Roman citizens if not dediticii might, by this fiction, make 
wills like Roman citizen freedmen, on the ground of the pessima 
condicio of dediticii. This suggest that the fiction was limited 
to the claim of their patrons to their property, although it 
appears, from the text of Gaius, that the lex Aelia Sentia was not 
very clear on this matter (163). Given the other disabilities 
associated with the status of dediticius, it would indeed have 
been surprising if some dediticii had been permitted'by a legal 
fiction to make Roman wills, especially considering that Junian 
Latins were not allowed to do so. 
Gaius ends his description of the disabilities associated 
with the status of dediticius with the words 'et haec its lege 
Aelia Sentia conprehensa sunt' (164) and there is no reason to 
doubt that all of the rules outlined above were indeed part of the 
lex Aelia Sentia, apart from the inclusion of informal 
manumissions in its application. In addition to the evidence 
cited, there are some excerpts which seem to represent juristic 
interpretation rather that the original provisions of the law. 
Paul, for example (165), describes various cirumstances in which 
placing a slave in chains does not affect his prospect of full 
freedom, as for example, if it is done by a person placed under a 
fideicommissum to free him, by one owner of a common slave, by a 
debtor or creditor where a pledge is involved and by a master who 
is furiosus or a pupillus. The slave is, however, not immune if 
placed in chains by someone acting on the authority, or with the 
approval, of the master. Ulpian. in his first book of commentary 
ad legem Aeliam Sentiam (166), explains that a person who is 
imprisoned is not 'vinctus' unless he actually has chains attached 
to him. 
Regulations of relations between patrons and ex-slaves 
The remaining provisions which are attributed by the sources 
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to the lex Aelia Sentia regulate relations between patrons and 
their ex-slaves s 
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... and the regulations which people in general and also 
those who 
had been their masters should observe towards freed slaves (167). 
The evidence suggests that the lex Aelia sentia introduced a 
formal process whereby a patron might accuse his freedman of 
ingratitude. Whereas there is no juristic evidence for formal 
accusations of this nature under the Republic, there are two texts 
relating to the lex Aelia Sentia which lay down rules concerning 
such accusations, and there was a fair amount of subsequent 
legislation. 
The relevant texts are D. 40.9.30 (Ulpian 4 ad legem Aeliam 
Sentiam) and D. 50.16.70 (Paul 73 ad edictum). In the former 
text, Ulpian merely discusses exactly who is entitled to bring an 
accusation of ingratitude against a freedman, the general 
impression being that, by the terms of the law. it was the 
exclusive right of the patron. Thus, Ulpian discusses the case of 
a person who has bought a slave for the purpose of manumission: if 
the slave is subsequently freed, not by him but by the terms of 
the constitutio Marci (168), he does not have the right (169). 
He adds that, if a son has manumitted with his father's approval, 
his father, as patron, has the right (par. l) (170) unless the son 
has freed a castrensis servus, in which case, he himself, as 
patron, has the right (par. 2). According to Ulpian, a person 
may accuse for as long as he is patron (par. 3) and in the case of 
a freedman with several patrons, if one of them has cause to 
accuse him of ingratitude, he may do so, but only with the consent 
of the others (par. 4). Ulpian also mentions the opinion of 
Julian that if a father has assigned a freedman to one of his 
sons, only the latter, as patron, may accuse (par. 5). In the 
text of Paul mentioned (D. 50.16.70), the jurist says that, by the 
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terms of the lex Aelia Sentia, a filius heres of the patron may 
instigate an accusation. 
These texts supply no information regarding what constituted 
punishable ingratitude on the part of a freedman, nor regarding 
the penalties attached to such accusations. Another text of 
Paul (1 senteniarum) provides the following general definition : 
... Ingratus libertus est, qui patrono obsequium non praestat vel 
res eius filiorumve tutelam administrare detractat (174). 
There are other texts which shed further light on these 
questions but, since these also show that the issue was regulated 
by several Imperial constitutions, it is difficult to ascertain 
what exactly was the situation at the time of the lex Aelia 
Sentia. ulpian mentions various punishable offences, together 
with the appropriate penalties, without assigning them to any 
Imperial enactment, but the severity of some of them makes it 
unlikely that this reflected entirely the Augustan situations 
... sed si quidem inofficiosus patrono patronae liberiave eorum 
sit, tantummodo castigari eum sub comminatione aliqua severitatis 
non defuturae; si rursum causam querellae praebuerit, et dimitti 
oportet. enimvero si contumeliam fecit auf convicium eis dixit, 
etiam in exilium temporale darf debebit: quod si manus intulit, in 
metallum dandus erit: idem et si calumniam aliquam eis instruxit 
vel delatorem subornavit vel quarr causam adversus eos temptavit 
(172). 
This text shows that the penalty for ingratitude to a patron 
varied according to the severity of the offence. Ulpian does not 
mention as a punishment reenslavement by the patron which clearly 
did become a punishment. For example, a text of Marcian (173) 
assigns to Claudius a ruling which permitted the reenslavement of 
certain offenders s 
Divus Claudius libertum, qui probatus fuit patrono delatores 
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summisisse, qui de statu eius facerent ei quaestionem, servum 
patroni esse iussit eum libertum. 
In addition, a passage of Tacitus (174) describes agitation 
in the reign of Nero to have patrons empowered to reenslave 
disrespectful freedmen. The same passage also implies that the 
penalty at the time was exile to a place at least 100 miles from 
Rome. It is reasonable to assume that the penalty of relegatio 
was introduced by Augustus. 
The absence of evidence for accusations of ingratitude to 
patrons during the Republic does not imply that freedmen at this 
time owed no obligations to their patrons. The evidence shows 
clearly that a system of rights and obligations existed between 
patrons and freedmen during the Republic, the main duty of the 
freedman being the rendering of obsequium (respect). Treggiari 
(175) has, however, shown that obsecuium was not enforced by law 
but depended on the moral concept of fides. The juristic 
evidence suggests that, whereas in earlier times an agreement 
setting out certain obligations might be made between patron and 
freedman at the time of manumission which was enforceable at law, 
praetorian intervention brought an end to this on the ground that 
it placed too great a burden on the freedman. Patrons did 
possess a legal right to demand from their freedmen a certain 
number of operae (days' work) which had been promised on oath at 
the time of manumission, but here too there was praetorian 
intervention to protect the freedman : 
"In Republican times at least, obseauium does not seem to have 
been enforced by law, but only through an agreement of the 
parties, as was the performance of o rae. But the idea of 
respect and dutifulness, obseguium, honor, reverentia, formed part 
of the moral obligation imposed by fides" (176). 
Treggiari believes that, because the law favoured the freedman by 
the end of the Republic, Augustus intervened in order to redress 
the balance. The principle of reverence to a patron was 
- 254 - 
similarly upheld in the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus which 
forbade freedwomen married to their patrons to divorce them and to 
marry someone else against their will. 
Another rule of the lex Aelia Sentia regarding relations 
between patrons and their ex-slaves provides a further link with 
the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus. This rule was concerned 
with oaths taken by ex-slaves to their patrons that they would not 
marry and have children. The lex Iulia seems to have made it 
possible for such oaths to be rescinded, while the lex Aelia 
Sentia went a step further and forbade patrons to compel their 
freedmen and freedwomen to make them in the first place. A 
rather corrupt text of Paul relates to this issue (177) : 
Adigere iureiurando, ne nubat liberta vel [sic FB, libertus 
ins. Mo. ] Liberos tollat, intelligitur etiam is, qui libertum 
iurare patitur.... Lege Iulia [Iuria F. ] de maritandis ordinibus 
remittitur [sic S cum B, permittitur F] iusiurandum, quod liberto 
in hoc impositum est, ne uxorem ducereret [duxerit F, dixerit r] 
libertae, ne nuberet, si modo nuptias contrahere recte velint. 
The text also exonerates a patron whose son does the 
compelling without his consent, and shows that the imposition of a 
stipulation that' a freedman perform operas (or substitute a 
monetary payment) is not forbidden. Paul further says that the 
prohibition is only relevant to those who are capable of having 
children, and that a patron may only compel a freedwoman to swear 
an oath that she will marry him if he intends to marry her and not 
if he wishes simply to prevent her from marrying someone else. 
Another text of Paul also ascribes to the lex Aelia Sentia a 
provision which forbade patrons to compel freedmen to swear an 
oath, although the nature of the oath is not specified: 
Qui contra legem Aeliam Sentiam ad iurandum libertum adegit, 
nihil iuris habet nec ipse nec liberi eius (178). 
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This implies that the penalty for contravening the law in this 
respect was a total loss of patronal rights over the freedman in 
question, not only by-the patron but also by his children. The 
loss of inheritance rights is confirmed in a text taken from 
Ulpian's 14th book of commentary ad Sabinum (179): 
Si quis libertam sic iureiurando adegit 'ne illicite nubat', non 
debere incidere in legem Aeliam Sentiam. sed si 'intra certum 
tempus ne ducat' 'neue aliam, quam de qua patronus consenserit' 
vel 'non nisi conlibertam' auf 'patrons cognatam', dicendum est 
incidere eum in legem Aeliam Sentiam nec ad legitimam hereditatem 
admitti. 
Two further texts which mention this ruling of the lex Aelia 
Sentia are taken from the juristic commentaries ad legem Iuliam et 
Papiam (180) of Terentius Clemens. In his fifth book of 
commentary, Clemens says that a patron does not contravene the law 
if he only enjoins temporary widowhood on a freedwoman (181), and 
in his eighth book of commentary, he, like Paul, discusses a case 
of compulsion without the patron's consent by a person in his 
power (182). 
It is easy to see why a provision which freed ex-slaves from 
an oath that they would not marry should have been a part of the 
lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus, concerned as this law was with 
the encouragement of valid marriage and procreation, even among 
ex-slaves. It is more difficult to see the relevance to the lex 
Aelia Sentia of a provision which went a step further and forbade 
such oaths to be required by patrons. However, it does further 
illustrate the close connection between these two Augustan laws 
and fits in with the other provisions of the lex Aelia Sentia 
which regulated relations between patrons and ex-slaves. 
The lex Aelia Sentia, in fact, seems to have provided a 
fair degree of protection for ex-slaves in relation to their 
patrons. There is evidence, for example, of a provision which 
penalised a patron who failed to suport his ex-slave: 
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Si patronus non aluerit libertum, lex Aelia Sentia adimit eius 
libertatis causa imposita tam ei, quam ipsi (183) ad quem ea res 
pertinet, item hereditatem ipsi et liberis eius, nisi heres 
institutus sit, et bonorum possessionem praeterquam secundum 
tabulas. (184) 
This is confirmed in another passage taken from the same book of 
commentary: 
Alimenta liberto petente non praestando patronus amissione 
libertatis causa impositorum et hereditatis liberti punietur: non 
autem necesse habebit praestare, etiamsi potest. (185) (186) 
The fact that a patron was expected, if necessary, to provide for 
his freedman is an indication of the continuing close bond between 
the two in spite of the latter's manumission. 
The final rule of lex Aelia Sentia relating to patrons and 
their ex-slaves for which there is evidence is one which forbade 
patrons to compel their ex-slaves to pay money in lieu of 
performing o rae: 
Non prohibentur lege Aelia Sentia patroni a libertis mercedes 
capere, sed obligare eos: itaque si sponte sua libertus mercedem 
patrono praestiterit, nullum huius legis praemium consequetur. 
Is, qui operas auf in singulas eas certain summam promisit, ad hanc 
legem non pertinet, quoniam operas praestando potest liberari. 
idem Octavenus probat et adicit: obligare sibi libertum, ut 
mercedem operarum capiat, is intellegitur, qui hoc solum agit, ut 
utique mercedem capiat, etiamsi sub titulo operarum eam 
stipulatus fuerit. (188) 
It is interesting to compare this with a ruling of the lex Iulia 
de maritandis ordinibus which, however, only concerned ex-slaves 
who had two or more children and which gave exemption to such from 
the obligation to provide 'operas doni muneris aliudve quicquam 
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libertatis causa.. . de quibus iuraverit vel promiserit obligatisve 
erit'. (189) 
THE 'LEX FtJFIA CANINIA' 
The lex Pufia Caninia preceded the lex Aelia Sentia by about 
six years, but was a less complex and significant statute. The 
jurist Gaius, Ulpian and Paul all provide summaries of its 
contents, but the only book of commentary devoted to it for which 
there is evidence is a liber sinaularis of Paul (190). It was 
passed in 2 B. C. when the consuls were L. Caninius Gallus and C. 
Pufius Geminus (191) and was abrogated by Justinian (192). 
The lex Fufia Caninia placed limits on the number of slaves 
to be manumitted by will: it had no bearing on any other form of 
manumission. Suetonius seems to be referring to it when he 
observes that Augustus 'manumittendi modum terminavit' (193). 
The limit placed on the manumission of slaves by will is 
described by Gaius (194) : 
Praeterea lege Fufia Caninia certus modus constitutus est in 
seruis testamento manumittendis. Nam ei, qui plures quam duos 
neque plures quam decem seruos habebit, usque ad partem dimidiam 
eius numeri manumittere permittiturj ei uero, qui plures quam x 
neque plures quam xxx seruos habebit, usque ad tertiam partem eius 
numeri manumittere permittitur. At ei qui plures quam xxx neque 
plures quam centum habebit, usque ad partem quartam potestas 
manumittendi datur. Nouissime ei qui plures quam C nec plures 
quam D habebit, non plures manumittere permittitur quam quintam 
partem; neque plures < ...... ....... >tur: sed praescribit lex, ne 
cui plures manumittere liceat quam C. Quodsi quis unum seruum 
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omnino auf duos habet, ad hanc legem non pertinet, et ideo liberam 
habet potestatem manumittendi. 
Thus, according to the terms of the law, a master might free only 
a certain proportion of his slaves, the proportion depending on 
the total number of slaves he possessed. Thus, if he possessed 1 
or 2 there were no restrictions, if he possessed between 2 and 10 
he might free half, between 10 and 30 one third, between 30 and 
100 one quarter and between 100 and 500 one fifth. One hundred 
was the maximum number of slaves who might be freed by any master. 
This is confirmed in Gai. Epitome 1.2r,. and by Ulpian (195): 
Lex Fufia Caninia*iubet testamento ex tribus seruis non pluree 
quarr duos manumitti, et usque ad decem dimidiam partem manumittere 
concedit: a decem usque ad triginta tertiam partem, ut tamen adhuc 
quinque manumittere liceat aeque ut ex priori numero: a triginta 
usque ad centum quartam partem, aeque ut decem ex superiori numero 
liberari possint: a centum usque ad quingentos partem quintam, 
similiter ut ex antecedenti numero uiginti quinque possint fiert 
liberi. Et denique praecipit, ne plures omnino quarr centuml ex 
cuiusquam testamento liberi fiant. 
A similar description of these rules is provided by Paul. (196). 
The passage of Gaius cited goes on to say that the ruling 
only applies to manumission by will so that there is no 
restriction placed by this law on those 'qui vindicta auf censu 
auf inter amicos manumittunt' (197). A rather corrupt portion of 
Gaius (198) shows that the law ensured that one master should not 
be allowed to free fewer slaves than another master who possessed 
a smaller number of slaves than he (199). 
Paul says (200) that in reckoning the number of slaves who 
might be freed by the law, fugitive slaves should be taken into 
account on the ground that they still belong to their master. If 
a master frees more than the permitted number of slaves, the 
freedom of those manumitted after that number has been reached is 
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invalid (201), and since the order of manumission is therefore 
important, Paul also says that liberties granted by codicil are in 
all circumstances regarded as subsequent to those granted by the 
will which confirms them. 
In order to facilitate the enforcement of this provision, 
the lex Fufia Caninia also laid down that slaves must be freed by 
name: 
Eadem lex cavet, ut libertates servis testamento nominatim dentur 
(202). 
Nominatim servi testamento manumitti secundum legem Pufiam 
possunt (203). 
Paul adds here that, by the terms of the sc Orfitianum, a 
description such as 'opsonator' or 'qui ex ancilla illa nascetur' 
is acceptable, provided that no more than one person fits that 
description. It may therefore be presumed that the lex Pufia 
Caninia itself was rigid in its requirement that manumission be 
made nominatim. 
According to Gaius, certain provisions of the lex Fufia 
Caninia, together with subsequent senatusconsulta, were designed 
to preclude fraudes. Thus the lex provided that if a testator 
tried to get around the rule by writing the names of his slaves in 
a circle so that there was no discernable order, none of the 
slaves would be free (204). This is confirmed by Gaius' 
Epitomator (205) who also says that if a testator grants freedom 
to all of his slaves without naming them, the gift will be 
invalid. He adds that, if a dominus frees several slaves when 
ill and on the point of death, the rule of the lex is to apply as 
though he had freed them by will, so that only a certain number 
will be free (206). Some of these rules were, no doubt, 
responses to attempts to evade the terms of the law and may well 
be attributable to the later sca which were enacted to preclude 
fraudes leais, although the jurists provide no details concerning 
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Regarding the question of the relevance of the rule to 
trusts, this is discussed by Buckland (207) who rightly argues 
that trusts must have been affected, if not at the time of the 
enactment of the lex Fufia Caninia (since fideicommissa only 
became legally binding at this time), at least subsequently 
through juristic interpretation. If fideicommissa were not 
affected by the rule, an enormous loophole would have existed, and 
an exerpt from Paul's book of commentary ad legem Fufiam Caniniam 
suggests strongly that they were (208). In addition, as Buckland 
observes, a description of a slave which, according to Paul, 
is 
acceptable in a will by the terms of the lex Fufia Caninia, 'qui 
ex ea ancilla nascetur', is only relevant to a trust. 
The Purpose of the Manumission Laws 
In assessing the purpose of the manumission laws, we need to 
look again at the relevant passages of Suetonius and of Dio 
mentioned earlier: 
Magni praeterea existimans sincerum atque ab omni colluvione 
peregrini ac servilis sanguinis incorruptum servare populum, et 
civitates Romanas parcissime dedit et manumittendi modum 
terminavit (209). 
Moreover, considering it of great importance to keep the people 
pure and untainted by all impurities of foreign or servile blood, 
he very sparingly granted Roman citizenship and placed a limit on 
manumission. 
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... and the fourth [book contained] commands and injunctions for 
Tiberius and for the public, among them that they should not free 
many (slaves) in order that the city should not be full of a mixed 
rabble, and not to enrol large numbers as citizens, so that there 
should be a big difference between them and their subjects (210). 
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As many were freeing many slaves indiscriminately, he laid down 
the age which the person freeing and the slave to be freed by him 
must be, and the regulations which people in general and also 
those who had been their masters should observe towards freed 
slaves. 
These passages, together with juristic evidence for the 
nature of some of the provisions of the manumission laws of 
Augustus, have given rise to the commonly held view that through 
these laws Augustus aimed to stem a massive tide of manumissions 
in order not only to limit the number of freed slaves in the 
population but also to stop the citizen body from being further 
polluted by the continuing admission into it of foreign, 
especially oriental, ex-slaves. This was the view put forward by 
Last (212) and reiterated by several other scholars (213). More 
recently, however, attempts have been made to show that the 
concept of a massive tide of manumissions in the late Republic and 
very early Empire is a misleading one. Hopkins (214) 
demonstrated that most slaves would, in fact, have always remained 
slaves, and this is the view also held by Treggiari (215). 
Atkinson (216) argued particularly against the view of huge 
4 
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numbers of slaves being manumitted by will on the basis of the 
absence of any firm evidence to support this view and of the fact 
that most Roman testators would have been concerned that the value 
of their property should not be dimished by the manumission of 
large numbers of slaves by will. She rejects the testimonies of 
both Suetonius and of Dio and believes that the manumission laws 
were, in fact, designed to encourage the freeing of slaves (at 
least of slaves of the right calibre) in order to supply freedmen 
for the army and viailes and for commercial activity. 
One of Atkinson's main arguments in support of the view that 
Augustus aimed to encourage rather than to discourage the growth 
of the freed population is based on the provision of the lex Aelia 
Sentia (or of the lex lunia which she believes to be Augustan) 
which gave to Junian Latins the right to full citizenship by the 
so-called anniculi probatio. This, she observes, provided an 
incentive to those ex-slaves who became Jünian Lati n, s on 
manumission to marry and to procreate, and falls into line with 
several provisions of the marriage laws which provided similar 
incentives to. ex-slaves to procreate (217). Atkinson further 
argues that, by waiving the rules of the lex Aelia Sentia for 
masters who wished to free slave women in order to marry them, 
Augustus was hardly aiming to preserve the "purity" of the citizen 
body (218). As for the lex Fufia Caninia, while she admits that 
it may well have reduced the number of manumissions, she believes 
that the purpose was rather to protect the interest of heirs and 
of creditors. 
The traditional view of the manumission laws as indicating 
Augustus' concern about the numbers and racial origins of ex- 
slavesin the citizen body, has also been contested by Bradley 
(219), who points out that there is little evidence to support the 
idea that Augustus in general opposed the extension of the 
citizenship to foreigners. Bradley also observes that, if 
Augustus wished simply to reduce the number of slaves being freed, 
he did not choose a very effective method of doing so. Thus, for 
example, while the lex Fufia Caninia limited the number of slaves 
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to be freed by will, masters might still free any number of slaves 
by the other methods. Bradley cites the passage of Dionysius 
already mentioned (220) to argue that the lex Fufia Caninia was 
designed to curb ostentation by the upper classes who saw the 
freeing of large numbers of slaves by will as a way of ensuring 
that they were remembered as benevolent and generous. He also 
argues that, if masters were allowed to free by will only a 
limited number of slaves who had to be named, testamentary 
manumission would have thus become more selective. This ties in 
with the lex Aelia Sentia which, he believes, was concerned not so 
much with the numbers and racial origins of slaves being freed but 
rather with their moral and social qualities. Thus slaves might 
not be freed by immature masters, ex-slaves under 30 might not be 
granted the. citizenship and morally disreputable slaves, 
dediticii, were forever debarred from access to the -citizenship. 
Unlike Atkinson, Bradley does not reject the testimonies of 
Suetonius and Dio but interprets their accounts (together with 
that of Dionysius) as supportive of his arguments. 
Can the accounts of Suetonius and of Dio indeed be made to 
fit in with this view of the manumission laws? There is no 
problem with Dio 55.13.7: here Dio merely says that Augustus was 
a1 
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The other passage, Dio 56.33.3 is more problematic: Bradley 
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These words can only be interpreted to indicate concern about 
numbers of ex-slaves in the population and concerning the 
"pollution" of the citizen body. Atkinson totally rejects the 
passage and believes that the whole idea of a fourth book of 
instructions left by Augustus for Tiberius was a later 
fabrication. Her arguments against accepting this passage are 
not atall convincing and a total rejection of the testimonies of 
4 
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Dio and of Suetonius does not seem to me to be justified. It is 
true that some rulings in the Augustan marriage laws encouraged 
procreation among ex-slaves, as they encouraged procreation among 
freeborn, but this is not the same as encouraging the manumission 
of more slaves. Moreover, while the number of slaves freed by 
will towards the end of the Republic may have been exaggerated by 
scholars, the fact that an upper limit of 100 was set by the lex 
Fufia Caninia suggests that it was indeed (as Dionysius asserts) a 
popular method of manumission which must have been curbed by the 
terms of the lex Fufia Caninia and, while the other avenues of 
manumission were, as Bradley argues, left open by the lex, they 
did not hold the attraction of providing a means of being 
remembered in a favourable light after death. 
There are even stronger arguments for upholding the 
testimonies of Suetonius and Dio regarding Augustus, desire to 
preserve the citizen body from pollution. It has to be 
" acknowledged, for example, that the denial of citizenship by the 
lex Aelia Sentia to manumitted slaves who were under 30 was very 
restrictive, and the admission of ex-slaves to the citizen body _ 
through the anniculi probatio was not, I believe, Augustan, having 
been introduced by the lex lunia. Non-senatorial ingenui were 
indeed encouraged to marry freedwomen by the terms of the marriage 
laws, but, because of the restrictions placed on the acquiring of 
citizenship by manumitted slaves, only the offspring of marriages 
in which the ex-slave partner was considered to be -worthy of 
citizenship would have been citizens. 
This idea of "worthiness" is important in the Augustan 
manumission laws. Augustus placed limits on manumission and 
especially on the admission of ex-slaves to the citizen body, but 
clearly had no desire to forbid it altogether. Rather, his 
concern seems to have been to make manumission and admission to 
citizenship more selective and controlled, thus curbing the free 
hand formerly enjoyed by masters. By the terms of the lex Aelia 
Sentia, a master under 20 who was evidently not regarded as 
sufficiently mature to judge the suitability of a slave for 
r 
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manumission might not free a slave, and a slave under 30 whose 
worth had not yet stood the test of time might not become a 
citizen. This latter rule would presumably also have had the 
effect of providing an incentive to manumitted slaves under 30 to 
behave well in the hope of attaining the citizenship on reaching 
30. Both of these rules were waived in the case of certain 
relationships, or at the discretion of a prestigious consilium, 
consisting of senators and eguites. The list of exemptions 
provides a further indication of the importance attached to family 
ties and relationships by Augustus, while the right of the 
consilium to judge the merit of individual cases illustrates the 
degree of control which might now be exercised over manumissions. 
Control over the enfranchisement of ex-slaves was also 
introduced by the permanent refusal of citizenship to criminal ex- 
slaves now classed with dediticii. It is easy to see why auch 
ex-slaves were not regarded as worthy of citizenship and the 1ex 
Aelia Sentia provided an explicit list of those in this 
stigmatised category. Masters were further restricted by the 
prohibition against manumission in fraud of creditors and of 
patrons, clearly designed to protect the interests of such and 
perhaps thus to remedy a common abuse. Similarly, the 
safeguarding of inheritances from leaving a familia was evidently 
the motive for exempting from all of the restrictions manumission 
for the purpose of providing a solus et necessarius heres. 
By the terms of the lex Pufia Caninia, masters might no 
longer make sweeping, indiscriminate grants of freedom to 
unlimited numbers of slaves in their wills, but were now limited 
to a certain number who had to be named. 
While these various measures were designed to make 
manumission more selective, some other provisions of the lex Aelia 
sentia increased control by the law over relations between patrons 
and their ex-slaves. As already observed, there had always 
existed certain reciprocal obligations between patrons and ex- 
slaves, but by the end of the Republic these rested on the concept 
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of fides rather than on any legal basis. Augustus now placed a 
heavier obligation upon ex-slaves to render due reverence to their 
former masters by the introduction of a formal accusation against 
freedmen for ingratitude, probably with the penalty of relegatio 
attached. For their part, patrons were obliged to support their 
freedmen, if necessary, and to allow them to choose whether to 
perform operas for their patrons or to pay money in lieu. The 
provision of the lex Aelia Sentia which forbade patrons to compel 
their ex-slaves to swear oaths that they would not marry and have 
children introduced further control over the behaviour of patrons. 
Given the nature of many of. the provisions of the 
manumission laws, there is no justification for regarding the 
presence of provisions of this nature in the laws as evidence that 
they were primarily designed to encourage the growth of the freed 
population, as Atkinson suggests. Rather, this provision provides 
evidence for the close links between these laws and the marriage 
laws which did indeed provide incentives to procreation among 
freeborn and freed. 
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(4) D. 40.9. 
(5) I believe that this was a later ruling, but include it here, 
since some scholars associate it with the lex Aelia Sentia. 
(6) I favour assigning this provision to the lex lunia, but it is 
frequently assigned to the lex Aelia Sentia. 
(7) Insts. 1.38. 
(8) Rea. 1.13. 
(9) For proposed emendations and references, see Biondi 
op. cit., p. 293 n. 2. 
(10) M. David & H. L. W. Nelson, Gai Institutionum Commentarii IV, 
Leiden 1954-68,1 Lieferung, pp. 53-4. 
(11) Just. Insts. 1.6.4. 
(12) Insts. 1.40. 
(13) D. 40.1.1,6 ad Sabinum. 
(14) D. 40.1.16,1 regularum. 
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(15) D. 40.2.15pr., 2 ad legem Aeliam Sentiam. 
(16) D. 40.2.20pr., 2 de officio proconsulis. See below for 
further comments on fideicommissa. 
(17) This would not have been a common situation; the manumitter 
would have to buy the slave from someone with a view to freeing 
him. 
(18) D. 40.5.34.1,3 fideicommissorum. 
(19) D. 40.2.4.2, Iulianus 42 digestorum. 
(20) D. 18.9.4,24 digestorum. 
(21) This was presumably because the decision to manumit was taken 
with the "immature judgment" of an under 20. 
(22) D. 40.9.16.1,3 ad legem Aeliam Sentiam, cf. 40.2.4.2. 
(23) D. 45.3.66. 
(24) D. 40.4.3,1 ad Sabinum. 
(25) D. 29.1.29.2,10 digestorum. 
(26) D. 29.1.1pr. 
(27) Insts. 1.41. 
(28) See below for further discussion of the lex Iunia and 
informal manumission. 
(29) CJ 1.2.1. 
(30) D. 40.9.7.1,2 ad Urseium Ferocem. 
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(31) CJ 7.11.4. 
(32) D. 40.2.1612r., 2 ad legem eliam Sentiam. 
(33) Insts. 1.139. 
(34) Insts. l. 19, see also Gai. Epitome 1.1.7, D. 40.2.11.12. 
(35) D. 40.2.13,6 de officio proconsulis. 
(36) 'id... libros' looks like a gloss. 
(37) D. 40.2.25,1 de manumissionibus. 
(38) W. W. Buckland, The Roman Law of Slavery, Cambridge 1970, p. 540. 
(39) D. 40.2.15,1 ad legem Aeliam Sentiam. 
(40) D. 40.2.9pr., 13 institutionum. 
(41) D. 40.2.14,4 reaularum. 
(42) D. 40.2.6,2 ad Urseium Ferocem. 
(43) D. 40.2.24,2 ad Neratium. 
(44) This is rather odd : it was usual for peculium to go with the 
ex-slave. 
(45) D. 40.9.16.1, Paul 3 ad legem Aeliam Sentiam. 
(46) D. 40.1.20,10 responsorum. 
(47) D. 40.2.20.1,2 de officio consulis. 
(48) D. 40.2.16.1,2 ad leaem Aeliam Sentiam. 
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(49) 22. Cit. p. 541. 
(50) CJ 7.4.5. 
(51) D. 40.5.4.18,60 ad edictum. 
(52) D. 40.1.20.1,10 responsorum. 
(53) D. 40.1.2O2 . 
(54) D. 40.2.20pr., 40.5.34.1. 
(55) D. 40.9.16pr. 
(56) D. 40.2.14.1, Marcianus 4 regularum. 
(57) D. 40.2.13,6 de officio proconsulis. 
(58) Insts. 1.6.6. 
(59) D. 40.2. ]9,29 diaestorum. 
(60) D. 40.2.20.2, Ulpian 2 de officio consulis. 
(61) D. 40.2.15.4, Paul 1 ad leaem Aeliam Sentiam. 
(62) D. 40.9.21, Modestinus 1 pandectorum. 
(63) D. 23.2.51, Licinius Rufus 1 reciularum. 
(64) D. 24.2.11,3 ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. 
(65) D. 40.2.9.1,13 institutionum. 
(66) CJ 2.30.3jr. 
(67) Insts. 1.20. 
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(68) David & Nelson, a. cit. vol. i p. 32, believe that 'puberum' was 
a later addition, on the ground that it was only relevant when 
equestrian status became hereditary so that the Emperor might 
0 
grant this status to a young person. 
the parallel passage of Ulpian. 
(69) Reg. 11.13a. 
(70) ILS 1910,1984. 
(71) D. 40.2.1,1 ad Sabinum. 
There is no mention of it in 
(72) D. 40.2.15.5,1 ad legem Aeliam Sentiam. 
(73) D. 1.10.1.2,2 de officio consulis. 
(74) Such a case would have been so rare as to make the argument 
almost hypothetical. 
(75) Sherwin White, The Roman citizenship, 2nd ed., Oxford 1973, 
p. 323f., shows that this principle goes back to very early times 
when the ideas of postliminium and exchange of citizenship 
regulated the Romans' dealings with their Latin neighbours. 
(76) Gai. Insts. 1.18-20. 
(77) Ulp. Reg. 1.12. 
(78) Insts. 2.276 
(79) op. cit. Il on this text. 
(80) D. 10.2.39.2,40.4.46. 
(81) See Buckland, pp. cit. p. 543 n. 6. 
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(82) x. 1.12 . 
(83) Insts. 3.56. 
(84) 4,5. 
(85) Insts. 3.56 . 
(86) e. g. schneider, ZSS 5 (1884) 225ff., Mommsen, Rdmisches 
Staatsrecht 3, Tubingen 1952 (repr. ) p. 626. 
(87) 1.5.3. 
(88) A. D. 19 is the only year in which a Junius and a Norbanus were 
consoles ordinarii, although in A. D. 15 there was an ordinarius and 
a suffect consul with these names. 
(89) 1.80. 
(90) 22. Cit. p. 333. 
(91) Insts. 1.31-4,3.63. 
(92) Reg. 3.5-6. 
(93) This is discussed at greater length below. 
(94) 1.19. 
(95) 'spud consilium' is regarded by some scholars as a gloss. 
(96) Ulpian 9.1.14, see also Gai. Insts. 1.21. 
(97) See Beseler ZSS 50 (1930) p. 18. 
(98) 1.6.1. 
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(99) D. 28.5.43,58,89. 
(100) 'eiusdem.... ipse' supplied by Mommasen. 
(101) Gai. Insts. 1.29. 
(102) The fact that citizenship was not automatically granted on 
attainment of the age of 30 is an indication of the importance 
attached to the "worthiness" or otherwise of the would-be citizen 
which had to be reassessed. 
(103) Reg. 3, de Latinis. 
(104) Insts. 1.31,66,68,69,70,71,73. 
(105) Insts. 1.80. 
(106) Schulz, Epitome 28.3, thinks that the excerptor added 'et 
Iuniam' and in Ulpian Req. 3.3 substituted 'lege Iunia' for 'lege 
Aelia Sentia'. 
(107) Sherwin White, pk. cit. p. 333, argues that the lex Aelia 
Sentia introduced the 'anniculi probatia'. provision and that it 
created a special kind of conubium between those who would later 
become Junian Latins (but who were still legally slaves) and Roman 
citizens. He sees this as the first step towards granting to them 
legal freedom, this being completed later by the lex lunia. 
(108) D. 50.16.134. 
(109) See ch. 3 n. 121. 
(110) It is easy to see how such a system of registration would 
have facilitated the application of the marriage laws, given the 
various rewards offered to those who had children. As for its 
relevance to the lex Aelia Sentia, Riccobono suggests that it 
might have been necessary in order to ascertain the age of would- 
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be manumitters, or to maintain the distinction between citizens 
and either Latins or dediticii. I favour the latter suggestion. 
(111) 'Nam is qui' supplied by comparison with Just. insts. 1.6nr. 
(112) Gai. Insts. 1.37. 
(113) Ulp. RS. 1.15. 
(114) 1.6.3. 
(115) D. 40.9.10,1 cottidiarum sive aureorum. 
(116) Buckland, M. cit. p. 561, suggests that Gaius, in not 
mentioning the intentions of the manumissor, may be reflecting an 
earlier view. This would imply that there was no requirement of 
animus fraudandi in the lex Aelia Sentia. Buckland's view, 
however, is very speculative and his arguments unconvincing. 
There is, in fact, no reason why the absence of any mention of 
animus in this particular text of Gaius should imply that he 
considered intentions to be irrelevant, especially in the light of 
the rest of the excerpt. Whether or not . the lex Aelia Sentia 
mentioned intentions it is difficult to say, but it*is clear that 
the jurists generally interpreted the law to apply only to those 
with fraudulent intentions. 
(117) D. 40.9.16.2, Paul 3 ad legem Aeliam Sentiam. 
(118) D. 40.9.16.3-5. 
(119) D. 40.9.11.1,3 institutionum. 
(120) D. 28.5.56(55). 
(121) Similarly, a debtor may free a slave given to him in order 
to be manumitted, D. 40.1.10,49.14.45.3. 
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(122) D. 40.9.1812r. 
(123) D. 40.9.7pr., 2 ad Urseium Ferocem. 
(124) D. 40.9.5,64 digestorum. 
(125) The text, as it stands, actually says that such freedom is 
safeguarded, but, in view of the rest of the text, a 'non' must 
have been omitted. 
(126) In another text (D. 40.4.57), Gaius suggests that Julian took 
a different view, but this seems to have been the most widely held 
view. 
(127) D. 40.7.1.1,5 ad Sabinum. 
(128) cf. D. 40.9.16.4 mentioned above. 
(129) D. 40.9.27.2r., Hermogenianus 1 iuris epitomarum. 
(130) D. 40.9.23,4 ex variis lectionibus. 
(131) D. 40.9.24,9 ad legem Iuliam et Papiam. 
(132) 1.14. 
(133) D. 28.5.43,64 digestorum. 
(134) 1.6.1. 
(135) D. 40.9.8,3 ciuaestionum. 
(136) 'cum' not in Codex Veronensis. 
(137) 1.47. 
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(138) D. 40.12.9.2,38.5.11. 
(139) D. 38.5.1.3, see Buckland, 92. cit. p. 560. 
(140) D. 38.5. 
(141) D. 38.5.11. 
(142) D. 40.12.9.2, ad edictum praetoris urbani titulo de liberali 
causa. 
(143) It is useful, in this connection, to examine the evidence 
for general fraus patrons, D. 38.5. 
(144) 'Ut' is preferable here to 'vel' 
necessitates replacing 'aunt' with 'sint' 
below. De Zulueta, The institutes of 
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CONCLUSION 
Having looked briefly at law-making under Augustus in general 
and at the most important and best documented Augustan statutes in 
detail, what conclusions can be drawn concerning the significance 
of the Augustan period in the history of Roman law and concerning 
the aims and achievements of Augustus as reflected in his law- 
making activities and in the nature of the enactments themselves? 
It is clear that Augustus initiated a vast legislative 
programme and the question therefore arises as to the extent of 
his personal responsibility for it. All of the Republican law- 
making channels continued to be employed under Augustus and, since 
this implies the involvement in law-making of the popular 
assemblies and the Senate as well as of various magistrates, it 
might be argued that much of the legislation of this period was 
initiated not by Augustus but by others, and therefore provides 
little help in determining his aims and policies. It was argued 
in chapter 1, however, that the way in which Augustus established 
a role for himself within all of the law-making channels, together 
with the nature of many of the enactments (especially of the most 
important ones), suggests very strongly that he was, indeed, 
responsible for these, however they were made law. Thus, for 
example, the two marriage laws are very clearly the work of one 
legislator in spite of the fact that the second one was proposed 
not by Augustus himself but by the consuls. There are, indeed, 
as has been shown, many links between the various Augustan 
enactments. Clearly it would not have been possible nor discreet 
for him to have undertaken such a programme of legislation without 
the co-operation of magistrates, senators, jurists and the like, 
but this by no means implies that he did not exercise overall 
control over law-making during this period. 
A number of different motives have been ascribed to Augustus 
in connection with the various enactments surveyed. Among these 
are the desire to enhance his image as a restorer of old ways and 
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of peace and prosperity, by encouraging procreation, especially 
within the all-important upper orders, by emphasizing the return 
to ancient moral standards and by stabilising the transmission of 
property. In addition, he revealed a desire to keep the citizen 
body free from -pollution", to enhance the distinctions between 
the orders and, naturally, to safeguard his own position. 
There are, however, other trends of greater significance 
observable in many of the enactments of Augustus. For example, 
it has been argued, in connection with the marriage and adultery 
statutes, that they intervened in a number of areas of life and 
law to an extent unknown in the Republican period when many of 
these areas were regulated at the discretion of private 
individuals and groups. The authority and independent activities 
of auch were now curtailed, and it is not difficult to see why 
this would have enhanced Augustus' own authority. The fact that 
he was responsible for a huge programme of legislation relating 
to auch a vast number of issues confirms that he wished to 
influence and gain some control over as many areas of law and life 
as possible. Since he created for himself a role within all of 
the traditional channels of law-making, he was able to exercise 
this control not only through statutes but also through edicts 
which were often addressed to the provinces or to the army and 
therefore provided a means of exercising influence in these areas, 
and through senatusconsulta which enabled him to influence areas 
within the Senate's sphere of competence. 
Another observable theme of considerable significance is the 
introduction of uniformity and improved organisation into many 
areas of the law. For example, it was shown in chapter 1 that the 
little we know about the important judiciary laws of Augustus 
suggests that they were designed to introduce better organisation 
and uniform rules to the civil and criminal courts. Similarly, 
the levee de vi seem to have been introduced in order to 
consolidate the Republican rulings concerning vie, to make them 
more comprehensive, and to introduce effective redress against 
this offence. it is well known that the rules governing many 
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areas of Roman law had developed in a typically ad hoc and 
piecemeal manner, (largely because the praetors and other 
magistrates involved in law-making were annually elected and 
therefore had a very limited period of office during which to 
oversee legislation), and that new rules and institutions were 
often introduced alongside the old without actually replacing 
them. Thus it was that the ius honorarium or magisterial law had 
developed alongside the ius civile, and thus it was that certain 
areas of the law needed to be systematised and consolidated. 
Much of Augustus' legislation, then, was innovative and far 
reaching because it encroached on areas regulated little or not at 
all by Republican statutes, because it covered such a vast range 
of issues and because it made sweeping reforms in certain confused 
areas of the law. It is interesting that many of his reforms and 
innovations were incorporated into statutes such as the marriage 
and adultery laws, which had ostensibly traditional themes. The 
adoption of Republican ideology, as has been argued, both suited 
Augustus' interests as he consolidated his position, and was 
designed to appeal. Indeed, other Augustan enactments such as the 
lex de ambitu, the lex de collegiis and the lex sumptuaria were 
traditional in content as well as in name. 
It was observed in chapter 1 that the privileged position held 
by Augustus within the various law-making channels laid the 
foundation for the later situation whereby the Emperor came to be 
regarded as the primary source of law. Similarly, Augustus' 
unprecedented position as princeps enabled him to undertake a 
comprehensive and ruthless law-making programme which no 
Republican magistrate would have had the authority, the 
opportunity nor, perhaps, the inclination and courage to 
undertake. For the first time, the changes effected in the law 
were, year after year, dictated largely by the aims and policies 
of one man. The effect of the transition from Republic to 
Principate on Roman law was thus profound. 
6 
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